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Recent studies document that covenant violations intensify the conflicts of interest 
between lenders and borrowers, and lead to greater restrictions on borrowing firms’ 
financing and investment activities (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b). 
Motivated by this literature, I investigate whether accounting conservatism, specifically 
conditional conservatism, mitigates the adverse consequences of debt covenant 
violations. I argue that conservative reporting can potentially ameliorate the conflicts of 
interest between lenders and borrowers. Therefore, I predict that accounting conservatism 
reduces the adverse impact of covenant violations on borrowers’ financing and investing 
activities and exhibits a positive association with operating and stock market performance 
after covenant violations. I obtain a sample of 312 violating and 5,327 non-violating firm-
quarters observations from U.S. non-financial public firms during the period of 1998 – 
2007 to test my hypotheses. Using three measures of conditional conservatism and a 
composite measure of the three individual measures, I find that the degree of increase in 
borrowing firms’ conservative reporting between loan initiation and covenant violation is 
associated with smaller reductions in firms’ financing and investing activities in the post-
violation period.  Furthermore, my analyses provide some evidence that firms that 
increase conservative reporting exhibit better stock market performance, implying that 
conservative reporting is beneficial for shareholders after covenant violations. I find no 
evidence that increased accounting conservatism affects operating performance after 
covenant violations. My results continue to hold after controlling for pre-contracting 
unconditional and conditional conservatism. Overall, my dissertation provides evidence 
that conservative accounting practices followed by borrowing firms ease the adverse 
consequences of debt covenant violations. My dissertation contributes to the emerging 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In this dissertation, I examine whether accounting conservatism alleviates the 
adverse consequences of debt covenant violations, such as restrictions on violating firms’ 
financing and investing activities by lenders. I also examine the implications of 
accounting conservatism for violating firms’ operating performance and stock market 
performance in the post-violation period.  
Accounting conservatism, defined as the tendency of firms to understate the value 
of firm assets (Givoly et al., 2007) in their financial statements has important 
implications for debt contracting. In particular, Watts (2003a, b) argues that lenders 
demand that borrowers use conservative accounting practices because the resultant 
downward bias in the reported value of net assets provides some assurance that the 
minimum amount of borrowers’ net assets is greater than the lenders’ claim on the 
borrowing firms. Consequently, conservative reporting reduces lenders’ downside risk.  
Consistent with this argument, recent studies provide empirical evidence that accounting 
conservatism is associated with a lower cost of debt (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 
2008).  
However, extant literature mainly focuses on the implications of accounting 
conservatism at the time of loan initiations. To the best of my knowledge, there has been 
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no empirical study examining how accounting conservatism affects the consequences of 
covenant violations when they do occur. My dissertation aims to fill this void by 
providing empirical evidence on the implications of conservatism for the consequences of 
debt covenant violations.  
Examining the implications of accounting conservatism for the consequences of 
debt covenant violations has important implications for the understanding of the role of 
accounting information in capital markets. First, lenders and borrowers re-contract after 
covenant violations, an important and frequent economic event in the financial 
contracting process. Roberts and Sufi (2009b) report that 25% of public firms disclosed 
covenant violations between 1996 and 2005. Second, while there is a current debate 
regarding the implications of accounting conservatism for the consequences of covenant 
violations (e.g., Gigler et al., 2009 vs. Kothari et al., 2010), there is a lack of empirical 
evidence on this issue. Furthermore, accounting ratios are often explicitly used in 
financial contracts, defining the decision rights between lenders and borrowers. However, 
the flexibility inherent in General Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) allows the 
borrowing firm to exercise reporting discretion (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Dichev and Skinner, 2002), which not only affects the timing of the transfer of these 
decision rights (e.g., Zhang, 2008), but also signals the borrowing firms’ intent to keep or 
terminate negative net present value projects (e.g., Francis and Martin, 2010). It is not 
clear from extant literature how managers’ reporting discretion after loan initiation affects 
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the outcomes of re-negotiation between the lender and borrower after debt covenants are 
violated.  
Recognizing that managers may deviate from pre-contracting levels of 
conservatism, I argue that the degree of increase in borrowing firms’ conservative 
reporting from the pre-contracting level signals borrowers’ intent to discontinue negative 
net present value projects rapidly, reducing lenders’ downside risk. As such, I expect to 
observe smaller reductions in these firms’ financing and investing activities after 
covenant violations, as compared to firms that do not increase conservative reporting to 
the same extent (or reduce reporting conservatism or keep it unchanged). To provide 
evidence on whether the increase in conservatism has value implications for violating 
firms after covenant violations, I further examine whether the increase in borrowers’ 
reporting conservatism from the pre-contracting levels are associated with better 
operating and stock market performance after the borrowers have violated debt 
covenants.   
To ensure the robustness of the results, I use a number of alternative measures of 
accounting conservatism in my empirical analysis. Specifically, I measure accounting 
conservatism as (i) accumulated negative non-operating accruals (NonAcc) (Givoly and 
Hayn, 2000), (ii) skewness of earnings (SK) (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Zhang, 2008), (iii) 
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C-Score metric (C-Score) (Khan and Watts, 2009), and (iv) a composite measure based 
on the above three individual measures (CCM).  
I construct a sample including 312 violating and 5,327 non-violating firm-quarter 
observations that have loan information available. I obtain this sample by merging (i) the 
covenant violation sample provided by Nini et al. (2009), (ii) the loan sample provided 
by Thomas Reuters Loan Price Corporation (LPC), and (iii) the Compustat firm-quarters 
observations with (iv) stock return data available on CRSP.  
I conduct a series of empirical analyses beginning with the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. I follow this up with a set of other tests including the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage selection model, the Propensity Score Matching model (PSM), and the 
Double Selection model in order to address the problems of selection bias that might arise 
from endogenous treatment variables (i.e., probability of violation and probability of 
change in conditional conservatism). After controlling for covariates and selection bias, I 
find that the implications of the change in conditional conservatism for the consequences 
of violation in financing and investing activities are significant as predicted. These results 
suggest that borrowing firms that increase reporting conservatism after obtaining their 
loans experience more favorable outcomes from re-negotiation after they violate debt 
covenants. I find mixed evidence of the effect of increased conservatism on firm 
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valuation after the violation of debt covenants. I find no evidence of accounting 
conservatism affecting operating performance after covenant violations.  
I also conduct several sensitivity tests. First, I analyze the covenant violating 
sample alone (excluding non-violators) and find that the results using the violating 
sample are consistent with the results in the main analysis that include both violators and 
non-violators in the sample. I also investigate whether the pre-contracting conditional 
conservatism has any implications for the consequences of violations in the violating 
sample.
1
 I find that the pre-contracting conditional conservatism has no impact on the 
consequences of covenant violations. Furthermore, I vary the measurement window for 
the calculation of the dependent variables and find no significant results using plus/minus 
two quarters (versus plus/minus four quarters for the main analysis) surrounding the 
covenant violation quarter. I also use assets as a deflator for changes in debt and changes 
in capital expenditures rather than market value of equity that I use for my main analyses. 
I find that the results are consistent with the main analyses for changes in debt issuance 
after covenant violations.  
My dissertation contributes to the literature on the role of accounting 
conservatism in debt contracting in the following ways. First, I provide evidence that 
                                                          
1
 In the main analysis with a pooled sample of violating and non-violating firm-quarters, the effect of pre-
contracting unconditional conservatism for the consequences of violations is modeled through the 
probability of violation model (Section 3.2.2) and the probability of change in conditional conservatism 
model (Section 3.2.5). 
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borrower conservatism eases the conflicts of interest between the lender and the borrower 
upon covenant violations, supporting the view that conservatism benefits the borrower 
after covenant violations. Second, my study contributes to the emerging literature on the 
effects of accounting quality on re-contracting outcomes after covenant violations. To the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study examining how accounting information 
impacts the consequences of covenant violations. My dissertation provides evidence that 
lenders value accounting conservatism at the re-contracting stage after covenant 
violations. 
My dissertation also contributes to the finance literature examining the 
consequences of covenant violations (e.g., Beneish and Press, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993; 
Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2009; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b). While these studies 
provide evidence that covenant violations lead to adverse outcomes for the borrower, I 
document that reporting conservatism mitigates such adverse consequences. 
The conclusions from this study are subject to several caveats. Some of the test 
results are weak, i.e., significant only at the 10% level. This might be due to the use of the 
change specification rather than the level specification for the dependent variables, such 
as the change in debt issuance and change in capital expenditures. In addition, although I 
use various models, e.g., Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model, Propensity Score 
matching model, and double selection model, to address the econometrics issues 
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associated with the two endogenous treatment variables (i.e., probability of violation and 
the probability of change in conservatism), the factors used in these models may have a 
low correlation with the underlying economic determinants of accounting covenant ratios 
due to the lack of theoretical guidance (Demiroglu and James, 2010). Future studies 
should systematically examine determinants of covenant ratios. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review 
the general background on debt covenants and accounting conservatism, based on which I 
develop my hypotheses. I discuss the sample and research design in chapter 3. In Chapter 
4, I provide the results of the validation tests of my conservatism measures and the 
descriptive statistics. In Chapter 5, I discuss the results of the empirical analyses. In 
Chapter 6, I discuss the results of the sensitivity tests. I conclude the dissertation in 




Chapter 2 Background, Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Background on Debt Covenants 
Debt covenants are restrictions imposed by lenders on borrowing firms during the life of 
loans. Finance theory suggests that the conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders 
create distortions in investment and financing decisions. For example, managers acting as agents 
for their principals, that is, the shareholders, may liquidate firm assets to pay dividends to 
shareholders (unauthorized distributions), undertake risky projects that are not anticipated by the 
lenders (asset substitution), or over invest in negative net present value projects (over-
investment) (Smith and Warner, 1979). These decisions would reduce the probability that the 
loan will be repaid and consequently result in wealth transfers from lenders to shareholders. To 
restrict managers’ risk-shifting behaviour discussed above, lenders require the borrowing firms 
to comply with debt covenants specified in lending agreements.   
Three types of debt covenants are observed in most lending agreements: affirmative 
covenants, negative covenants, and financial covenants. An affirmative covenant requires the 
borrower to undertake a certain course of action, for example, to buy liability insurance for its 
chief executive officer or to maintain December as the fiscal year end. A negative covenant 
prevents the borrower from taking certain actions. For example, a negative covenant may specify 
that the borrower cannot invest in certain projects or that the capital expenditures cannot exceed 
the amount specified by the lenders.  
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A financial covenant requires the borrower to maintain a certain level of financial 
performance relating to metrics such as interest coverage ratio, current ratio, leverage, and net 
worth. Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that financial covenants, employing a noisy but 
contractible signal (e.g., accounting ratios), are used in financial contracts to reflect the 
contingent nature of debt contracts that allows the lender to secure the decision right ex ante. 
Given that financial covenants are based on accounting information and accounting information 
has implications for the transfer of decision rights (to be discussed in Section 2.3), I focus on the 
circumstances (e.g., reporting practices) surrounding the violation of financial covenants rather 
than the violation of non-financial covenants. The next section reviews the current literature on 
the consequence of covenant violations.  
2.2 Literature Review on Consequences of Covenant Violations 
Recent finance studies suggest that covenant violation exacerbates the conflict of interest 
between lenders and borrowers, leading to significant reductions in firms’ investing and 
financing activities (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b).  As discussed in 
Section 2.1, use of financial covenants in debt contracts allows lenders to secure decision rights 
when the borrowing firms fail to meet financial covenant threshold. The transfer of decision 
rights accompanying the violations of covenants provides lenders an opportunity to extract rents 
from borrowers by demanding higher concession fees or interest rates (Beneish and Press, 1993; 
10 
 
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995).
2
  In addition to demanding extra compensation from 
violating firms, lenders can require borrowing firms to terminate a specific project or undertake 
less risky projects (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Nini et al. (2009) suggest that lenders may 
force the borrowing firms to sell illiquid assets (e.g., specialized machinery or equipment) for 
more liquid assets (e.g., more generalized machinery) to reduce potential risk associated with 
their lending. These responses to covenant violations reflect lenders’ incentives to protect their 
claim in the borrowing firms, incentives that might not necessarily be in the best interest of the 
borrowing firms. Building on this literature, Chava and Roberts (2008) and Roberts and Sufi 
(2009b) argue that covenant violations represent an important mechanism through which lenders 
can exercise their decision rights to protect their interests and influence the borrowing firm’s 
financing and investing policies. Specifically, lenders can directly affect the borrowing firms’ 
financing activities by demanding faster loan repayment, reducing the borrowing base, or 
increasing interest rates. Lenders can also restrict the borrowing firms’ investing activities by 
imposing additional capital expenditure covenants or requiring the borrower to terminate specific 
projects. Using covenant violation data, Chava and Roberts (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009b) 
show that after covenant violations, there is a significant reduction in the borrowing firms’ 
financing and investing activities.
3
   
                                                          
2
 In rare cases, lenders may waive the violations without imposing any additional restrictions or end the lending 
relationships with the borrowers (Beneish and Press, 1993). 
3
 Although covenant violation leads to unfavorable outcomes, Roberts and Sufi (2009b) have shown that borrowers 
rarely switch lenders after covenant violations. This suggests that borrowers are unlikely to obtain more favorable 
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The above discussion clearly suggests that covenant violations intensify the conflicts of 
interest between lenders and borrowers over investing and financing policies. However, the value 
implications of covenant violations are not clear. On one hand, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) 
and Gorton and Kahn (2000) suggest that lenders’ responses to covenant violations may interfere 
with the violating firms’ positive net present value projects, leading to a decrease in firm value. 
Consistent with this conjecture, Tan (2011) finds that violating firms experience worse operating 
performance after violation. On the other hand, Nini et al. (2009) argue that lenders’ intervention 
after covenant violations have value implication for violating firms as lenders can force the 
borrowing firms to eliminate negative net present value projects. They find that covenant 
violators experience improvements in operating performance as well as stock market 
performance in the periods after covenant violations.  
Although the above-mentioned studies in the finance literature examine the consequences of 
covenant violations, the implications of accounting conservatism for the consequences of 
covenant violations have not been examined. This issue is important because the speed with 
which debt covenants are likely to be violated depends on the extent to which borrowing firms’ 
use conservative reporting practices. I discuss such implications for the consequences of 
covenant violations in Section 2.3. 
2.3 Accounting Conservatism 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




Accounting conservatism is an important accounting practice that has influenced 
financial reporting for at least five hundred years (Basu, 1997). There have been many 
controversies surrounding the economic role of this practice since the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) issued an exposure draft in 2006 removing accounting conservatism 
from the conceptual framework. In 2010, the concept of conservatism was eliminated from the 
FASB’s and International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) joint conceptual framework 
(FASB, 2010).  
I start the discussion by defining accounting conservatism and introducing two types of 
accounting conservatism that have been studied in the extant literature, followed by a discussion 
of the implications of accounting conservatism on debt contracting.  
2.3.1 Definition of Accounting Conservatism 
Throughout the dissertation, I follow Givoly et al. (2007) and define accounting 
conservatism as “the systematic understatement of the book value of the entity’s assets”. 
According to this definition, conservative reporting causes the reported value of an entity to be 
lower than its economic value on average. The understatement comes from two types of 
accounting conservatism: conditional and unconditional conservatism, the topic to be discussed 
next. 
2.3.2 Unconditional Conservatism 
Unconditional conservatism represents the practice of understating the book value of net 
assets “due to predetermined aspects of the accounting process” (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). This 
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type of accounting conservatism reports the lower value of firm assets without taking into 
account the timing and the amount of the future benefits of these assets. For example, the 
requirement of expensing research and development (R&D) expenditures rather than capitalizing 
these expenditures represents an application of unconditional conservatism because the R&D 
expenditures are expensed without considering their future realization (e.g., unconditionally 
expensed). Another example of unconditional conservatism is the choice of double-declining 
depreciation method vs. straight-line depreciation method. The double-declining depreciation 
method produces a lower value on the balance sheet because it results in quicker depreciation of 
assets compared with the straight-line depreciation method. However, the choice of quicker 
depreciation is not conditional on the change in the economic value of the underlying assets. In 
summary, unconditional conservatism leads to reporting lower value of entity assets without 
taking into consideration the cash flow realization of future expected gains and losses.  
2.3.3 Conditional Conservatism 
Unlike unconditional conservatism that does not allow for the recognition of changes in 
the value of assets, conditional conservatism reflects changes in economic value of firm assets
4
 
by imposing higher verification requirements for the recognition of good news than the 
recognition of bad news, resulting in a differential speed of recognition of bad news versus good 
                                                          
4
 Accounting for change in economic value can be symmetrical if gains and losses are recognized at the same speed. 
Under the current U.S. GAAP and Canadian GAAP before the Canadian adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS), gain recognition is limited to reporting the increases in values of marketable securities 
held for trading and foreign currency gains. 
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news (Basu, 1997) in earnings. To assess the conservative nature of earnings, Basu (1997) 
derives a measure of asymmetric timeliness by comparing the association between earnings and 
bad news (as measured by negative stock returns) relative to that between earnings and good 
news (as measured by positive stock returns). He shows that the former association is stronger. 
The asymmetric timeliness is manifested through writing downs the value of assets but not 
writing up the value of assets. For example, a write-down takes place in inventory due to losses, 
damages, obsolescence, decline in market price, or other decreases in expected future cash flows 
arising from disposition of the inventory; a write-down is also required through an impairment 
charge on assets when the firm loses its competitiveness and customer base. In contrast, writing 
up of assets is prohibited when the economic value of firm assets exceeds the reported value. The 
asymmetric recognition of losses and gains leads to systematic understatement of the value of 
firm assets.
5
 In the next section, I discuss the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting. 
2.4 Role of Accounting Conservatism in Debt Contracting 
The role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting is contentious. Arguments have 
been made supporting both the beneficial role and as well as the detrimental effect of accounting 
conservatism in debt contracting, which I elaborate next.   
2.4.1 Potentially Beneficial Role of Accounting Conservatism in Debt Contracting 
                                                          
5
 Since the adoption of IFRS in Canada on January 1, 2011, public firms in Canada have the option of revaluating 
long-lived assets in subsequent periods. For example, a public firm can choose to recognize the increased value of 
property, plant, and equipment and must do this periodically once they undertake this option (IAS 16). 
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Watts (2003a,b) argues that accounting conservatism plays an important role in debt 
contracting arising from lenders’ asymmetric payoff function. Given a fixed amount of claim on 
firm assets, lenders do not share the benefits of an appreciation in firm value, but they bear the 
downside risk. As a result, lenders demand timely recognition of bad news into earnings. 
Conservative reporting satisfies this demand by requiring timely downward revision of book 
value of assets, leading to quicker covenant violations, and allowing lenders to gain decision 
rights promptly (Watts, 2003a,b; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Zhang, 2008). For example, 
quicker recognition of capital assets impairment in earnings would reduce earnings and probably 
increase debt to equity ratio above the level of maximum allowable debt to equity ratio specified 
in debt contracts. On the other hand, conservative borrowers are also rewarded by being offered 
lower costs of borrowing ex ante because conservative reporting triggers quicker covenant 
violations (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Zhang, 2008). Following this reasoning, conservatism is 
regarded as a beneficial mechanism in debt contracting.  
Recent studies generally find evidence consistent with the argument that accounting 
conservatism can be beneficial in debt contracting. Ahmed et al. (2002) show that conservative 
firms obtain better debt ratings from lenders; Zhang (2008) demonstrates that conservative 
borrowers are rewarded with lower costs of borrowing. Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) provides 
evidence that conservative firms have lower spreads for their loans that are traded on the 
secondary loan markets. Furthermore, researchers also find that conservatism is associated with 
lower cost of equity capital (Lara et al., 2009; Li, 2010). In addition to the direct evidence of the 
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contracting benefits of accounting conservatism, cited above, the literature also suggests that the 
prevalence of conservative reporting is attributable to demand from the lenders. In a cross-
country study, Ball et al. (2008) show that conservatism is related to the size of a country’s debt 
market rather than the size of its equity market, and the demand for conservative reporting is 
largely driven by debt financing activities. Chen et al. (2011) find that the demand for 
conservatism is stronger if lenders have stronger bargaining power over borrowers. Tan (2011) 
shows that after covenant violations, lenders demand greater accounting conservatism from 
violating firms because lenders are able to exercise stronger influence on violating firms’ 
reporting policies.  
Firms that report more conservatively send out a signal to their lenders that they are 
likely to discontinue unprofitable projects (negative net present value projects) earlier by 
recognizing losses from these projects into earnings in a timely manner. Francis and Martin 
(2010) show that more conservative firms are likely to divest unprofitable projects earlier than 
less conservative firms. Srivastava et al. (2009) find that conservative firms discontinue 
unprofitable projects in a timelier manner than less conservative firms. Ahmed and Duellman 
(2011) show that conservative firms have better operating performance and higher gross margins 
as compared to less conservative firms.  
But other authors have highlighted some adverse effects of accounting conservatism that 
I discuss next. 
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2.4.2 Potential Detrimental Effect of Conservative Reporting 
Despite evidence that conservatism is associated with lower cost of debt and equity 
capital and that lenders have a strong demand for conservative reporting, some scholars still cast 
doubt on the beneficial role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting. Gigler et al. (2009) 
posit that conservative reports may send out a false signal about future firm performance, leading 
to inefficient liquidation of positive net present value projects. Although Gigler et al. (2009) 
discuss the detrimental effect of accounting conservatism in a debt contracting framework, their 
formalization of the problem is based on the assumption that there is no moral hazard problem in 
contracting and that managers do not have the intent to alter the information signal conveyed by 
financial statements. This formalization is in line with the existing value relevance literature in 
which decision usefulness is defined as the provision of information for “direct valuation” of a 
firm (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Kothari et al., 2010). Based on the “direct valuation” 
objective from the equity holder’s perspective, accounting standard setters and some scholars 
(e.g., Schipper, 2005) argue that accounting conservatism, not being neutral, may reduce the 
usefulness of accounting information for investment decisions.
6
 However, using the “direct 
valuation” objective to evaluate the usefulness the accounting information in debt contracting 
may not be appropriate because the agency problem is an important issue in debt contracting in 
                                                          
6
 In terms of specific implications of accounting conservatism for value relevance, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) 
show that accounting conservatism increases the value relevance of earnings, but decreases the reliability of 
earnings, suggesting that there is a trade-off between these two important characteristics of earnings. 
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which debt-holders’ interests are not perfectly aligned with those of shareholders (see discussion 
in Section 2.1).  
In summary, while Watts (2003a, b) and other studies suggest that conservatism benefits 
contracting parties, Gigler et al. (2009) and accounting standard setters dismiss the benefits of 
accounting conservatism by arguing that conservatism alters the information content of financial 
reports, reducing the usefulness of accounting information. These two perspectives differ in a 
sense that while Watts (2003a, b) and others emphasize the agency costs reduction role of 
conservatism in contracting, Gigler et al. (2009) and accounting standard setters focus on the 
information role of accounting conservatism in decision making. As suggested in Gao (2011), 
since accounting information is not the only source of information for creditors’ decision 
making, the contracting benefits of accounting conservatism outweighs the costs of providing 
non-neutral information. In this thesis, I rely on the implications of accounting conservatism for 
contracting and examine the role of accounting conservatism in reducing agency costs in the 
event of covenant violations. But before I do that, I explore the differential roles of conditional 
and unconditional conservatism in debt contracting.  
2.4.3 Implications of Conditional versus Unconditional Conservatism for Debt Contracting 
As discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, although unconditional conservatism leads to 
the reporting of the lower bound of asset value, it does not take into account any adverse changes 
in economic conditions facing firms. In contrast, conditional conservatism has an informational 
role because it asymmetrically reflects the change in firm value in earnings (e.g., for “adverse 
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circumstances” only). This asymmetric recognition of change in firm value in earnings could 
trigger covenant violations (Zhang, 2008; Ball et al., 2008; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
However, unconditional conservatism can potentially affect the application of conditional 
conservatism because a high level of unconditional conservatism reduces the incidence of 
conditional conservatism since reported asset values are already understated. This restricts the 
incidence of reporting future bad news through asset write-downs. However, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) suggest that lenders probably can unravel and adjust for the bias created by 
pre-contracting unconditional conservatism in specifying the level of covenant slack, defined as 
the difference between the accounting ratios used in debt contracts and the actual accounting 
ratios. Thus, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Ball et al. (2008) argue that unconditional 
conservatism does not generate contracting benefits under most circumstances; rather, it may 
create noise in gauging the implications of conditional conservatism because to the extent to 
which past unconditional conservatism differs among firms, the recognized amounts of bad news 
in subsequent periods are different.   
In summary, because unconditional conservatism does not reflect contemporaneous 
changes in firm value into earnings, its implications for debt contracting are limited. In contrast, 
conditional conservatism that allows timely recognition of bad news into earnings is relevant for 
lenders who are concerned with the downside risk of lending. Accordingly, I focus on the effects 
of conditional conservatism on the consequences of debt covenant violations. However, in order 
to control for the implications of unconditional conservatism for the subsequent applications of 
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conditional conservatism, I include a measure of unconditional conservatism when I model 
factors affecting change in conditional conservatism in Section 3.2.5. In the rest of this 
dissertation, I refer to “conditional conservatism” as “conservatism” or “accounting 
conservatism” except when I specifically discuss the implications of “unconditional 
conservatism”. 
2.4.4 Managers’ Reporting Discretion after Loan Initiation 
As discussed in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, extant studies focus on the implications of 
conservatism for debt contracting at the time of loan initiation (e.g., Beatty et al., 2008; 
Nikolaev, 2010; Sunder et al., 2009). Unlike these studies, I examine the implications of 
conservatism for re-contracting after loan initiation at the time of covenant violation. Re-
contracting is a setting different from initial contracting in the following aspects. When the debt 
contract is initiated, the terms of the loan contract reflect the information available at that time 
(e.g., Beatty et al., 2008; Sunder et al., 2008). However, terms of the re-contract (arising from 
violations of the covenants settled at loan initiation), are expected to reflect the new information 
that might become available during the period between loan initiation and covenant violation.  
Particularly, extant literature provides evidence suggesting that firms’ reporting practices do 
change after initial contracting. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest managers 
have strong incentives to engage in earnings management to avoid covenant violations after loan 
initiation. Dichev and Skinner (2002) show that there are an abnormal number of firms that just 
have their financial ratios above the covenant threshold, suggesting that firms use reporting 
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discretion to delay covenant violations. Beatty et al. (2008) document that firms increase 
conservative reporting after loan initiation. Furthermore, Kim (2008) finds that there is an 
increase in conservative reporting after loan initiation and the increase is particularly larger for 
firms with greater covenant slack. Despite the foregoing evidence about the importance of new 
information between loan initiation and covenant violation, the implications of the changes in 
accounting conservatism during the interim period have not yet been explicitly examined in the 
literature. Indeed, recognizing the distinction between loan contracting and loan re-contracting, 
Roberts and Sufi (2009a) use the change, as opposed to the level of firm performance when they 
study the determinants of re-contracting. To reflect the dynamic nature of re-contracting, I 
develop my hypotheses regarding the implications of change in firms’ conditional conservatism 
after loan initiation and before violation for the consequences of covenant violations in the next 
section. 
 2.5 Hypotheses Development 
As discussed in Section 2.2, covenant violations result in financial frictions manifested 
through significant reductions in firms’ borrowing and investing activities (Chava and Roberts, 
2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b). I argue that the increase in conservative reporting after loan 
initiation mitigates this conflict of interest. This happens because an increase in conservative 
reporting by borrowers after loan initiation allows for a quicker transfer of decision rights to 
lenders than initially anticipated. Consequently, lenders obtain the rights to examine the status of 
the borrowers’ assets earlier, reducing lenders’ uncertainty and downside risk. Furthermore, the 
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increase in accounting conservatism also signals borrowing firms’ willingness to abandon 
negative net present value projects quickly (Srivastava et al. 2009; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011), 
suggesting that conservative borrowers may carry fewer negative net present value projects, 
thereby reducing lenders’ concerns over the downside risk. Since conservative borrowers are 
associated with lower downside risk and carry fewer negative net present value projects than less 
conservative borrowers, lenders are likely to allow these borrowers to continue to borrow. On the 
other hand, less conservative firms have higher downside risk (e.g. bankruptcy risk) and tend to 
carry a greater number of negative net present value projects. Consequently, lenders are likely to 
reduce the capital they supply to these borrowers.
7
 Therefore, I posit the following prediction (in 
the alternative form): 
H1: Ceteris paribus, covenant violations are likely to cause a smaller reduction on firms’ 
ability to borrow when firms exhibit a larger increase in accounting conservatism as 
compared with firms that exhibit a smaller increase or a decrease in conservatism after 
loan initiation. 
Similarly, since more conservative borrowing firms are associated with lower downside 
risk and are likely to have fewer negative net present value projects than those with less 
                                                          
7
 Although I argue that firms that increase conservative reporting receive better outcomes after covenant violations, 
it does not necessarily mean that all firms would report conservatively to achieve these benefits. This is because the 
interests of shareholders and managers may not be perfectly aligned. Consequently, managers may not act in the best 
interests of the shareholders and report conservatively. In the case of covenant violations, some managers may 
increase conservative reporting to signal their intent to discontinue negative present value projects, and some 
managers may want to delay covenant violations because they could keep control of the firms and enjoy the private 
benefits from controlling the firms for a longer period of time (Jensen, 1986). 
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conservative reporting policies, lenders are likely to impose fewer restrictions on more 
conservative firms’ investment activities after covenant violations. These arguments lead to the 
following prediction: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, covenant violations are likely to cause a smaller reduction on firms’ 
ability to invest when firms exhibit a larger increase in conservatism as compared with 
firms that exhibit a smaller increase or a decrease in conservatism after loan initiation. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, covenant violations result in the transfer of decision rights 
from borrowers to lenders that allows lenders to impose restrictions on firms’ investing and 
financing activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that additional restrictions can either 
benefit shareholders if these restrictions lead to termination of negative NPV projects or they 
might hurt shareholders if these restrictions lead to termination of risky but positive NPV 
projects. Nini et al. (2009) argue that lenders’ interventions are beneficial to the violating firms 
because lenders have the power to force the violating firms to eliminate negative present 
projects. They show that following covenant violations, violating firms have better operating and 
stock market performance.  
 As an extension of Nini et al. (2009), I investigate whether conservative reporting has 
value implications for the consequences of covenant violation. I argue that the increase in 
conservatism would help lenders secure the decision rights earlier so that lenders are less 
concerned with the downside risk of the firms. As a result, conservative borrowers are allowed to 
carry on most positive net present value projects. On the other hand, for less conservative 
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borrowers, lenders are concerned with the downside risk. To protect themselves, they may prefer 
to secure their outstanding loans with more liquid assets. Consequently, lenders would require 
less conservative borrowers to hold off investing in illiquid assets and retain as much as liquid 
assets (e.g., cash) as possible. This might cause the elimination of or disruption with risky 
positive net present value projects and lead to worse operating performance. Based on the 
foregoing discussion, I posit my prediction as the following:   
H3: Ceteris paribus, covenant violations are associated with a greater improvement in 
operating performance when firms exhibit a larger increase in conservatism as compared 
with firms that exhibit a smaller increase or a decrease in conservatism after loan 
initiation.  
The stock market implications of conservatism for the post-violation period rest on 
whether market participants can recognize the implications of conservative reporting for 
operating performance. Because normally there is a substantial delay between the occurrence of 
an actual violation/negotiation and the public disclosure of the events,
8
 I argue that market may 
gradually incorporate the information regarding the implications of conservative reporting for 
operating performance into stock prices. This leads to a positive association between the increase 
in conservative reporting and post-violation stock market performance. Therefore, I form the 
following prediction: 
                                                          
8
 The public disclosure of violation and the corresponding negotiation is normally through 10Q or 10K fillings for 
public firms. The delay between the occurrence of the event and the subsequent disclosure can be quite substantial, 
say, up to 90 days for a 10-K filing and 45 days for a 10-Q filing (Griffin et al., 2011). 
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H4: Ceteris paribus, covenant violations are associated with better stock market 
performance when firms exhibit a larger increase in conservatism compared with firms 
that exhibit a smaller increase or a decrease in conservatism after loan initiation. 
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Chapter 3 Research Design 
In this chapter, I first discuss the three conservatism measures for conditional 
conservatism, the C-Score, the non-operating accrual measure, and the skewness of earnings 
measure, followed by a measure for unconditional conservatism. Then I present the empirical 
models for testing hypotheses. 
3.1 Measures of Conservatism 
In this section, I first describe the measure of conditional conservatism and then discuss 
the measure of unconditional conservatism. 
3.1.1 Measures of Conditional Conservatism 
3.1.1.1 C-Score Measure 
The first measure for conditional conservatism is the C-Score, a Basu (1997) type 
measure developed by Khan and Watts (2009). Basu (1997) shows that earnings have a stronger 
association with bad news (negative stock returns) than its association with good news (positive 
stock returns), a property referred to as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. This property of 
earnings has been used as a measure of conditional conservatism because a stronger association 
between earnings and bad news implies that bad news is recognized more quickly than good 
news. This measure of conditional conservatism has been applied in cross-country and cross-firm 
studies (e.g., Beatty et al., 2008; Francis and Martin, 2010; Nikolaev, 2010). But, obtaining a 
firm-year Basu (1997) measure not only requires time-series data, but also requires firms to 
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experience both positive and negative shocks. Khan and Watts (2009) develop a firm-year 
conservatism measure. Specifically, they first include firm size, leverage, and market-to-book 
ratio in the Basu (1997) regression and estimate the coefficients on the interaction terms between 
the negative stock returns dummy and firm size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio. Then they 
multiply the estimated coefficients on size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage with size, market 
to book ratio, and leverage. Finally, they sum the products of the multiplications to obtain the C-
Score measure for each firm-year. The specific procedure to estimate the C-Score for my thesis 
is outlined in Appendix A. This measure has been adopted in recent studies by Chen et al. (2011) 
and Tan (2011). I calculate C-Score for each firm in both the pre-contracting and post-
contracting period for n quarters, and take the average of the C-Score as the following: 
   [           (    )]  (∑  
   
           )    , where n is the number of quarters between loan 
initiations and covenant violation and  n ≥ 4.
9
 The change in conservatism is calculated as 
follows:                (            )     (           ). See Figure 1 for the 
illustration of the calculation of the changes in C-Score and the other two conditional 
conservatism measures. 
3.1.1.2 Non-Operating Accrual Measure 
To ensure the robustness of the results, I also use two more commonly used accounting-
based conservatism measures, namely, the accumulated negative non-operating accruals 
                                                          
9
 For non-violators, any fiscal quarter after loan initiation and before maturity is designated as a “violation quarter” 
and conservatism is calculated for these quarters accordingly. 
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(NonAcc) and the skewness of earnings relative to the skewness of cash flows (SK). Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) argue that in a steady state, accruals are expected to converge to the level of cash 
flows, and therefore the negative divergence of accruals from cash flows over time reflects the 
application of the accounting conservatism known as the quick recognition of the impairment on 
assets, bad debt expenses, and restructuring charges. I calculate the moving average of non-
operating accruals over n quarters before the quarter of loan initiation as the pre-contracting 
NonAccPre, and the moving average of accruals over the same n quarters after loan initiation as 
the post-contracting NonAccPost, where n is a number of quarters between loan initiation and 
covenant violation and n ≥ 4. Note that non-operating accruals are the difference between total 
accruals (total accruals = operating income before depreciation – cash flows from operation 
activities) and operating accruals (operating accruals = changes in accounts receivables + change 
in inventories + change in prepaid expenses – change in accounts payable – change in income tax 
payable). I multiply this measure by negative one such that a larger value of this measure 
represents more conservative reporting. Therefore, the measure of change in conservatism is 
calculated as ChgNonAcc = NonAccPost – NonAccPre.  
3.1.1.3 Skewness of Earnings Measure 
  I follow Zhang (2008) and Beatty et al. (2008) to calculate the SK measure as the 
difference between the skewness of earnings and the skewness of cash flows over n quarters 
between pre-contracting and post-contracting periods, where n is defined similarly as in the 
calculation of change in NonAcc. As documented in Zhang (2008), when a lower verification 
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requirement is imposed for the recognition of bad news, earnings capture a greater amount of bad 
news and therefore earnings series become negatively skewed. However, because firm 
performance also may affect earnings skewness irrespective of conservative accounting choices, 
I subtract skewness of cash flows from skewness of earnings to control for the variations in firm 
performance. As in the calculation of NonAcc, I multiply this measure by negative one to allow 
larger value of skewness to indicate more conservative reporting. Therefore, the measure of 
change in conservatism is calculated as ChgSK=SKPost – SKPre. 
3.1.1.4 Composite Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
I also use a composite measure of conditional conservatism. I first standardize each 






 , where Con is one of the three 
conservatism measures and Min (Con) and Max (Con) are the minimum and maximum value of 
each conservatism measure in the sample, respectively. I then obtain the composite measure by 
summing the standardized values of the three conservatism measures.  
3.1.2 Measure of Unconditional Conservatism 
I use the unconditional conservatism measure (Res_Pre) developed by Penman and 
Zhang (2002) in my empirical tests. This measure captures the effect of unconditional 
conservatism by reflecting the level of accounting reserves arising from the adoption of 
predetermined accounting policies: Res_Pre= (Inventory reserve + R&D Reserve +ADV 
Reserve)/Total Assets. Inventory reserve is the LIFO reserve reported by companies. R&D 
reserve represents the amortized R&D assets that should appear on the balance sheet if the 
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company does not expense R&D expenditure in the year of the spending and capitalizes and 
amortize it instead. Specifically, I follow Penman and Zhang (2002) and compute R&D Reserve 
as the sum of the un-depreciated R&D expenditures, namely, R&D Reserve = ∑            
   
   
(  ∑   
 
   ) where n is the estimated useful life of R&D expenditure,    is the industry 
amortization rate used in Lev and Sougiannis (1996), and R&D is the annual R&D expenditures. 
ADV Reserve is the advertising expense capitalized and amortized over two years. Bublitz and 
Ettredge (1989) show that advertising expenses have a two-year useful life, and therefore the 
ADV Reserve is calculated as AdvResv=0.5*AdvExpt where AdvExpt is the reported advertising 
expense. 
3.2 Empirical Model 
Examination of the implications of a change in conservatism for the consequences of 
covenant violations is challenging because changes in conservatism and covenant violations are 
correlated. First, the probability of violation is an endogenous event affected both by 
conservatism (Zhang, 2008) and by the initial contracting terms at the time of loan initiation 
(Demiroglu and James, 2010). Second, the change in conservatism is also an endogenous 
variable affected by managerial incentives and reporting practices demonstrated in past periods 
(e.g., pre-contracting conditional and unconditional conservatism). Particularly, if managers have 
adopted a very conservative reporting policy (both conditional and unconditional) in the past 
(which lowers the value of the reported assets), prior to loan initiation, they are less likely to 
apply conservative accounting policies (e.g., conditional conservatism) after loan initiation. 
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Furthermore, the probability of violation also has implications for conservative reporting because 
firms with tighter covenants (i.e., firms that are more likely to violate covenants) are less likely 
to increase conservative reporting after loan initiation (Kim, 2008). Consequently, change in 
conservatism in these firms is expected to be smaller in these situations. This discussion suggests 
that managers would self-select into groups that exhibit different amounts of change in reporting 
conservatism and/or the probability of covenant violations. The resulting non-random 
assignment of firms into different groups would lead to biased parameter estimates (see 
Appendix C for a discussion regarding how self-selection leads to biased estimates) if the self-
selection bias were not addressed. 
To address the issues discussed above, I use a number of methodologies
10
.  I first follow 
Demiroglu and James (2010) and use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to test the 
different hypotheses, that is, without considering the endogenenity issues (Section 3.2.1). 
Second, I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage sample selection model (Section 3.2.3) as well as 
the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) model (Section 3.2.4) to account for the selection bias 
                                                          
10 Prior studies have shown that conservatism is related to the number of covenants in debt contracts (Nikolaev, 
2010) and the cost of debt (Zhang, 2008) at loan initiation. This implies that the initial contracting terms (use of 
covenants and cost of debt) are endogenously determined by the level of pre-contracting conservatism. However, 
because the number of covenants and cost of debt are not the variables of interest in this dissertation, the potential 
effects of any estimation bias arising from the endogenous nature of these variables are not explored. 
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arising from endogenous covenant violations.
 11
 In the third and the final set of analyses, in order 
to address the concern that the probability of violation will affect managers’ incentives to adopt a 
conservative reporting policy, I use the Double Selection model to sequentially model the 
probability of covenant violation and the probability of change in conservatism (Amemiya, 
1985) (Section 3.2.5).  
3.2.1 OLS Regression Method 
3.2.1.1 Testing of H1 
In testing the implication of accounting conservatism for firms’ debt financing ability after 
covenant violations, I follow previous empirical capital structure studies on the determinants of 
firms’ debt issuance (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995; Roberts and Sufi, 2009b) and use variables 




                                                          
11
 Chava and Roberts (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009b) use Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to address 
the endogeneity issue of covenant violations. This approach requires the precise measure of the covenant threshold 
and they focus on two types of covenants that can be precisely measured (current ratio covenant and net worth 
covenant). For my violation sample, only 79 firm-quarter violations have either current ratio or net worth as 
financial covenants. The small sample size would significantly affect the power of the tests. Therefore, I rely on an 
alternative approach to address the endogeneity issue. Another advantage of using the selection model and the 
propensity score matching approach is that I can incorporate conservatism as a factor predicting the probability of 
covenant violation.  
12
 I do not include pre-contracting unconditional conservatism in this specification in equations (1) – (4) because 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that unconditional conservatism is not relevant in debt contracting. Alternatively, 
I explicitly address the implication of pre-contracting unconditional conservatism for change in conditional 
conservatism in the model estimating the probability of change in conservatism (Section 3.2.5).  
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                                                                       (1) 
Chg_Debt is the change in debt issuance during four quarters after covenant violations 
minus debt issued during four quarters before the quarter of covenant violations.
13
 Vio is an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 for covenant violation firm-quarters, and 0 for non-violation firm-
quarters. According to Roberts and Sufi (2009b), the coefficient on Vio is predicted to be 
negative because covenant violations exacerbate the conflicts of interest between lenders and 
borrowers. Chg_Conit-1 measures changes in the different conservatism measures from pre- to 
post- loan initiation (i.e., the three conservatism measures and the composite measure as well). 
Lee (2010) argues that conservatism might constrain firms’ ability to borrow because quicker 
covenant violations due to conservative reporting reduce borrowers’ incentives to borrow.
14
 Lee 
(2010) finds that conservatism is negatively associated with firms’ debt issuance behavior, which 
suggests a negative coefficient on Chg_Conit-1. H1 predicts that an increase in conservatism 
mitigates the negative consequences of covenant violation on debt issuance, suggesting that, a3, 
the coefficient on the interaction term between covenant violation and change in conservatism, is 
                                                          
13
 For the non-violating firm-quarters, the dependent variables and independent variables are measured for each 
quarter because each firm-quarter is designated as an event quarter (also see footnote 7). 
14
 It might be noted that my study is different from Lee (2010) in the sense that I examine the implications of 
conservatism for firms that have borrowed and violated covenants. 
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predicted to be positive. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by total market value of 
equity and is estimated as the average value of this variable over four quarters prior to the 
covenant violation quarter. Leary and Roberts (2005) show that managers have a tendency to re-
balance leverage ratios. Specifically, when firms have a high level of leverage, managers tend to 
reduce the level of outstanding debt, leading to a smaller leverage ratio; when firms have a low 
leverage ratio, managers tend to issue more debt to increase leverage ratios. Thus, I include 
Leverage as a control variable and the predicted sign on Leverage is negative. EBITDA is a 
proxy of cash flow generated from operating activities, measured as earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization. I compute the average value of this variable over four quarters 
before the quarter of covenant violation. The implication of cash flows for firms’ debt issuing 
activities is not clear because managers with sufficient funds can either use funds generated 
within the organization to finance new projects, or subject themselves to debt-holders’ 
monitoring and prefer to borrow (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Size is the natural 
logarithm of market value of equity, measured as the average value of size over four quarters 
before the quarter of covenant violations. The effect of Size on borrowing is ambiguous. Larger 
firms tend to operate in different segments and are less likely to fail, and hence Size may be 
inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy and should have a positive impact on firms’ 
ability to issue debt. However, Size also may be a proxy for information asymmetry, increasing 
shareholders’ preference for cheaper equity financing. I include pre-violation stock returns as a 
measure of firms’ pre-violation stock market performance (Cret), calculated as the total raw 
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returns over four quarters before the quarter of covenant violation. Firms that exhibit better stock 
market performance are able to obtain new loans more easily; therefore, the predicted sign on 
Cret is positive. P_lending is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the borrower has borrowed from 
the same lender before, and 0 otherwise. P_lending is used to control for information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers. If the borrower has borrowed from the same lender before, 
information asymmetry is smaller, suggesting a positive coefficient on this variable. 
In this model and other models in this chapter, I include year fixed effects (Year Indicators) 
and industry fixed effect (Industry Indicators) to account for the year and industry effect for the 
dependent variables. In addition, I also include several loan-specific variables including pricing, 
loan maturity, number of covenants, etc. (described in Appendix A), to account for the 
implications of loan structure for the consequences of covenant violations. 
3.2.1.2 Testing of H2 
To examine the effect of conservatism on investment activities after covenant violations, 
I estimate the following linear regression model:
 
                                                                             
                                                                       
                                                                                       (2)
 
Chg_Cap_X is the change in capital expenditures during four quarters after covenant violations 
minus capital expenditures incurred during the four quarters before covenant violations, deflated 
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by the beginning balance of property, plant and equipment (PPE). H2 predicts that covenant 
violations have smaller impact on firms’ investing behavior when firms increase conservative 
reporting to a greater extent, suggesting a positive coefficient on the interaction term between 
Vio and Chg_Con, that is, a3>0. According to Chava and Roberts (2008), the coefficient on Vio 
is expected to be negative as covenant violations intensify the conflicts of interest between the 
lenders and borrowers arising from their differential preference for investment projects. The 
change in a firm’s investment activities can be affected by factors other than covenant violations 
and accounting conservatism. Economic theories suggest that firms’ investment is increasing in 
investment opportunities and decreasing in financial constraints (Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003). I 
follow this literature and use market-to-book ratio (MB) as a measure of a firm’s investment 
opportunity set. MB is measured as the average value of this variable over four quarters before 
the quarter of covenant violation and is predicted to have a positive impact on the changes in 
capital expenditures. EBITDA is expected to have a positive association with the changes in 
capital expenditures because firms with a higher level of cash flows are likely to invest more. 
The coefficient on Leverage is expected to be negative because highly leveraged firms may have 
difficulty in obtainig funds to finance investments (Lang et al., 1996) and are likely to invest 
less. Given that pre-violation performance may affect firms’ investment activities positively, the 
coefficient on Cret is predicted to be positive. I also include an indicator variable for the 
availability of credit ratings (Rating_D) because Chava and Roberts (2008) find that the 
availability of rating is associated with smaller reductions in investments. This positive 
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association between the availability of credit ratings and change in capital expenditures is 
attributable to the fact that borrowers with credit ratings tend to experience smaller information 
asymmetry between themselves and their lenders.   
3.2.1.3 Testing of H3 
To examine the implications of change in conservatism for the operating performance 
after covenant violations, I estimate the following linear regression model: 
                                                                       
                                                                  (3) 
I use changes in gross margin (Chg_GM) to measure improvements in operating 
performance.
15
 Gross Margin (GM) is measured as the difference between revenues and costs of 
goods sold as a percentage of revenue from the previous quarter. Vio is similarly defined as in 
equation (1). According to Nini et al. (2009), the coefficient on Vio is predicted to be positive 
because lenders have a corporate governance role that helps borrowers to improve operating 
performance (Nini, et al., 2009). H3 predicts that the improvement in operating performance is 
more significant in firms that increase conservative reporting, suggesting a positive coefficient 
on a3. Size is predicted to have a negative association with the changes in gross margin since 
larger organizations are less flexible and they may need more time to improve their performance. 
                                                          
15
 I do not use change in ROA as a measure of operating performance because ROA can potentially be affected by 
the application of conservatism. That is, lower past earnings due to conservative reporting is associated with higher 
earnings in next period. 
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I also include MB and Cret as control variables because these two variables represent the growth 
options and the expected future cash flows, respectively. I expect a positive association between 
Chg_GM and each of these two variables. 
3.2.1.4 Testing of H4 
To test the relationship between change in conservatism and the value implications of 
covenant violations on the firms, I estimate the following linear regression:  
         ( )                                                        
                                                       
                                                                                           (4) 
           
   
where Post_Ret4 (8) is the raw stock returns over four (eight) quarters after violations. I 
use raw stock returns over four (and eight quarters) to capture the value implications of 
conservatism for the consequences of covenant violations. This measure is commonly used in 
studying the effect of corporate governance on firm value (e.g., Akhigbe and Martin, 2006). In 
addition to the measure of conservatism and its interaction with Vio, I include MB, Size, and 
Leverage as control variables. These variables are similarly defined as in equations (1), (2), and 
(3). A positive coefficient on Vio*Chg_Con it-1 provides support for H4.  
 
3.2.2 Probability of Covenant Violation Model
 
In this section, I discuss the probability of violation model which I use to obtain the inverse 
Mills’ ratio for the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model and the propensity score for the 
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Propensity Score Matching model.  Please see Appendix C for the discussion of the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage selection model and the Propensity Score Matching model. 
 I draw factors from the previous literature to model the probability of covenant violation. 
Specifically, I use the following Probit regression model to predict the probability of violation:   
    (     )    (                                                            
  
                                                                    
                                                               
 
                                 )
                                                   
(5) 
Vio is an indicator variable, set to 1 when the firm-quarter is in covenant violation and 0 
otherwise. Subscript it-n indicates that the variable is measured at the quarter of loan initiation 
and it-1 indicates that the variable is measured at the quarter of covenant violation. The 
definition and measurement of other variables are given in Appendix A. 
The probability of violation is positively associated with the tightness of the covenant slack 
such that all else being equal, the tighter the initial covenants, the more likely the covenants are 
to be violated. I include firm characteristics (e.g., MB and Size) and loan characteristics (e.g. 
Loan Sizes, Spread, Tenor, NumCov, Per_P, P_lending, and NoLenders) in the model to 
indirectly control for initial covenant tightness. In an ideal situation, I would directly compare 
financial ratios and covenant thresholds. However, a debt contract may use a definition of 
financial ratios different from what is used in financial statements (Leftwich, 1983; Beatty et al., 
2008; Li, 2010). For example, a debt contract may include off-balance lease in measuring of the 
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level of debt. Consequently, directly measuring covenant tightness may introduce measurement 
errors. I adopt an indirect approach to control for initial covenant tightness by including firm and 
loan characteristics that are discussed in details below.
16
  
I include costs of borrowing (Spread), loan maturity (Tenor), performance pricing (Per_P),
17
 
number of lenders (NoLenders), loan amount (Loan Size), number of covenants (NumCov), and 
the presence of prior lending relationship (P_lending) as predictors of the probability of violation 
in the Probit regression model.
18
 Firms that pay higher interest rates might have greater agency 
costs and information asymmetry, and the covenants for these firms are expected to be tighter. 
Consequently, I predict the probability of violation to be higher for firms with higher borrowing 
costs. The effect of loan maturity is ambiguous. Longer loan maturity is associated with greater 
agency costs that may cause lenders to impose tighter covenants, thereby predicting a positive 
relationship between the probability of violation and loan maturity. However, for loans with 
longer maturity, lenders may prefer borrowers to experience less frequent violations to reduce 
renegotiation costs during the life of the loan, which implies a negative relation between the 
                                                          
16
 Zhang (2008) has used this indirect approach.  
17
 Performance pricing is a contracting term that ties the costs of borrowing to the accounting performance of the 
borrowing firms. See the definition of performance pricing in Appendix A 
18
 The debt contracting literature documents that contracting terms are affected by firm characteristics at loan 
initiation (e.g., Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Bharath et al., 2008), suggesting that the inclusion of both loan 
characteristics and firm characteristics may not be necessary. Despite this, I include both to increase the confidence 
of the model in capturing the effect of covenant tightness. 
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probability of covenant violation and loan maturity. Larger loans are associated with greater 
agency costs and lenders are more likely to impose tighter covenants (Demiroglu and James, 
2010), thereby increasing the probability of violation. Demiroglu and James (2010) document 
that loans with performance pricing, a contracting term tying the costs of debt to firm 
performance, are more likely to have tighter covenants. Therefore, I predict that performance 
pricing (Per_P), is positively associated with the probability of violation. I predict that when 
firms borrow from a large number of lenders, they are less likely to violate covenants because an 
increase in the number of lenders is associated with smaller agency costs (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996), therefore leading to less restrictive covenants. I predict a positive relationship 
between the number of covenants and the probability of violation because a larger number of 
covenants are associated with greater agency costs and tighter covenants. 
I include firm size (logarithm of market value of equity, MV) and growth opportunity 
(market-to-book ratio, MB) at loan initiation as predictors of probability of violations. Demiroglu 
and James (2010) argue that growth opportunity is negatively associated with covenant tightness 
because firms with greater growth opportunity are likely to require greater financing flexibility, 
leading to greater covenant slack. Consistent with their arguments, they find that growth 
opportunity is negatively associated with initial covenant tightness.
19
 Larger firms tend to have 
                                                          
19
 Demiroglu and James’ (2010) sample contains only firms with covenants relating to current ratio and debt to 
EBITDA ratio. As discussed, the measurement of current ratio is relatively standardized, but the measurement of 
Debt to EBITDA ratio requires information about how debt is defined. Demiroglu and James (2010) obtain the 
definition of debt in each contract from Tearsheets provided by DealScan. I do not have access to Tearsheets for my 
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smaller bankruptcy risk and therefore lenders may allow greater covenant slack for larger firms. I 
predict that all else being equal, the probability of covenant violation is negatively associated 
with firm size and growth opportunity. 
I use stock market performance over four quarters before violation (Cret), change in return 
on assets (Chg_ROA), and change in cash flows (Chg_EBITDA) to capture the change in firms’ 
economic performance and change in leverage (Chg_Leverage) to reflect the change in the 
riskiness of firms. I predict that the probability of violation is negatively associated with Cret, 
Chg_ROA, and Chg_EBITDA because an increase in these variables is associated with an 
increase in the difference between the actual financial ratios and the covenant thresholds (e.g.,  
cash flows ratio); on the other hand, the probability of violation is positively associated with 
Chg_Leverage because an increase in the leverage ratio is associated with a decrease in the 
difference between the actual leverage ratio and the covenant threshold. 
The last set of independent variables represents reporting conservatism. I include pre-
contracting conditional conservatism, pre-contracting unconditional conservatism, and changes 
in conditional conservatism between loan initiation and covenant violation. I include pre-
contracting conditional conservatism in predicting the probability of violation because Zhang 
(2008) finds some evidence that pre-contracting conservatism is associated with higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sample. In addition, restricting firms with covenants relating only to current ratio or net worth significantly reduces 
the sample size, a major concern for my study because the sample has already been reduced significantly after I 
require both the loan data and time-series accounting data to be available. 
43 
 
probability of violation. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that unconditional conservatism is 
not relevant in the contracting process because it does not reflect the contemporaneous changes 
in firm performance by definition. However, unconditional conservatism may affect the 
application of conditional conservatism as high unconditional conservatism reduces the 
probability of applying conditional conservatism in the subsequent periods. I include a measure 
of unconditional conservatism (Res_Pre) in the model. If initial covenant slack reflects the level 
of conditional and unconditional conservatism at loan initiation, all else being equal, any 
increase in conditional conservatism from their pre-contracting period levels, would increase the 
probability of covenant violation, suggesting a positive association between changes in 
conditional conservatism and the probability of covenant violation.  
3.2.3 Heckman Selection Model 
Using equation (5), I obtain the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) for each violating and non-
violating observation and then include the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) in the OLS models 
[equation (1) - (4)] presented in section 3.2.1 with the same predictions. To ensure that the 
exclusion restrictions
20
 are satisfied, in the first-stage regression [equation (5)], I include 
Res_Pre in the first stage regression and do not include it in the second-stage [equation (1) - (4)]. 
This is because I expect that the implications of  unconditional conservatism (Res_pre) at loan 
initiation is likely to be reflected in the initial contracting terms, but unconditional conservatism 
is not likely to affect the consequences of covenant violations. In the second-stage regression 
                                                          
20
 The restriction exclusion is satisfied when an independent variable is included in the first stage choice model and 
the same variable is excluded from the second stage outcome model.   
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[equation (1) – (4)], I include additional variables that are not modelled in the first stage (i.e., MB 
it-1). I argue that MB it-1 is not correlated with the probability of violation because the market-to-
book ratio at the time of covenant violation is not likely to be related to initial covenant tightness 
specified at the time of loan initiation.  
3.2.4 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) model 
To implement the propensity score matching approach (PSM) approach, I first use equation 
(5) to obtain the propensity score for each violating and non-violating firm-quarter observations.  
Then I match each violating firm-quarter observation with a non-violating firm-quarter 
observation requiring the difference between their propensity scores to be less than 1 %. I keep 
the violating firm-quarter observations and the matched non-violating firm-quarter observations 
and estimate the same models [equation (1) - (4)] presented in Section 3.2.1. The prediction is 
the same as that in Section 3.2.1. Note that one advantage of propensity score is that it does not 
have the exclusion restrictions requirement (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004).  
3.2.5 Double Selection Model 
As discussed at the beginning of Section 3.2, the foregoing analysis is complicated by the 
fact that change in conditional conservatism could be an endogenous choice variable that is 
correlated with the probability of covenant violation. Following the economics literature, I use 
the double selection model to address the problems associated with the two endogenous 
treatment variables in which the selection equation is used twice for the two endogenous 
treatment variables (Amemiya, 1985). I discuss the implementation of this model next. 
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In the first selection model, I use equation (5) to estimate the inverse Mills’ ratio as I have 
explained in the Section 3.2.3. I then include this inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) in the second 
selection model with changes in conservatism on the left hand and other variables affecting the 
probability of changes in conservatism on the right hand side as follows: 
    (     )    (                                                           
                                                                    
                                            )                           (6) 
where Chg is a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 if the change in conservatism is greater than the 
median value of the change in conservatism of the sample (treatment firms: firms with larger 
increase in conservatism) and 0 otherwise (control firms: firms with smaller increase in 
conservatism). To facilitate the use of the Probit model, I transform the continuous variable of 
change in conservatism into a dichotomous variable for which I may lose variations from this 
variable, leading to weaker results by using this approach. 
I discuss the rationales of including each right hand side variable in this section with the 
detailed definition and measurement of each variable included in Appendix A. Con_Pre is the 
pre-contracting conditional conservatism; Res_Pre is a measure of pre-contracting unconditional 
conservatism. I include pre-contracting conditional conservatism because there is a mechanical 
relationship between pre-contracting conditional conservatism and change in conditional 
conservatism between loan initiation dates and covenant violation dates. This mechanical 
relationship arises because change in conservatism is obtained by subtracting the pre-contracting 
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conditional conservatism from post-contracting conditional conservatism. I also include a 
measure of pre-contracting unconditional conservatism because unconditional conservatism has 
a negative relationship with subsequent conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). 
Although Kim (2008) argues that the deterioration in credit rating means higher costs of 
borrowing, causing the firms to decrease conservative reporting,  Kim’s empirical evidence 
actually supports the opposite. Because Kim (2008) is the only study examining change in 
conservatism in contracting setting, I include Chg_Rating in my model but do not make any 
prediction for this variable. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2011) show that conservatism is positively 
associated with the size of institutional ownership because higher percentage of institutional 
ownership provides stronger monitoring on firms’ reporting. I include institutional ownership 
variables (Insti1, Insti2, and Insti3) in the model and expect that firms with a greater number of 
institutional shareholders (insti1), block holders (inti2), institutional activists (inst3) are less able 
to deviate from their pre-contracting period conservatism levels. I also include firm 
characteristics at loan initiation such as MB, Size, and Leverage. Firms with higher MB are 
generally more conservative in the past and will likely recognize fewer losses in the subsequent 
periods. Thus, they will be less conservative in the subsequent periods, leading to a negative 
relationship between the level of past MB and future change in conservatism. The implications of 
Size for change in conservatism are ambiguous. On one hand, larger firms are likely facing 
greater political scrutiny and are likely to be more conservative; however, larger firms have 
greater ability to hide their losses (Khan and Watts, 2010). Therefore, the sign on Size is unclear. 
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The effect of Leverage is also ambiguous. Firms with higher leverage are likely to face a tight 
covenant threshold, and these firms are likely to be less conservative. However, firms with 
higher leverage may face lenders’ pressure to report more conservatively (e.g., Watts, 2003; 
Beatty et al, 2008). I include an indicator variable P_lending indicating whether borrowers have 
borrowed from the same lenders in previous loan contracts. The prior lending relationship can 
have both positive and negative impacts on the borrower’s reporting decision. First, with 
repeated lending relationships, lenders are likely to rely more on soft non-financial information 
(Ball et al., 2008), reducing the demand for reporting conservatism. On the other hand, Chen et 
al. (2011) use P_lending as a construct for lenders’ bargaining power and find that firms are 
more likely to report conservatively if they have borrowed from the same lender before. 
Conservatism is positively associated with litigation risk (Qiang, 2007). I include Litigation in 
the model and expect that change in conservatism is positively associated with litigation risk. I 
do not include any variable measuring initial covenant slack in the model as the effect of 
covenant slack is expected to be captured by IMR1 through the model predicting the probability 
of violation [equation (5)]. 
Using the second selection model [equation (6)], I obtain a second inverse Mills’ ratio 
(IMR2) and include IMR2 in the regression models [equations (1) - (4)] presented in section 
3.2.1. I expect the sign on the coefficients to be the same as those predicted in Section 3.2.1.  
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The exclusion restriction is achieved by including several factors such as change in credit 
rating (Chg_rating) and Litigation in the second selection model [equation (6)], but not the final 
outcome equations [equations (1) - (4)]; I also include variables such as Rating_D, Secured and 




Chapter 4 Sample Selection, Validation Tests of Conservatism Measures, 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
In this chapter, I first discuss the sample selection procedure in Section 4.1. In order to 
evaluate whether the three conditional conservatism measures (e.g., C-Score, NonAcc and SK) 
reflect the notion of asymmetric timeliness (Basu, 1997),
21
 I provide a discussion of the 
validation tests and the results thereof in Section 4.2.  I discuss the descriptive statistics in 
Section 4.3. Finally, I provide a graphical illustration of the change in investment, financing, and 
operating performance around the quarter of violations for the violating sample in Section 4.4 
and Figures 3 - 5.  
4.1 Sample Selection 
Table 1 describes the sample selection process. I construct my sample by merging the 
Dealscan loan data from Thomas Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), the covenant 
violation data provided by Nini et al. (2009), and two additional databases containing accounting 
information as well as market-based information, namely, Compustat and CRSP, respectively. 
4.1.1 Loan Sample 
I obtain my loan data from Dealscan. This database contains comprehensive loan 
information on global loan markets. Carey and Hrycray (1999) show that the Dealscan database 
consists of between 50% and 75% of all commercial loans in the United States during the early 
1990s. Since 1995, the loan coverage in Dealscan has increased significantly. According to LPC, 
their LPC staff obtain approximately 60% of the loan data in the database from Securities and 
                                                          
21
 As discussed in Section 3.1.1.1, the calculation of the firm-level Basu (1997) measure requires the availability of 
time-series data as well as positive and negative stock returns that may not be available for some sample firms. 
Therefore, I use the C-Score to measure firm-level conditional conservatism. 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and registration 
statements) and the rest of the data by contacting borrowers and lenders directly.  
The basic unit of observation in Dealscan is a loan, also referred to as a facility or tranche. 
For most loans, LPC provides information about the loan amount, the inception of the loans 
(deal active date), the projected maturity (maturity date), specific information about covenants, 
collateralization requirement, and the costs of the loan measured by the number of basis points 
above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) (hereafter spread). The loans are normally 
packaged together into deals or packages with different loan purposes, loan amounts, costs of 
borrowing, and loan maturity.  
The loan sample consists of 30,530 U.S. dollar-denominated private loans made by banks 
(e.g., commercial and investment) and non-bank (e.g., insurance companies and pension funds) 
lenders to U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2006. The sample period begins in 1996 because the 
covenant violation data is available from 1996 (see the discussion about the violation sample in 
the next section). I use the Compustat-Dealscan Link provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to 
merge the Dealscan loans with the Compustat identifier GVKEY. This merger results in 20,049 
loans for 4,829 borrowers. I require that the borrowing firms are non-financial firms with non-
missing loan information on spreads, loan sizes, covenants, and loan maturity. This procedure 
leaves me with a sample of 10,353 facilities under 6,414 deals for 3,262 borrowers. As discussed 
above, a deal may contain several facilities. To avoid overweighting of a particular loan in each 
quarter, I follow Sunder et al. (2009) and Nikolaev (2010) and keep the loan with the largest 
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amount in each quarter in my sample.
22
  Employing the above procedures, I obtain 6,351 
facilities for the final loan sample (Loan Sample). 
4.1.2 Violation Sample 
I use the covenant violation sample provided by Nini et al. (2009, hereafter NSS) via the 
link: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm. Using a text-searching algorithm, NSS 
identify 16,554 covenant violations (3,869 firms) from 1996 to 2007. NSS acknowledge that this 
sample contains repeat violations and this may occur for two reasons. First, both 10Ks and 10Qs 
fillings may disclose the same violation occurring in the same fiscal year. Second, violating firms 
have to report the same violations in subsequent quarters if the covenant violations are not 
waived immediately. Following NSS, I define a violation as a new violation if the firm has not 
reported any violation during the past eight quarters. Because the loan sample period starts in 
1996 and it is not clear whether violations occurring in 1996 and 1997 are new violations or not, 
I exclude the first two years (1996 and 1997) from the sample. Imposing these filtering rules, I 
obtain 4,045 firm-quarter new violations for 3,387 firms for the Violation Sample. Note that while 
the loan sample starts in 1996 (Section 4.1.1), the violation sample starts in 1998.  
4.1.3 Violation Sample with Loan Information 
To obtain the violation sample with related loan information, I merge the Loan Sample 
described in Section 4.1.1 with the Violation Sample described in Section 4.1.2 by requiring the 
violation date to lie between the deal active date and maturity date. After merging these two 
samples, there are 1,180 firm-quarter violations for 1,098 firms in the sample. Next, I require the 
availability of financial data to calculate changes in conservatism and other financial variables. I 
manually examine the 10K and 10Q disclosure of the matched violation sample to ensure that the 
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 In the construction of the violation sample, I keep all loans in each quarter to facilitate the comparison of the loan 
information provided by 10K and 10Q disclosures and the Dealscan loan information. 
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violating loans are correctly linked to loan information. Specifically, I compare lenders, loan 
amount, loan initiation date, maturity date, or a combination, disclosed in 10K or 10Q fillings 
with the Dealscan loan information to establish the correct link (see Appendix D for an example 
of10K disclosure of loan information and violation). Finally, I obtain 312 firm-quarter violations 
for 303 firms. 
4.1.4 Non-Violation Sample with Loan Information 
In order to examine how conservatism mitigates the consequences of covenant violations, I 
also select a non-violating sample with related loan data. I first eliminate the violation firms 
(3,387 firms) from the Loan Sample and then match the remaining sample with the Compustat 
firm-quarters between 1998 and 2007 by requiring the fiscal quarter ending date (Compustat: 
datadate) between the loan initiation date (or January 1, 1998, whichever is later), and the 
maturity date (or December 31, 2007 whichever is earlier).
23
  By doing so, I obtain 29,580 firm-
quarters for 1,396 firms. I then require these firm-quarters to have variables needed to estimate 
accounting conservatism and other financial measures. I obtain a final non-violating sample of 
5,327 firm-quarters for 535 firms. See Figure 2 for the illustration of the sample selection 
procedure for the non-violation sample. 
4.2 Validation of Conditional Conservatism Measures 
 
In Table 2, I summarize the results of the validation tests examining the effectiveness of the 
three conservatism measures in my sample firms (consisting of 5,639 firm-quarters of 
observations with 312 violating quarters and 5,327 non-violating firm-quarters) to distinguish the 
different degrees of conservatism measured by Basu’s (1997) regressions. Because each 
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 These requirements restrict the non-violating observations “violating” or event quarter to the period between 
January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2007, consistent with the sample period for the violation sample obtained by 
NSS. 
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violating and non-violating firm-quarter is associated with a pre-contracting and a post-
contracting conservatism measure, I group the 5,639 pre-contracting firm-quarter observations 
with the 5,639 post-contracting firm-quarter observations together. I then partition these 
observations into three rank ordered equal-sized groups based on each individual conservatism 
measure and estimate the following Basu (1997) regression for each group:  
                                                                                                      (7) 
where Et is earnings per share; Pt-1 is the fiscal quarter-end stock price per share; Rt is quarterly 
returns. DRt is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if Rt is negative and 0 otherwise. γ3 is the Basu 
(1997) measure of the conditional conservatism. I expect that γ3 is significantly larger for the high 
NonAcc, C-Score and SK groups compared to the lowest rank-ordered group.  
The results from the three panels in Table 2 confirm this prediction. Specifically, Panel A 
shows that for the NonAcc measure, γ3 in the low group is 0.016 and not significant, but γ3 is 
0.148 and significant in the high group. The difference between the high and low groups is 0.132 
and this difference is significant (t=5.20) at 1%. The differences for the high-low C-Score and 
SK group are 0.064 (t=5.35) and 0.133 (t=5.13), respectively and both are significant at the 1% 
level. In summary, the validation test results provide evidence that my three conservatism 
measures capture the essence of the asymmetric timeliness that reflects the conditional 
conservatism suggested by the Basu (1997) regression [equation (7)]. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
4.3.1 Loan Sample 
 
In this section, I first provide the descriptive statistics for the Loan Sample in Table 3 Panel 
A. On average, the sample firms borrowed 297 million U.S. dollars in 1996 – 2006 in each deal, 
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a finding similar to that reported by Bradley and Roberts (2004) for a different period (1993 - 
2001). This loan sample is also very similar to Bradley and Roberts (2004) sample in terms of 
the maturity (42 months vs. 44 months, respectively) and pricing (194 basis points vs. 192 basis 
points, respectively). However, a greater percentage of my sample firms contain performance 
pricing (Per_P) (65.50% in my sample vs. 43.95% in the Bradley and Roberts [2004] sample), 
which may reflect the increased use of performance pricing in private lending in recent years 
(Asquith et al., 2005). 
4.3.2 Violating and Non-Violating Loan Sample before Imposing the Financial Data 
Requirement 
 
As indicated in the sample selection procedure (Section 4.1.3), requiring the availability of 
financial variables reduces the sample size for both the violating and non-violating samples. To 
gain insight on whether the sample after imposing data requirements (Table 6 Panel A, hereafter 
referred to as the “after” sample) is different from the sample before imposing the financial data 
requirements (Table 3 Panel B, hereafter referred to as the “before” sample), I first present the 
descriptive statistics for the “before” sample in this section; I then compare the “before” sample 
(Table 3 Panel B) with the “after” sample (Table 6 Panel A) in Section 4.3.4. The comparison 
between the “before” sample and “after” sample would provide insight into whether the results 
from the “after” sample are generalizable to other samples. 
The comparison between violating and non-violating firm-quarters for the “before” sample 
(Table 3 Panel B) suggests that violating and non-violating firm-loans are significantly different 
in many dimensions. For example, on average, non-violating loans tend to be larger loans (mean 
difference = 227.760 million dollars, p value of the difference = 0.000). Maturity is longer for 
the violating firms (mean difference = - 2.861months, p value of the difference = 0.000) and the 
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violators are likely to borrow from a smaller number of lenders than the non-violators (mean 
difference in the number of lenders = 3.764, p value of the difference = 0.000). The most striking 
difference is that violators have much higher costs of borrowing (mean difference = -65.542 
basis points, p value of the difference = 0.000), suggesting that lenders are likely to use the 
pricing terms (e.g., spread) and impose tighter financial covenants at the same time to control 
borrowers’ potential risk. Another important difference is that violating firms on average have 
8% more financial covenants than the non-violators (2.253 vs. 2.161; p value of the difference = 
0.000), also suggesting that lenders are likely to use different contracting terms to control the 
underlying risk at the time of loan initiation.  
4.3.3 Yearly and Industry Distribution of the Sample 
 
Table 4 shows the yearly distribution of violating firm-quarters for which I have information 
to calculate the test variables between 1998 and 2007. The frequency of violation peaked in 1998 
(10.39%) and was followed by another increase in 2001 (7.56%), consistent with the occurrence 
of an economic downturn in 2001. After 2001, the percentage of violating firm-quarter 
observations trended downward from 4.74 % to 0.85% in 2007, the last year of my sample 
period. Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the yearly distribution of my sample 
reflects the economic trend in recent years and the sample is representative of the population in 
terms of the ability to capture the trend in the economic cycle.   
Table 5 contains the industry distribution of violating firms. The industry classification is 
based on the two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Firms in 
the Manufacturing industry experience the most frequent violations (48.18%) and firms in the 
Educational Service industry have the smallest percentage of violations (0.33%). 
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4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Final Sample at Loan Initiation 
 
In Table 3 Panel B, I compared the difference between the violating and non-violating firm-
quarters for the “before” sample. In Table 6, I provide the descriptive statistics for the “after” 
sample. I first compare the “after” sample (Table 6 Panel A) with the “before” sample (Table 3 
Panel B). The comparison suggests that, consistent with the statistics presented in Table 3 Panel 
B for the “before” sample, the violating and non-violating firms are significantly different in 
Loan Size, maturity (Tenor), Spread, number of covenants (NumCov), and the presence of 
performance pricing (Per_P). Specifically, non-violating firms tend to borrow more (mean 
difference in loan size =202.298 million dollars; p value of the difference =0.000). The 
difference in maturity between the violating and non-violating firm-loans is marginally 
significant with the non-violators borrowing at longer terms (mean difference = 1.943 months; p 
value of the difference = 0.081). Consistent with the comparison presented in Table 3 Panel B, 
covenant violators for the “after” sample also have significantly higher costs of borrowing than 
the non-violators (mean difference = - 74.805 basis point; p value of the difference = 0.000). The 
violators tend to have a greater number of financial covenants (mean difference = - 0.177; p 
value of the difference =0.002) and are less likely to have the performance pricing clause in their 
contracts as compared with the non-violators. Also consistent with the comparison presented in 
Table 3 Panel B, covenant violators tend to borrow from fewer lenders than non-violators do 
(mean difference = 4.448; p value of the difference = 0.000). The above mentioned differences 
in loan features suggest that violators are risky borrowers to begin with, at the time of initiation 
of the loan, and lenders impose more stringent contracting terms to control for risk. In addition, 
the evidence that the violators have higher costs of borrowing and greater number of covenants 
also suggest that lenders seem to use pricing and non-pricing contract terms along with tighter 
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covenants to control for lending risk. These different contracting terms (e.g., spread and number 
of covenants) are used such that they serve as complements rather than substitutes to each other.   
The preceding discussion suggests that the difference in the contracting terms between the 
violating and non-violating firms are similar for the “before” and “after” sample. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the violators in Table 3 Panel B with the violators in Table 6 Panel A shows that 
the loan size (median: 70 million vs. 68 million) and the spread (225 basis points vs. 212.5 basis 
points) are comparable in the two samples. This comparison provides evidence that the final loan 
sample with all required financial data available is not significantly different from the sample 
before such requirements are imposed, reducing concerns of the generalizability of the 
hypotheses test results. 
In terms of the firm characteristics at loan initiation, Table 6 Panel A shows that the 
violators tend to be smaller firms with fewer institutional shareholders. Particularly, the natural 
logarithm of market value of violating firms is significantly smaller than that of the non-violating 
firms (mean difference = 1.176, p value of the difference = 0.000). The non-violators on average 
have 55 institutional shareholders (insti1) compared with 30 for the violators. Although the 
number of institutional owners with holding > 5% (insti2) is not significantly different between 
the violators and non-violators, the number of institutional owners with activists (insti3) is 
significantly fewer for the violators than for the non-violators (mean difference = 1.269; p value 
of the difference =0.000).  
The comparison of other firm characteristics shows that the violators have higher Leverage 
and lower MB and EBITDA, consistent with earlier evidence that violators tend to be riskier 
borrowers at the time of loan initiation. 
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 Table 6 Panel A also presents the comparison of the conditional conservatism at loan 
initiation. The statistics suggest that violators are more conservative than non-violators when 
using C-Score (mean difference = - 0.032; p value of the difference = 0.000) and SK (mean 
difference = - 0.343; p value of the difference = 0.001) as a measure of the conservatism. This 
difference suggests that more conservative firms at loan initiation are more likely to violate 
covenants sooner. However, the evidence presented earlier also suggests that these violating 
firms are risky firms (higher cost of debt and greater number of covenants) and probably have 
tighter initial covenants, which could lead to higher probability of covenant violations  
Table 6 Panel B presents the correlation among the contracting terms, pre-contracting 
conservatism, and firm characteristics at loan initiation. The contemporaneous association 
between the measures of unconditional conservatism (Res_Pre) and the conditional conservatism 
is positive and significant for the C-Score measure (ρ=0.089)
24
 at a significance level of 5% and 
this association for NonAcc and SK is positive but insignificant.
25
 C-Score exhibits a positive 
association with NonAcc (ρ =0.086), but a negative and insignificant association with SK, 
suggesting that SK and C-Score and NonAcc may capture different aspects of conservatism. The 
composite measure (CCM) is significantly associated with the three individual measures, 
providing evidence that the transformation of the three individual measures into one measure is 
successful.  The C-Score measure is positively associated with Spread at 5%, inconsistent with 
Zhang (2008) and Ahmed et al. (2002) who have shown that conservatism is associated with 
                                                          
24
 ρ is the coefficient of correlation. 
25
 Note that the prediction that high unconditional conservatism leads to lower future conditional conservatism 
suggests that there is a negative association between current unconditional conservatism and subsequent conditional 
conservatism. The positive relationship between C-Score and unconditional conservatism (Res_Pre) observed here 
is a contemporaneous one.  
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lower costs of borrowing. This might be because the size component used in the calculation of 
C-Score is negatively associated with the cost of debt and C-Score is also negatively associated 
with the size of the firm, leading to a positive association between C-Score and the costs of 
borrowing. The number of financial covenants (NumCov) is positively associated with NonAcc 
(ρ = 0.086) at a significance level of 5%, consistent with Nikolaev’s (2010) finding that more 
conservative firms are likely to have a greater number of covenants. This association between the 
number of covenants (NumCov) and the two other conservatism measures (C-Score and SK) is 
also positive, but not significant. However, the composite measure (CCM) exhibits a positive and 
significant association with NumCov.  
Table 6 Panel B shows that the association between firm characteristics and loan terms is 
consistent with the previous literature. For example, higher EBITDA and ROA are associated 
with lower costs of borrowing (ρSpread,EBITDA = - 0.260; ρ Spread, ROA= - 0.279) and  higher 
Leverage is associated with higher costs of borrowing (ρ = 0.312) (Dennis et al., 2000). 
 The correlation analysis in Table 6 Panel B also shows that there is a positive association 
between C-Score and the probability of having a secured debt (ρc-Score, secured = 0.156), an 
association that is different from that of Chen et al. (2011) who use bank lending data from 
China and find that the probability of having a secured debt is negatively associated with the C-
Score. The evidence that secured debt (Secured) is also more likely to be found in debt contracts 
with higher costs of borrowing and a greater number of covenants further confirms that lenders 
coordinate different loan contracting terms to control the underlying risk.  
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Final Sample at Covenant Violation 
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Table 7 compares the changes in conservatism and the consequences of covenant 
violations between the violating and non-violating firm-quarter observations. Using different 
conservatism measures, I show that violators increase conservatism from the time of loan 
initiation to the time covenant violations, much more than the non-violators , but the mean 
difference in change between the violators and non-violators is significant only for NonAcc 
(mean difference =- 0.003 , p = 0.047). In terms of the difference in the credit ratings, Panel A 
suggests that while the violators experience a decrease in credit quality (Chg_Rating = 0.200),
26
 
non-violators exhibit an improvement in the credit quality (Chg_Rating = - 0.092), and this 
difference is significant at the 1% level. Panel A also shows that both violators and non-violators 
have a decrease in EBITDA, but the decrease for violators is significantly higher than that for 
non-violators (mean difference = 0.008; p value of the difference = 0.000). Similarly, the stock 
market performance (Cret) between the violators and non-violators before violation is 
significantly different at 1%. Non-violators have cumulative raw returns of 0.162 over four 
quarters before the violation compared with -0.136 for the violators.   
The outcome variables for the violators versus the non-violators are also significantly 
different. Particularly, both violators and non-violators have a reduction in debt issuance, but the 
reduction for violators (Chg_Debt = - 0.012) is 3 times that of the non-violators (Chg_Debt = - 
0.004) with the difference in reduction being significant at the 1% level. The decrease in capital 
expenditures also exhibits a similar pattern: the decrease for the violators is 7 times that for the 
non-violators (-0.021 vs. -0.003). These results are consistent with Roberts and Sufi (2009b) and 
Chava and Roberts (2008). Panel A also shows that the violators experience a decrease in 
operating performance (Chg_GM = -0.015) compared with the non-violators that exhibit no 
                                                          
26
 Note that higher value of credit ratings indicates worse credit quality. 
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change (Chg_GM =0.000) and the difference in change is significant at the 1% level. These 
results are not consistent with Nini et al. (2009) who find that violators experience greater 
improvement in the operating performance. My results are consistent with a more recent study 
by Tan (2011) who find that violators have worse operating performance as compared with non-
violators. Furthermore, the four-quarter stock market returns (Post_Ret1) for violators are 0.033 
compared with 0.182 for the non-violators and the eight-quarter stock market returns (Post_Ret2) 
for the violators are 0.175 compared to 0.386 for the non-violators. The difference in Post_Ret1 
(2) between the violators and non-violators is significant at the 1% level. 
Table 8 provides a comparison of the firm characteristics and outcome variables between 
high and low conservative violating firms. I define high conservatism firms as firms with change 
in conservatism greater than the sample median and low conservatism firms as firms with change 
in conservatism smaller than the sample median. Panels A, B, C, and D show the comparison 
using NonAcc, SK, C-Score, and CCM as a measure of conservatism, respectively. As the 
patterns in the descriptive statistics are similar across all four panels, I only discuss the 
descriptive statistics using CCM as a measure of conservatism (Panel D). Panel D shows that the 
pre-contracting unconditional conservatism (Res_Pre) is higher for firms with smaller increase in 
conservatism. However, this difference is not significant. The increase in credit rating 
(Chg_rating) is higher for low conservatism firms, but there is no significant difference between 
the two groups. The other firm characteristics between the high and low conservatism firms are 
not significantly different, either. Although the outcomes of covenant violations are more 
favorable (e.g., smaller decrease in debt, capital expenditures, and gross margin and better eight-
quarter stock returns) for firms with greater increase in conservatism, these differences are not 
significant.  
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Table 9 presents the correlations between the change in conservatism and the outcome 
variables. The upper half of the table presents the correlation for the violating firm quarters and 
the lower half presents the correlation for the non-violating firm-quarter observations. For the 
violating firm-quarter observations, Chg_Debt is positively associated with NonAcc (ρ= 0.101), 
SK (ρ = 0.120), and the composite measure CCM (ρ = 0.135) significant at 10%, 5%, and 5%, 
respectively, implying that firms that increase conservative reporting after loan initiation are able 
to issue more debt than firms that decrease conservative reporting. In the non-violating firm-
quarters, the correlation between Chg_Debt and NonAcc and CCM is negative and insignificant. 
Chg_Debt is negatively correlated with C-Score in both the violating and non-violating firm-
quarter observations, but this negative correlation is only significant for the non-violating firm-
quarter observations. The univariate analysis provides some evidence that there is a positive 
association between change in conservatism and change in debt for the violating sample, but not 
for the non-violating sample. 
Table 9 also shows that for the violating sample, change in capital expenditures 
(Chg_Cap_X) is positively correlated with all conservatism measures, but only the correlation 
between C-Score and Chg_Cap_X (ρ = 0.151) is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that 
firms that increase conservative reporting are able to invest more compared to firms that do not 
increase conservative reporting or decrease conservative reporting.  For the non-violating 
sample, the correlation between Chg_Cap_X and conservatism is neither positive nor significant.  
For the violating sample, Chg_GM is negatively associated with all conservatism measures 
and none of them are significant. For the non-violating sample, the correlation between Chg_GM 
and conservatism measures is negative and significant for C-Score (ρ = -0.045) at 5% and 
positive for SK (ρ =0.048) and CCM (ρ = 0.034), also significant at the 5% level.  
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For the violating sample, Post_Ret1 is positively associated with SK, C-Score, and CCM, but 
none of them are significant at the 5% level. Post_Ret1 is negatively associated with NonAcc and 
this association is not significant, either. Post_Ret2 is positively associated with C-Score (ρ = 
0.132) at a significance level of 5%, but this positive and significant association is not observed 
in other conservatism measures. For the non-violating firm-quarter observations, the correlation 
between the other two conservatism measures and Post_Ret1 and Post_Ret2 is not significant. 
Overall, the univariate analysis suggests that there is some evidence that post-violation stock 
market performance is associated with the increase in conservatism for the violating sample, but 
not for the non-violating sample. 
4.4 Graphical Analysis  
 
I provide a graphic illustration of the violating firms’ debt issuance and investment behavior 
and the operating performance around the quarter of covenant violations in Figures 3 - 5. In these 
figures, I line up the firm-quarter observations at the quarter of violation and partition firm-
quarters into two groups: one group with change in the composite measure of conservatism 
(CCM) greater than the median of the sample and one group (chg =1) with change in CCM less 
than the median of the sample (chg = 0).  The X-axis represents the quarters relative to the 
quarter of covenant violations and the Y-axis represents the level of debt issuance, capital 
expenditure, and gross margin.  
Figure 3 shows that these violators have a significant drop in debt issuance after the 
covenant violation quarter. The debt issuance reaches a low level in the third quarter of violation 
and bounces back afterwards. The group with change in CCM greater than the median of the 
sample (chg=1) has a smaller drop within three quarters of violations compared to the group that 
has a change in CCM that is lower than the median of the sample (chg = 0). In the third quarter 
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after violation, the high change group has lower debt issuance, but in the fourth quarter, the high 
change group returns to a level of debt issuance higher than that of the low change group. 
Figure 4 illustrates the investment behavior for the violating firms around the quarter of 
violation. Both the high and low change groups experience decreases in their capital 
expenditures. However, it seems that the low group has a smaller reduction in capital 
expenditures because in the second quarter after violation, the low change group experiences a 
sudden increase in capital expenditures. Therefore, from the graphic illustration, it is not clear 
whether firms’ investment behavior is associated with the change in conservatism. 
Figure 5 shows the operating performance measured by gross margin around the covenant 
violating quarter. The gross margin decreases in the quarter of violation, but after that, we see an 
increase in gross margin, but the level of gross margin in the post-violation period does not 
exceed the level in the pre-violation periods. Similar to Figure 4, it is difficult to tell which group 
has a bigger change in gross margin. 
4.5 Summary of Chapter 4 
In this chapter, I first provide evidence that the three conservatism measures used in this 
thesis can distinguish the degree of asymmetric timeliness captured by the Basu (1997) measure. 
Then, I show that my final sample with financial data available is similar to the sample before I 
impose the financial data requirement. I also provide evidence that lenders are likely to use 
several contracting features at the same time to control for the underlying risks. The correlation 
analysis and the graphic illustrations suggest that there is mixed evidence between the change in 
conservatism and the outcomes of covenant violations. Note that all results reported in this 
chapter (including the correlation results and the graphical illustrations) do not control for other 
determinants of debt issuance, capital expenditures, operating and stock market performance and 
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cannot be used as results for hypotheses tests. In the next chapter, I discuss the results for my 
empirical tests with covariates. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analyses 
 
In this chapter, I first present the results of the empirical analysis using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression in Section 5.1. Next, I present the analysis of the determinants of 
the probability of covenant violation in Section 5.2. I discuss the results using the Heckman 
(1979) self-selection model and the Propensity Score Matching approach in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, 
respectively. In Section 5.5, I estimate the probability of change in conservatism model, and in 
Section 5.6, I discuss the results using the Double Selection model. All variables used in the 
empirical analysis are defined in Appendix A. 
5.1 Results Using OLS Model 
5.1.1 Testing of H1 
H1 states that, the negative impact of covenant violations on firms’ financing activities is 
smaller for firms that exhibit a larger increase in accounting conservatism compared with 
violating firms that exhibit a smaller increase in conservatism after loan initiation. In Table 10, I 
present the empirical results for H1 using three conservatism measures as well as the composite 
measure. The first column (Model 1) contains the results without the inclusion of any control 
variables; in Model 2, I include firm characteristics as control variables and in Model 3, I include 
both firm characteristics and loan variables as controls. I cluster standard errors by firms for all 
three models (Peterson, 2009). Model 2 and Model 3 also include year and industry fixed effects.   
Table 10 shows that using NonAcc, SK, C-Score, and CCM in Model 3 with all control 
variables included, the coefficients on Vio are - 5.647, - 5.278, - 5.003, and -30.277, respectively, 
all being significant at the 1% level.  These results are consistent with those documented by 
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Roberts and Sufi (2009b), suggesting that violating firms experience significant reductions in 
debt issuance.  
Overall, the results using alternative conservatism measures support H1. Specifically, the 
results in Model 1 show that, when other control variables are not included, the coefficients on 
the interaction term Vio*SK (Model 1: coefficient = 1.880; standard error = 1.340) and 
Vio*CCM (Model 1:  coefficient = 15.665; standard error = 9.974) are positive and significant 
at the 10% level. When all control variables are included, the coefficients on Vio*NonAcc 
(Model 3: coefficient = 137.567; standard error = 104.633), Vio*SK (Model3: coefficient = 
1.907; standard error = 1.334), and Vio*CCM (Model3: coefficient = 15.877; standard error = 
9.902) are all significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the prediction in H1, 
suggesting that increased conservatism mitigates the negative consequences of covenant 
violations on firms’ abilities to issue debt. Although the results are not strong, the interaction 
variables are all significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on Vio*C-Score is negative but 
insignificant (coefficient = -9.698; standard error = 16.121).   
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with the predictions. For 
example, although the coefficients on Leverage are insignificant in the models, their signs are 
consistent with predictions. The coefficients on NonAcc, C-Score, and CCM are negative, but 
only the coefficient on C-Score is significant (Model 3: coefficient= -12.445; standard error = 
7.678). To some extent, the negative coefficient on C-Score confirms Lee’s (2011) finding that 
more conservative firms are less likely to issue debt. The coefficient on Cret is positive and 
significant (coefficient = 1.536, 1.526, 1.444, 1.534; standard error = 0.433, 0.430, 0.442, 
0.430), consistent with the prediction that firms performing well in the stock market are likely to 
obtain greater amount of loans. I find that MB has a negative but insignificant coefficient in all 
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models. This insignificance may be due to the inclusion of Cret as being a measure of firm 
performance, a variable that has not been used in the previous literature. The coefficient on Size 
is positive and significant when the loan variables are not included (Model 2), suggesting that 
larger firms are more likely to issue new debt. However, this positive relationship disappears 
when the loan variables are included. The adjusted R
2 





reported in Roberts and Sufi (2009b) for a similar specification. The 
coefficients, adjusted R
2
, and the significance level on the main testing variables (Vio*Chg_Con) 
do not change significantly when the loan variables are included (Model 3). However, to ensure 
consistent analysis, I include loan variables in the subsequent analysis using the Heckman (1979) 
self-selection model in Section 5.3, the Propensity Score Matching model in Section 5.4, and the 
Double Selection model in Section 5.6. 
5.1.2 Testing of H2 
 
H2 states that covenant violations have smaller negative impact on firms’ investment 
activities if the violating firms exhibit increased accounting conservatism compared with firms 
that exhibit a smaller increase in conservatism after loan initiation. I report the results of testing 
H2 in Table 11. Consistent with Chava and Roberts (2009), the coefficient on Vio is negative and 
significant across all models, indicating that violating firms experience greater reductions in 
investment activities as compared to non-violating firms. The results for estimating Model 3 
(with the control variables included) show that while the coefficients on Vio*NonAcc (coefficient 
= 19.781, standard error = 21.006) and Vio*SK (coefficient = 0.151, standard error = 0.195) 
are positive but not significant, the coefficients on Vio*C-Score (coefficient = 9.354, standard 
error = 4.185) and Vio*CCM (coefficient = 2.111, standard error =1.488) are positive and 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. These results provide evidence supporting H2 
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that more conservative firms experience smaller reductions in investing activities after covenant 
violations. The results, still weak, are somewhat better than those for tests of H1, using OLS. 
Consistent with predictions, the coefficients on Size range from - 0.207 to - 0.233 and are 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that larger firms have smaller change in their capital 
expenditures. The effect of firms’ market performance (Cret) is positive with coefficients 
ranging from 1.616 to 1.625 and significant at the 1% level in all models, providing evidence 
that firms with better economic performance are likely to invest more. The effect of Leverage is 
positive but insignificant. Future growth opportunities do not have an effect on firms’ investment 
behaviour probably because the inclusion of Cret dominates the effect of MB. Consistent with 
Chava and Roberts’ (2008) findings, firms with credit ratings have larger change in capital 
expenditures after controlling for other factors affecting firms’ investment behavior. This 
positive association suggests that information asymmetry is lower between the borrower and 
lender if a credit rating is available for the borrower. The effect of prior lending relationship 
(P_Lending) is positive in all models, but none of the coefficients are significant. 
5.1.3 Testing of H3 
 
H3 predicts that firms that increase conservative reporting have better operating 
performance after covenant violations. Table 12 presents the results for the testing of H3. I do 
not find that violating firms exhibit greater improvement in operating performance, a result that 
is different from those of Nini et al. (2009). Specifically, I find that when the control variables 
are not included (Model 1), the change in gross margin (the proxy for operating performance) is 
smaller for the violating firms than that for the non-violating firms. In Model 1 using NonAcc, 
SK, and C-Score as a measure of conservatism, the coefficients on Vio are - 1.453, - 1.452, - 
1.458, respectively and they are all significant at the 1% level. When the control variables are 
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included (Model 3), there are no significant differences in the change in gross margin between 
the violating and non-violating firms. For example, the coefficients on Vio range from -0.866 to 
0.829 in models (Model 3) and none of the coefficients are significant.  
The results in Table 12 also show that the coefficients on the interaction term between 
Vio and Chg_Con are not consistent with predictions. Particularly, the coefficients on 
Vio*Chg_Con are negative for NonAcc (coefficient -6.779; standard error = 20.815), SK 
(coefficient = -0.177; standard error = 0.256), and CCM (coefficient = -1.092; standard error 
=1.846) and none of the coefficients are significant. Although the coefficient on Vio* C-Score is 
positive (coefficient = 3.578; standard error = 5.346), it is not significant at conventional levels.  
Therefore, the tests using the Ordinary Least Square approach do not provide evidence 
supporting H3.  
The coefficient on MB is consistent with predictions. For example, using the C-Score in 
Model 3, the coefficient on MB is 0.148 (standard error = 0.079) and significant at the 5% level. 
This result suggests that firms with greater growth opportunity are expected to see greater change 
in gross margin than firms with smaller growth opportunity. The coefficient on Cret is positive 
and significant across all models, suggesting that firms with higher expected future cash flow are 
likely to experience greater improvement in gross margins. 
5.1.4 Testing of H4  
 
Tables 13 and 14 present the results for the testing of H4. Table 13 shows the results for 
the stock returns calculated over four quarters after covenant violations and Table 14 presents the 
results for the stock returns calculated over eight quarters after covenant violations. Table 13 
shows that using three individual conservatism measures (NonAcc, SK, C-Score), the violators 
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have smaller returns than that of the non-violators: the coefficients on Vio range from -0.146 to -
0.167 and are significant at the 1% level. Consistent with H4, the coefficient on Vio*Chg_Con is 
positive and significant at 5% level only when C-Score (Model 3: coefficient =0.587; standard 
error =0.292) is used as a measure of conservatism.  The coefficients on Vio*NonAcc (Model 3: 
coefficient =-0.717; standard error =1.579) and Vio* SK (Model3: coefficient = 0.017; standard 
error = 0.017) are either negative or positive but insignificant. The above discussed results 
provide mixed evidence with regard to the implications of conservatism for firm valuation after 
covenant violations.  
The significant positive coefficient on Size is consistent with the literature that size is 
negatively related to future returns. The coefficients on Leverage are negative (coefficient = -
0.006; standard error = 0.008) across all models using different conservatism measures, but 
none of the coefficients are significant. MB has a negative and significant coefficient 
(coefficients range from -0.008 to -0.010 and standard errors are 0.004 for all models), consistent 
with MB predicting negative future returns.  
Table 14 shows the eight-quarter return results. The coefficient on Vio is negative and 
significant at least at the 5% level in models with various conservatism measures. The coefficient 
on Vio*Chg_Con is positive across all measures and models, but only significant for SK 
(coefficient = 0.039; standard error =0.029) at 10% and for C-Score (coefficient = 0.974; 
standard error = 0.447) at the 1% level. In summary, the value implications of post loan-
initiation accounting conservatism for firms after covenant violations are mixed for the OLS-
based tests of H4.  
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However, it might be noted that the OLS estimates reported above do not control for the 
potential selections biases, which I discuss in the following sections. 
5.2 Analysis of the Probability of Violation 
 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the violating and non-violating firms are significantly 
different in many dimensions at the time of loan initiation, and these differences lead to non-
random assignment of firms into violating and non-violating groups, which could result in biased 
parameter estimates. To address this non-random assignment problem, I employ the Heckman 
(1979) self-selection model (Section 5.3.) and the Propensity Score Matching method (Section 
5.4). Both approaches involve estimating models of probability of covenant violation, which I 
discuss first in this section. 
Table 15 presents the results for the model used to predict the probability of covenant 
violation, using a Probit model [equation (5)]. Consistent with the prediction, I find that firms 
with a greater increase in conservatism are more likely to violate covenants. Specifically, the 
coefficients on change in CCM and SK are 0.558 (standard error = 0.198) and 0.519 (standard 
error = 0.180), respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on change 
in NonAcc (coefficient = 0.157; standard error = 0.176) and change in C-Score (coefficient = 
0.178; standard error =0.189) are positive but insignificant. The positive coefficient on the 
change in conservatism suggests that after controlling for tighter covenants (captured by pre-
contracting conservatism and other variables), deviation from pre-contracting conservatism leads 
to higher probability of violations. While the coefficients on the pre-contracting SK (coefficient = 
0.271; standard error = 0.066) and CCM (coefficient = 0.978; standard error = 0.315) are 
positive and significant at the 1% level, the coefficient on pre-contracting NonAcc is negative 
(coefficient = -3.039; standard error = 5.189) and insignificant. The positive relationship 
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between pre-contracting conservatism and the probability of violation suggest that more 
conservative firms receive tighter covenants.
27
 The coefficient on the pre-contracting 
unconditional conservatism is not significant in any models, consistent with Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2005) argument that unconditional conservatism is not relevant in contracting, at 
least in triggering covenant violations.  
Table 15 shows that the coefficients on loan variables are generally consistent with the 
predictions. Specifically, the coefficient on Tenor (the number of months between loan initiation 
and loan maturity) is negative and significant at the 1% level, lending support to the prediction 
that lenders would prefer less frequent violations for long-term debt to reduce the renegotiation 
costs. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Spread (the costs of borrowing), is positive and 
significant in all three models across all measures: this coefficient is 0.009 for the model with 
NonACC, SK, and C-Score, and 0.008 for the CCM measure and all coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level. These findings are consistent with the prediction that while lenders demand higher 
compensation from risky borrowers, they also impose tight control on these firms using tighter 
covenants, thereby triggering frequent covenant violations.  
Consistent with Demiroglu and James’ (2010) findings that larger firms and firms with 
higher market-to-book (MB) ratio receive greater covenant slack, I find that larger firms and 
firms with higher MB are less likely to violate covenants. Specifically, Table 13 shows that using 
NonAcc, SK, C-Score, and CCM in different models, the coefficients on Size are - 0.215, - 0.248, 
- 0.198, and - 0.136 and the coefficients are significant at the 1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
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  Frankel and Litov (2007) provide some evidence supporting this conjecture. Particularly they find that there is a 
negative association between net worth covenant slack and the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness. 
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respectively.  The coefficients on MB are negative and significant with coefficients ranging from 
- 0.070 to - 0.102 and significant at the 1% level for all models across all measures.  
Table 15 also provides evidence for the relationship between the probability of violation 
and firm performance. Table 15 shows that the coefficients on Chg_ROA are consistently 
positive for all models, but not statistically significant, suggesting that the Chg_ROA variable 
does not predict the probability of violation. This insignificant result may be because lenders do 
not necessarily use net income as a covenant threshold in debt contracts. In contrast, 
Chg_EBITDA, a cash flow measure, is negatively associated with the probability of violation. 
Specifically, the coefficients on Chg_EBITDA are - 29.110, -31.006, - 28.253, and - 30.303 in 
models with different conservatism measures and these coefficients are all significant at the 1% 
level. These results suggest that the increase in EBITDA is associated with a lower probability of 
violation. Furthermore, Table 14 shows that the increase in Leverage is associated with a higher 
probability of covenant violation, but none of the coefficients are significant. After controlling 
for the accounting performance Chg_EBITDA, the coefficient on Cret is still negative and 
significant at the 1% level across models using different conservatism measures (coefficient = - 
1.415, - 1.386, - 1.407, and - 1.391; standard error = 0.241, 0.235, 0.239, and 0.234). These 
results suggest that because the accounting ratios (e.g., EBITDA and Leverage) can only partially 
capture the change in firm performance and trigger covenant violations, the inclusion of stock 
market performance in the probability model is very important.  
5.3 Results Using Heckman (1979) Selection Approach  
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, I calculate the inverse Mills’ ratio from the Probit model 
that I discussed in Section 5.2 and include the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) in the second stage 
outcome regressions. Because I have four models using different conservatism measures, I 
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calculate IMR1 for each model separately. I report the second stage outcome regressions using 
the full model with all control variables included (Model 3 in Section 5.1.1) in Table 16 - 20. 
I present the results for the testing of H1 in Table 16. The coefficient on IMR1 is 
significant at the 10% level in models with various conservatism measures, suggesting that 
correcting for the selection bias is very important in this setting. The coefficient on Vio 
(coefficient = - 28.921, - 25.822, - 25.833, and - 56.400; standard error = 8.344, 7.288, 7.699, 
and 21.386, respectively for the four models)
28
 is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
providing evidence that after controlling for the non-random assignment of firms into violation 
and non-violation groups, violators experience greater reductions in debt issuing abilities, which 
is consistent with the OLS results. The coefficients on the interaction term Vio*NonAcc and 
Vio*SK are 151.235 (standard error = 105.121) and 1.831 (standard error = 1.309), 
respectively. Both are significant at the 10% level. Despite the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term Vio*C-Score, the coefficient on the interaction term Vio*CCM is positive and 
significant at the 10% level (coefficient =15.762; standard error = 9.706). Overall, the above 
discussed analysis suggests that the results using the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model 
support the prediction that an increase in conservatism is associated with smaller reductions in 
firms’ debt issuance after the violation of debt covenants. These results are consistent with the 
results in Section 5.1.1 in which I use the OLS model without controlling for the selection bias 
although the results are still weak with p-values not better than 10%. 
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 In this dissertation, I follow the estimation convention that ignores additional sampling variability introduced by 
the presence of the inverse Mill’s ratio in the second-stage regression. That is, I do not adjust the standard errors of 
the parameter estimates in the second-stage OLS outcome equation due to the inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio 
constructed from the parameter estimates in the first-stage Probit equation. 
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In Table 17, I present the results for the testing of H2 using the inverse Mills’ ratio 
included in the model. The coefficient on IMR1 is only significant when C-Score is used as a 
measure of conservatism (coefficient = 1.798; standard error = 1.060). Consistent with the 
evidence in section 5.1.2, the coefficient on Vio (coefficient = -6.104, -4.987, - 6.275, and -
8.063) is negative and significant at least at the 5% level across models using different 
conservatism measures, lending support to the prediction that the violators suffer greater 
reductions in capital expenditures. The coefficient on Vio and conservatism interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for the C-Score measure (coefficient = 9.450; standard 
error = 4.185). The coefficient on Vio*CCM (coefficient = 2.090; standard error = 1.501) is 
also positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficients on the other two interaction terms, 
namely, Vio*NonAcc (coefficient = 22.469; standard error = 20.954) and Vio*SK (coefficient = 
0.139; standard error = 0.196), are positive but not significant. Overall, the above analysis 
suggests that after controlling for the selection bias, covenant violations have less adverse impact 
on firms’ investment activities if the violating firms have increased conservative reporting to a 
greater extent compared to firms that have not.  
Table 18 presents the results for the testing of H3.  The coefficient on the inverse Mills’ 
ratio (IMR1) is negative and significant, suggesting the existence of selection bias. The 
coefficients on Vio are positive and significant at least at the 10% level in the model using 
NonAcc (coefficient=10.240; standard error = 5.454), C-Score (coefficient = 8.888; standard 
error = 5.745) and CCM (coefficient = 11.319; standard error = 6.102), suggesting that 
violating firms exhibit greater improvement in operating performance than the non-violating 
firms do. Note that this result is different from the OLS results for which the coefficient on Vio is 
significantly negative in models with no control variables included. The coefficient on the 
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interaction term between Vio and conservatism is -13.598 (standard error = 21.295) for the 
NonAcc measure, - 0.145 (standard error = 0.252) for the SK measure, and - 1.054 (standard 
error =1.855) for the composite measure (CCM). These results are not consistent with the 
prediction in H3 that firms that increase conservative reporting to a greater extent have better 
operating performance after covenant violations. Therefore, the results using the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage selection model do not provide evidence supporting H3. 
I present the four-quarter and eight-quarter stock returns results in Tables 19 and 20, 
respectively. First, the results in both tables show that the coefficients on IMR1 are not 
significant, suggesting that the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model may not be effective 
or required in correcting the selection bias for the testing of the valuation implications of 
conservatism. The coefficient on Vio is negative and significant in all models, consistent with the 
OLS regression analysis. Table 19 shows that for the four-quarter return test, the coefficient on 
the interaction term between Vio and the conservatism measure is only significant for the C-
Score measure of conservatism (coefficient = 0.576; standard error = 0.293). Table 20 shows 
that the coefficient on Vio*Chg_Con is significant when SK (coefficient = 0.041; standard error 
= 0.029) and C-Score (coefficient = 0.947; standard error =0.451) are used as a measure of 
conservatism. The coefficients on Vio*NonAcc and Vio*CCM are positive but insignificant. 
Overall, the tests using the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model provide mixed evidence 
for the predictions in H4 that firms that increase conservatism to a greater extent exhibit better 
stock market performance after covenant violations. Also note that the insignificant coefficients 
on the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) in Tables 19 and 20 suggest that the correction for the 
selection bias may not be effective for the testing of the value implications of conservatism.  
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5.4 Results Using Propensity Score Matching Approach  
 
I present the results of using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach in Tables 21 
– 25. To save space, I only discuss the properties of coefficients on the main variables of interest, 
namely, Vio and Vio*Chg_Con, and outline the difference between the PSM model and the OLS 
model. In the testing of H1, Table 21 shows that the coefficients on the interaction term 
Vio*NonAcc is 126.551 (standard error = 93.613) and the coefficient on Vio*C-Score is 7.239 
(standard error = 5.324). Both coefficients are significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on 
Vio*SK (coefficient = 1.265; standard error = 1.186) is positive and insignificant, but the 
coefficient on Vio*CCM is 4.890 (standard error = 1.796), significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, the results for H1 are consistent with the results using the OLS model and the 
Heckman (1979) selection model, suggesting that conservatism reduces the negative 
consequences of covenant violations on firms’ abilities to issue new debt. 
The results in Table 22 for the testing of H2 are also consistent with the results using the 
OLS model and Heckman (1979) selection model. Specifically, the coefficient on the Vio*C-
Score is positive (coefficient = 11.231; standard error = 4.824) and significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient on Vio*CCM is 2.005 (standard error = 1.503) and significant at the 10% level. 
The coefficients on other two conservatism measures are positive but not significant. 
The results for H3 using the PSM approach are presented in Table 23. Consistent with the 
results reported for the OLS model and Heckman (1979) selection model, none of the 
coefficients on Vio*Chg_Con are significant. 
I present the PSM approach results for the testing of H4 in Tables 24 and 25. The results 
are slightly different from the results using OLS and the Heckman (1979) selection approach. 
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Specifically, while in the OLS model and the Heckman (1979) selection model, the coefficient on 
Vio*NonAcc is negative and insignificant, the results using the PSM approach show that the 
coefficient on Vio*NonAcc is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient = 0.065; 
standard error = 0.027). Similarly, while the coefficient on Vio*SK is positive and insignificant 
when using the OLS model and Heckman (1979) selection model, this coefficient on Vio*SK 
using the PSM approach is positive and significant at the 10% level (coefficient = 3.544; 
standard error = 2.071). In the OLS model, the coefficient on Vio*C-Score is positive and 
significant, but the coefficient on Vio*C-Score (coefficient = 0.141; standard error = 0.362) is 
positive but insignificant using the PSM approach. The coefficient on the composite measure 
(CCM) is also significant at the 10% level (coefficient = 0.260; standard error = 0.171). Now I 
turn to the eight-quarter return tests (Table 24). The results for the eight-quarter returns test are 
stronger than that of the four-quarter return tests. Particularly, the coefficient on Vio*NonAcc is 
significant at the 1% level (coefficient = 6.548; standard error = 2.811) and the coefficient on 
Vio*SK is significant at the 5% level (coefficient = 0.076; standard error = 0.044). Consistent 
with the above results, the coefficient on Vio*CCM is also significant at the 5% level (coefficient 
= 0.437; standard error = 0.246). In summary, compared to the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
selection model, the PSM approach provides stronger support for H4, suggesting that 
conservative violating firms exhibit better stock market performance after covenant violations.  
5.5 Analysis of the Probability of Change in Conservatism 
 
The previous analyses assume that the change in conservatism after loan initiation is 
exogenous. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, change in conservatism is an endogenous event 
that is affected not only by managers’ abilities and incentives, but also correlated with the 
probability of violation. Therefore, I use the Double Selection model to address issues associated 
80 
with correlated endogenous treatment variables. As discussed in Section 3.2.5, in order to 
estimate the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR2) for the Double Selection model, I include IMR1, the 
inverse Mills'  ratio from the probability of violation equation (Sections 3.2.2 and 5.2), in 
equation 14 to account for the endogenous probability of covenant violation.   
In Table 26, I report the results for the model predicting the probability of change in 
conservatism. Table 26 shows that the coefficient on IMR1 is insignificant for all conservatism 
measures, suggesting that the potential selection bias arising from the probability of violation 
does not affect the probability of change in conservatism. As expected, the coefficient on 
Con_Pre is negatively associated with change in conservatism, suggesting that higher pre-
contracting conservatism is associated with smaller change in conservatism. The coefficient on 
Res_Pre (a measure of unconditional conservatism) is negative and significant at the 1% level 
for the NonAcc measure (coefficient = - 2.124; standard error = 1.019), consistent with the 
argument that the larger past unconditional conservatism is associated with smaller future 
conditional conservatism. However, this negative coefficient is not observed for the SK and C-
Score measures. The MB variable is negatively related to the change in conservatism only in the 
model with NonAcc as a measure of conservatism, but this relationship is not significant. 
Inconsistent with my predictions, MB is positively and significantly related to C-Score 
(coefficient = 0.341; standard error = 0.146) at the 5% level. This result could arise from the 
fact that the calculation of C-Score includes a MB component, leading to a mechanical 
relationship between the change in C-Score and MB. The coefficients on Chg_Rating are 0.134 
(standard error = 0.055) and 0.107 (standard error = 0.064) for the model using SK and C-
Score, respectively. These two coefficients are significant at 5% and 1%, respectively, 
suggesting that firms with greater change in credit rating (worse rating) would increase 
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conservatism, consistent with the results in Kim (2008). This could be due to the fact that a 
decrease in credit rating is normally accompanied by deterioration in economic performance, 
leading to the recognition of losses through applying conservative accounting policies. 
Consequently, greater amount of bad news captured by the deterioration in credit rating (greater 
change) is probably associated with higher reporting conservatism. The three institutional 
ownership measures are not significantly correlated with the change in conservatism, suggesting 
that institutional ownership may be effective in constraining firms’ reporting, but may not be 
relevant in inducing change in conservatism. I also find that litigation is unrelated to the change 
in conservatism, perhaps because litigation cannot predict change in conservatism.  
5.6 Results Using Double Selection Model 
 
In Tables 27 - 31, I present the results using the Double Selection model. Because the 
coefficients on IMR1 are not significant in the second selection model (discussed in Section 5.5 
and tabulated in Table 26), I expect the results from the Double Selection model not to be 
different from the results using the single selection model. Consistent with this expectation, I 
find that the coefficients on IMR2 are not significant in any test except for the test of H1 using 
SK as a measure of conservatism. Furthermore, the results using Double Selection Model are not 
different from the results using the single selection model presented in Section 5.3. Specifically, 
in testing the effect of conservatism on firms’ financing activities after covenant violations (H1), 
Table 27 shows that the coefficients on Vio*Chg_Con are 137.631 (standard error = 104.125), 
1.900 (standard error = 1.331), - 8.486 (standard error = 16.268), and 15.788 (standard error = 
9.868) for the models using NonAcc, SK, C-Score, and CCM as a measure of conservatism, 
respectively. The coefficients on NonAcc, SK, and CCM are significant at the 10% level, 
consistent with the prediction in H1 that conservatism mitigates the impact of covenant 
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violations on firms’ financing activities. Table 28 shows the testing results for H2 that 
conservatism could alleviate the adverse impact of covenant violations on firms’ investing 
activities. The coefficients on Vio*Chg_Con are 19.035 (standard error = 20.906), 0.152 
(standard error = 0.195), 9.348 (standard error = 4.197), 2.099 (standard error = 1.484) for the 
model using NonAcc, SK, C-Score, and CCM as a measure of conservatism, respectively. Among 
the coefficients, those on Vio*C-Score and Vio*CCM are significant at 1% and 10% level, 
respectively, confirming the analysis provided in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 that conservatism reduces 
the negative impact on firms’ investing activities. Table 29 provides the results for H3 regarding 
the implications of conservatism for firms’ operating activities and none of the coefficients on 
Vio*Chg_Con are significant, which is also consistent with the results using the OLS model and 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model. Tables 30 and 31 provides results for H4 
regarding the stock market implications of conservatism after covenant violations. The 
coefficient on Vio*Chg_C-Score is significant at the 1% level (coefficient = 0.605; standard 
error = 0.291) in the four-quarter returns (Table 30). The coefficients on the interaction term 
between Vio and other conservatism measure are not significant. In the eight-quarter returns test 
(Table 31), the coefficient on Vio*SK (coefficient = 0.039, standard error = 0.030) and Vio*C-
Score (coefficient = 0.952; standard error = 0.446) are significant at the 10% and 1% level, 
respectively. The coefficients on the interaction terms between Vio and NonAcc and CCM are not 
significant. These results suggest that there is mixed evidence regarding the implications of 
conservatism for the stock market performance.
29
 
5.7 Summary of Empirical Analysis 
                                                          
29
 Untabulated results using abnormal stock returns adjusted for size-decile returns as the dependent variable for H4  
test show that the coefficients on Vio*Chg_Con are not significantly different from  the reported results using  raw 
stock returns as the dependent variable. 
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Table 32 provides a summary of the test results for this chapter. It is shown that the 
change in debt is positively associated with change in the NonAcc measure of conservatism and 
the composite measure (CCM) across different empirical models, namely, the OLS model, the 
Heckman (1979) selection model, the Propensity Score Matching Model, and the Double 
Selection Model. While the results using the SK measure are consistent with H1 in the OLS, 
Heckman selection model, and Double Selection model, the results using the C-Score measure is 
significant only for the Propensity Score Matching Model (PSM). Overall, the empirical tests 
provide evidence that conservatism reduces the negative impact of covenant violations on firms’ 
ability to borrow.  
For the test of H2, the results using individual conservatism measures are consistent with 
the prediction in some models but not in all models. However, when the composite measure 
(CCM) is used, the results are consistently positive and significant as predicted across various 
models, suggesting that conservative violators exhibit smaller reductions in investing activities 
after covenant violations.  
I find no empirical evidence suggesting that conservatism has implications for operating 
performance after covenant violations (H3).
30
 The lack of evidence may arise from the fact that 
operating performance probably is a noisy construct for lenders’ preference for positive net 
present value projects.  
For the test of H4, the results are consistent with the prediction using the Non-Acc, SK, 
and the CCM measure in the PSM model for both four-quarter and eight-quarter returns tests. In 
other tests, while the results are consistent with the prediction for the SK measure only in the 
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 Untabulated results using change in sales as a proxy for the improvement in operating performance are not 
significantly different from the reported results using change in gross margin as a measure of operating performance. 
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eight-quarter return tests, the results are consistent with the prediction for the C-Score measure in 
both the four-quarter and eight-quarter return tests. Overall, there is mixed evidence in support of 
H4. 
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Chapter 6 Sensitivity Tests 
 
6.1 Tests Using the Violating Sample Only  
 
The analyses presented so far use the pooled sample with both violating and non-
violating firm-quarter observations included in order to test the implications of conservatism for 
the consequences of covenant violations. Because the occurrence of covenant violation is not a 
random event, I used the Heckman Selection Model and the PSM approach to address the 
selection bias. In this section, I discard the non-violating sample and focus on the violating 
sample only to examine whether there is a relationship between change in conservatism and the 
outcomes of violations given that the firms are in violation. Note that while this approach allows 
the assessment of the effect of conservatism on the outcome variables for all violating firms, it 
does not control for the relationship between conservatism and the outcome variables in the non-
violating state. I present the OLS regression results using the violating sample only in Tables 33 
- 37. 
In Table 33, I provide results for the testing of H1 using the violating sample. Consistent 
with the results presented in Section 5.1.1, the coefficients on NonAcc (coefficient = 161.313; 
standard error = 92.151), SK (coefficient = 1.708; standard error = 1.204) and CCM 
(coefficient = 13.568; standard error = 8.000) are significant at the 5% and 10% levels 
respectively, providing evidence that change in debt issuance is positively associated with an 
increase in conservatism given that the firms are in violation of debt covenants. The coefficients 
on Leverage (coefficient = - 4.511, - 4.482, - 4.603, and - 4.858; standard error = 3.380, 3.456, 
3.513, and 3.538) are negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that firms with higher 
leverage issue less debt after covenant violations. The coefficient on EBITDA is negative and 
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significant, supporting the prediction that firms with higher cash flow are less likely to issue 
debt.  The adjusted R
2
s are 14%, 13.6%, 12.5%, and 14%, in the four models, respectively, 
values that are much greater than those in tests using both violating and non-violating sample 
(e.g., Table 10: 3.3%, 3.6%, 3.1%, and 3.8%) included in the model, suggesting that the model 
using only the violating sample provides a better fit. 
Table 34 presents the results of testing H2. Consistent with the pooled sample OLS 
model results (Section 5.1.2), the coefficient on C-Score (coefficient = 10.434; standard error = 
4.718) is significant at the 1% level. However, inconsistent with the pooled sample OLS results, 
the coefficient on CCM is not significant, implying that the significant coefficient on the 
Vio*Chg_CCM in Section 5.1.2 (Table 11) might arise because the outcome variables exhibit a 
different relationship with Chg_Con in the violating versus the non-violating sample. The 
coefficient on EBITDA is positive and significant, suggesting that violating firms with higher 
EBITDA are likely to invest more after covenant violation. Consistent with the pooled sample 
OLS results, the coefficients on the rating dummy (Rating_D) are positive (coefficient = 1.806, 
1.910, 1.888, and 1.899) and significant at the 5% level. I also find that the adjusted R
2
 is higher 
using the violating sample (ranging from 8% to 9.9%) relative to that for the pooled violating 
and non-violating sample (Table 11: ranging from 4.3% to 4.5%).   
Table 35 shows that the results for H3 are not significant, consistent with the pooled 
sample results.  
Tables 36 and 37 contain the results for H4 and the results are similar to the results in the 
pooled sample OLS results (Tables 13 and 14). For the four-quarter returns tests, the coefficients 
on C-Score and CCM are 0.873 and 0.132, respectively and they are significant at the 1% and 
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10% level, respectively (Table 13).  The coefficients on these two conservatism measures are 
also positive and significant at the 1% and 10% level for the eight-quarter returns tests (Table 
14). So, the tests of H4 using the violating sample alone provide corroborating evidence for the 
analysis using the pooled sample with and without controlling for selection bias in the model. 
6.2 Implications of Pre-Contracting Conservatism  
As discussed in the Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, the level of past conservatism may affect the 
level of future reporting conservatism and hence the level of pre-contracting conservatism has 
implications for subsequent change in conservatism. In the main analysis presented in Chapter 5, 
I include pre-contracting conditional conservatism in the selection model to account for any bias 
arising from non-random assignment of firms into groups that exhibit different degrees of change 
in conservatism. In this section, I allow the pre-contracting conditional conservatism to interact 
with the change in conservatism and examine whether the level of pre-contracting conservatism 
has implications for the relationship between the change in conservatism and the consequences 
of covenant violations. Specifically, I estimate the following OLS model:         
 
                                                                    
                                                                                 (8) 
where the outcome is the consequences of violations, namely, change in debt (Chg_Debt), 
change in capital expenditure (Chg_Cap_X), change in gross margin (Chg_GM), and firm 
valuation after violation (Post_Ret1 or Post_Ret2). In equation (8), Con_Pre it-n is the pre-
contracting conditional conservatism. This variable is set to 1 when the pre-contracting 
conditional conservatism is greater than the sample median and 0 otherwise. Chg_Con is the 
change in conservatism using one of the three conditional conservatism measures and the 
composite measure. Control variables are the same as the control variables used in Section 3.2.1 
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for each outcome variable. I also include industry and year fixed effect as control variables in the 
model. 
I report the results for this analysis in Table 38. The coefficients on the interaction term 
Con_Pre*Chg_Con are not significant for any conservatism measures except for the C-Score 
measure in the return tests. This result suggests that the level of pre-contracting conservatism has 
no implications for the relationship between the change in conservatism and the outcomes of 
covenant violations. This could arise from the fact that covenant ratios at the time of loan 
initiation already reflect the level of pre-contracting conservatism at that time. This allows the 
probability of violation to differ for firms with different pre-contracting conservatism (see the 
discussion in Section 5.2 on the probability of violation and pre-contracting conditional 
conservatism).  
6.3 Sensitivity Tests for H1, H2, and H3 
6.3.1 Using Different Measurement Window for Dependent Variables 
In the main analysis presented in Chapter 5, I calculate the change in debt issuance, 
change in capital expenditures, and change in gross margin from four-quarter before to four 
quarter after violations to allow the outcomes of violation to be realized through renegotiation. 
To assess the sensitivity of my results to the size of the measurement window, I shorten the 
measurement window to plus-minus two quarters surrounding the violation date. Tables 39- 41 
report the results for the analyses using the new measurement window. Tables 39 and 41 show 
that the coefficient on Vio*Chg_Con is not significant for the test of H1 and H3 for all models 
using the different conservatism measures. Table 40 shows that the coefficient on Vio*Chg_Con 
is significant for the C-Score measure only in the test of H2 (Model 3: coefficient =8.02; 
standard error = 4.913) at the 10% level, while the coefficients on other measures are not 
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significant. It is worth noting that the adjusted R
2
 is much smaller using the two-quarter change 
than those in the main analysis using a plus-minus four-quarter window. Specifically, while the 
adjusted R
2
s using the OLS model for H1 (Table 10 Model 3) are 3.3%, 3.6%, 3.1%, and 3.8%, 
respectively, for each conservatism measure, the adjusted R
2
s for H1 using the two-quarter 
window (Table 39 Model 3) are 1.0%, 1.1%, 1.1%, and 1.1%, respectively. Similarly, while the 
adjusted R
2
s for the H2 test of the change in capital expenditures using the minus-plus four-
quarter window surrounding covenant violations are 4.4%, 4.3%, 4.5%, and 4.4% , respectively 
(Table 11 Model 3), the adjusted R
2
s are 1.8%, 1.7%, 1.8%, and 1.7% for the model using the 
two-quarter change (Table 40 Model 3).  For H3, the adjusted R
2
s for the four-quarter change are 
2.8%, 3%, 3.1%, and 2.9% (Table 12 Model 3), respectively, but the adjusted R
2
s are - 0.001, 
0.000, - 0.001, and - 0.001, respectively for the two-quarter change (Table 41 Model 3). The 
smaller adjusted R
2
s for the two-quarter window indicates that calculating changes over two 
quarters is probably too short to capture the impact of renegotiation outcomes, which 
significantly reduces the explanatory power of the independent variables in the model. 
6.3.2 Deflating Debt Issuance and Capital Expenditure by Assets 
 
Because accounting conservatism could impact the reported value of assets, I use market 
value of equity rather than assets as a deflator in my tests for changes in debt and capital 
expenditure. To examine whether my results are sensitive to using a different deflator, I use 
assets as a deflator for the tests of change in capital expenditure and change in debt in the post 
violation period. I report the results for this analysis in Tables 42 and 43. Results of H1 (Table 
42) for the Vio*CCM variable are similar to those using market value of equity as deflators. The 
only difference is that when market value of equity is used as deflator (Table 10), the coefficient 
90 
on Vio*C-Score is negative but insignificant, but when assets is used as a deflator, the coefficient 
on Vio*C-Score is significant at the 10% level (coefficient = 5.007; standard error = 3.750).  
 The results for change in capital expenditure are presented in Table 43. The coefficient 
on Vio is positive and significant across all models using the three individual conservatism 
measures, suggesting that violating firms invest more than non-violators. This result is 
inconsistent with the results in Chava and Roberts (2008). This anomalous result might arise 
from the fact that these violating firms sold significant portion of their assets (Nini et al., 2009), 
resulting in a lower level of assets, and hence higher capital expenditure per dollar of assets for 
the violating firms. Therefore, the use of assets as a deflator in this test may not be appropriate. 
91 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I examine whether accounting conservatism moderates the 
consequences of covenant violations and thereby shed light on the economic role of accounting 
conservatism in the re-contracting process after covenant violations. Because I examine a re-
contracting setting in which managers might change their reporting discretion, I hypothesize that 
an increase in conditional conservatism after loan initiation reduces the conflicts of interest 
between borrowers and lenders upon covenant violations, resulting in fewer restrictions on 
borrowers’ investing and financing activities by lenders. In addition, I hypothesize that the 
reduction on firms’ investing and financing activities reflect lenders’ concerns over the 
borrowing firms’ downside risk, resulting in differential impact on the borrowing firms’ positive 
(and negative) net present value projects and hence different operating and stock market 
performance. 
 Using a sample of 312 violating and 5,327 non-violating firm-quarter observations and 
three different conditional conservatism measures, I first employ the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression to test my hypotheses. I find evidence supporting my hypothesis on the 
mitigating effect of conservatism on firms’ financing and investing activities. I find limited 
evidence indicating that change in conservatism affects firms’ valuation after covenant 
violations. I do not find evidence that firms that increase conservative reporting to a greater 
extent have better operating performance after covenant violations compared to firms that do not. 
In addition to the OLS regression, I also employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection 
approach and the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach to account for any selection bias 
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arising from endogenous probability of covenant violations. These two approaches provide 
evidence consistent with the OLS results regarding the implications of conservatism for investing 
and financing activities. In terms of the implications of conservatism for firm valuation (H4), the 
results from the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model and PSM model are consistent with 
the results from the OLS model that firms that increase conservative reporting to a greater extent 
after loan initiation exhibit better stock market performance compared to firms that do not. I also 
use the Double Selection model (Amemiya, 1985) to address the econometric issues due to 
potential correlated endogenous treatments concerning the probability of covenant violation and 
change in conservative reporting. I find that the results using the OLS model and Heckman 
(1979) selection model continue to hold under this approach for the hypothesized mitigating 
effects of conservatism for the consequences of covenant violation on financing and investing 
activities.  
I conduct several sensitivity tests and the results from these tests do not alter the primary 
findings. Using alternative research designs, I find evidence that conservatism reduces the 
adverse consequences of covenant violations on firms’ financing and investing activities and 
conservatism has some impact on firms’ valuation after covenant violations.  
My dissertation contributes to the emerging literature on the role of accounting 
conservatism in the re-contracting process and enhances our understanding of the role of 
accounting information in different stages of contracting. My dissertation also provides empirical 
evidence supporting the claim that conservatism can benefit borrowing firms after covenant 
violations, consistent with the argument that conservatism is a mechanism to mitigate the 
conflicts of interest between contracting parties.  
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However, there are several caveats that need to be noted. First, although I find consistent 
evidence that conservatism mitigates the adverse consequences of covenant violations on firms’ 
investing and financing activities using different econometrics models, some results are only 
marginally significant. This is probably due to the use of the change specification rather than a 
level specification of the dependent variable. Secondly, although I endeavour to address the 
endogeneity concern on the probability of covenant violations using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage selection model, the Propensity Score Matching model, and the Double Selection model, 
the fact that the variables chosen to identify exogenous variations, particularly for the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage selection model and Double Selection model, may not be true exogenous 
variables. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the theoretical guidance on the 
determinants of initial covenant tightness is limited (Demiroglu and James, 2010) and that the 
probability of violation is correlated with the change in conservatism. Identifying the true 
exogenous variables requires more sophisticated theories and knowledge about the driving forces 
of the underlying re-contracting process. Such theories are not readily available in the extant 
debt-contracting literature and building such theories exceeds the scope of this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, in future research, a systematic examination of the determinants of initial covenant 
tightness and the role of conservatism in the determination of covenant tightness is needed to 




Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Con_Pre: one of the conservatism measures calculated at the time of loan initiation as the following: 
NonAccPre is the average of non-operating accruals over n quarters prior to the quarter of loan initiation 
where n is equal to the number of quarters between loan initiation and covenant violation.
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 Non-operating 
accruals = -[(net income (Compustat:ni) + depreciation (Compustat:dp) – cash flows from operation 
(Compustat: oancf)– changes in AR(Compustat:rect) –change in inventories(Compustat:invt)+ change in 
account payable (Compustat :ap)+ change in tax payable(Compustat:txp)-change in prepaid expense 
(Compustat:xpp)) /average assets(Compustat:at)]. When cash flows from operation is not available, cash 
flow from operation = funds from operation (Compustat:fopt)+change in cash (Compustat:che) – change in 
current assets (Compustat:act) + change in current liabilities in debt (Compustat:dlc)+change in current 
liabilities (Compustat:lct); 
SKPre is the negative of the difference in the skewness of earnings and the skewness of cash flows over n 
quarters prior to loan initiation, where n is the number of quarters between loan initiation and covenant 
violation; 
C-ScorePre is the average C-Score (Khan and Watts, 2009) over n quarters prior to loan initiation, where n 
is the number of quarter between loan initiation and covenant violation and the calculation of C-score is 
described in Appendix B; 
CCMPre is the composite measure of conditional conservatism, calculated as the sum of the three 







 , where Con is one of the three conservatism measures and 
Min(Con) and Max(Con) are the minimum and maximum value of each conservatism measure in the 
sample, respectively.   
Con_Post is one of the conservatism measures calculated as the following: 
NonAccPost is the average of non-operating accruals over the number of quarters between loan initiation 
and covenant violation; 
SKPost is the negative of the difference in the skewness of earnings and the skewness of cash flow over the 
number of quarters between loan initiation and covenant violation; 
C-ScorePost is the average of C-Score over n quarters between loan initiation and covenant violation and 
the calculation of C-score is described in Appendix B; 
CCMPost is the composite measure of conservatism after loan initiation, calculated similarly as CCM_Pre 
Chg_Con is change in conservatism, calculated as Chg_Con=Con_Post – Con_Pre; 
Res_Pre is the measure of unconditional conservatism prior to loan initiation. This measure captures the effect of 
unconditional conservatism by computing the level of accounting reserves as a result of the application of 
unconditional accounting policy (Penman and Zhang (2002). Res_Pre= (Inventory reserve + R&D Reserve +ADV 
                                                          
31
 For non-violators, each quarter is treated as a possible violating quarter. 
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Reserve)/Total Assets (Compustat: at). Inventory reserve: LIFO reserve reported by companies (Compustat: lifr); 
R&D reserve represents the amortized R&D assets that should appear on the balance sheet if the company does not 
expense R&D expenditure in the year of the spending. R&D Reserve = ∑          (  ∑   
 
   
   
   ) where n is 
the estimated useful life of R&D expenditures and    is the industry amortization rate calculated by Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996), and R&D is the annual R&D expenditure (Compustat: xrd); ADV Reserve is the advertising 
expense capitalized and amortized over two years. Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) show that advertising expenses have 
two-year useful life, and therefore the ADV Reserve is calculated as AdvResv=0.5*AdvExpt (Compustat: xad); 
MBt-n is the average value of market to book ratio (Compustat: prcc*csho/ceq) over four quarters prior to the quarter 
of loan initiation; 
MBt-1 is the average value of market to book ratio (Compustat: prcc*csho/ceq) over four quarters prior to the quarter 
of covenant violation; 
Sizet-n is the average of market value of equity (Compustat:prcc*csho) over 4 quarters prior to the quarter of loan 
initiation; 
Sizet-1 is the average of market value of equity (Compustat:prcc*csho) over 4 quarters prior to the quarter of 
covenant violation; 
Leveraget-n is the average value of leverage over four quarters prior to the quarter of loan initiation where leverage 
= (long-term debt +long-term debt in current liabilities)/market value of equity (Compustat: (dltt+dlc)/(prcc*csho)); 
Leveraget-1 is the average value of leverage over four quarters prior to the quarter of covenant violations where 
leverage = (long-term debt +long-term debt in current liabilities)/market value of equity (Compustat: 
(dltt+dlc)/(prcc*csho)); 
Chg_ Leveraget-1= Leveraget-1- Leveraget-n; 
EBITDAt-n is the average value of operating income before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(Compustat:oibdp) over four quarters prior to the quarter of loan initiation, deflated by the market value of equity; 
EBITDAt-1 is the average value of operating income before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(Compustat:oibdp) over four quarters prior to the quarter of covenant violation, deflated by the market value of 
equity; 
Chg_EBITDAit-1=EBITDAt-1-EBITDAt-n; 
ROAt-n is the average value of return on assets (net income (compustat:niq)/ total assets (Compustat: atq) over 4 
quarters prior to the quarter of loan initiation; 
ROAt-1 is the average value of return on assets (net income (compustat:niq)/ total assets) over 4 quarters prior to the 
quarter of covenant violation; 
Chg_ ROAt-1= ROAt-1-ROAt-n; 
Cret is the cumulative raw stock returns over 4 quarters prior to the quarter of covenant violations; 
GM_Pre (%) is the average value of gross margin (Compustat: (saleq-cogsq)/saleq)) over four quarters before the 
quarter of covenant violations;  
GM_Post (%) is the average value of gross margin (Compustat: (saleq-cogsq)/saleq) over four quarters after 
covenant violations; 
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Debt_Pre (%) is the average value of debt issuance (adjusted long term debt issuance
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 – adjusted long term debt 
reduction)/(market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter) (Compustat: (Adj_dltisy-adj_dltry)/(MVt-1) over 
four quarters before the quarter of covenant violations; 
Debt _Post (%) is the average value of debt issuance (adjusted long term debt issuance – adjusted long term debt 
reduction)/(market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter) (Compustat: (Adj_dltisy-adj_dltry)/(MVt-1) over 
four quarters after covenant violations; 
Cap_X _Pre (%) is the average value of capital expenditures (Compustat: adj_capxy/ ppeq t-1) over four quarters 
before the quarter of covenant violations; 
Cap_X _Post (%) is the average value of capital expenditures (Compustat: adj_capxy/ ppeqt-1) over four quarters 
after the quarter of covenant violations; 
Chg_GM= GM_Post – GM_Pre; 
Chg_Cap_X = Cap_X_Post – Cap_X_Pre; 
Chg_Debt = Debt_Post – Debt_Pre; 
Post_Ret1 is the cumulative raw stock returns over four quarters after covenant violation; 
Post_Ret2 is the cumulative raw stock returns over eight quarters after covenant violation; 
Chg_Rating is the change in credit rating calculated as the difference in credit rating in the quarter before loan 
initiation and the quarter before violation. I obtain credit rating from Compustat. If credit rating is not available, I 
use imputed credit rating. Specifically, I regress credit rating on leverage, interest coverage ratio, return on equity, 
profit margin, and firm size using firms with credit rating available (Zhang , 2008) . I then use the coefficients 
obtained from the above model to calculate credit ratings for firms with missing data. I use the following model: 
Rating= 21.37685 -0.00001337 Interest Coverage Ratio + 2.09366*leverage – 1.45322*ROA – 0.00158*margin – 
1.26615*size (The larger number in rating indicates worse credit situation). The predicted credit rating is 
winsorized at the maximum (29) and minimum (2) value used in the Standard & Poor's Issuer Credit Rating system 
Insti1 = log (1+number of institutional owners); 
Insti2= log (1+number of institutional owners with holding greater than 5%);  
Insti3= log (1+number of institutional owners that are activists);  
Litigation is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if a firm is operating in a high litigation industry (SIC code is 2833-
2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, or 7340-7374), and 0 otherwise (Francis et al. 1994; Lim and Tan, 2008); 
 
Vio is an indicator variable, equal to one for violating firm-quarters and 0 otherwise. 
Industry Indicator (Ind1, Ind2…… Ind9) is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the observation has an industry 
SIC number with a first digit of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively, and 0 otherwise; 
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 The Compustat item “dltisy” captures the cumulative debt issuance from the beginning of fiscal year to the quarter 
end. I calculate the adjusted debt issuance (adj_dltsiy) by subtracting the debt issuance in the preceding quarters, that 
is, dltisyt- dltisyt-1 for fiscal quarter 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
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Year Indicator (Year1998, Year1999… Year2006) is an indicator variable if the data are from the 1998, 1999,…, 
2006, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
Loan Variables 
Spread: The interest rate spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) on all drawn lines of credit; 
Tenor: The number of months between the loan initiation dates and the maturity dates; 
 
Performance Pricing (Per_P): An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the loan has a performance pricing 
option tying the promised yield to one or more accounting measures of performance, and 0 otherwise. Missing 
values are coded as 0; 
 
Loan Size: The amount of the loan; 
 
Number of Covenants (NumCov): The total number of accounting-based covenants; 
 
Secured: an indicator variable, 1 for secured borrowing and 0 otherwise; 
 
Number of Lenders (NoLenders): The total number of lenders participating in the lending; 
 
P_lending: an indicator variable, equal to1 if the borrower has borrowed from the same lead lender in the prior 
borrowing, and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B: Description of C-Score Measure (Khan and Watts, 2009) 
 
Khan and Watts (2009) develop a firm-year specific measure based on Basu’s (1997) notion of asymmetric 
timeliness as well as empirical and theoretical evidence that firm size, market to book ratio, and leverage generate 
cross-sectional variations in accounting conservatism. The basic Basu (1997) model is the following: 





     (A1) 
where itE  is earnings, Rit is annual returns, itDR is an indicator variable equal to one when returns are negative, and 
t2  measures the incremental timeliness of earnings loss recognition. 
Khan and Watts (2009) extend the Basu (1997) model by incorporating firm size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage 
to estimate the following equation: 
               


)/( 4321101/ 1 itititittitttPit LevBMSizeRDRE t   
               ititititititt
LevBMSizeDRR   )/( 43211       (A2) 
where Size is the natural log of market value of equity, M/B is the market to book ratio, Lev is the leverage of the 
firm, and other variables are as defined in the equation A1. 
This results in an expanded regression model: 
             


)/( 432101/ 1 ittittitttititttPit LevBMSizeRDRE t   
  itittittitttitit
LevBMSizeDRR   )/( 4321     (A3) 
I estimate the regression model in A3 by Ordinary Least Squares regression in each quarter. All variables in 
estimating the coefficients are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. I calculate the asymmetric timeliness (C-Score) 
for each firm-quarter by using coefficients estimated for that quarter as follows:  
      
ittittittit LevBMSizeScoreC t 

432 /                                                                              (A4) 
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Appendix C: Selection Bias and the Economic Choice Model 
 
Selection bias arises when economic agents self-select into different groups, causing biased coefficient 
estimates in the Ordinary Least Square estimation procedure (Maddala, 1983). The selection model, also referred as 
an economic choice model, takes into account an endogenous choice variable to address the potential self-selection 
bias (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In this appendix, I first briefly discuss the economic choice model and 
its implications for my study. I then discuss the Heckman Selection approach and the Propensity Score Matching 
approach.  
The Economic Choice Model 
To illustrate how non-random assignment or self-selection biases the OLS estimates, I discuss the 
economic choice model that has been extensively used in the economics literature (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 
2004) in this appendix. I follow Roberts and Whited (2011) and denote the choice (treatment) as d, set to 1 if the 
choice or treatment is made or received, and 0 otherwise. In my study, the choice is covenant violations or changes 
in conservatism. Observations receiving the treatment are referred to as the treatment group, and observations not 
receiving the treatment are referred to as the control group. The observable outcome variable of this choice 
(treatment) is denoted by Y. In my study, Y is changes in debt issuance, changes in investment, etc. There are two 
potential outcomes, denoted as Y (1) for observations receiving the treatment and Y (0) for observations in control, 
respectively. Y (1) could be changes in investments when a firm receives the treatment (violation or high 
conservatism), and Y (0) could be the firm’s changes in investments when a firm is not in violation or has low 
conservatism. Following this notation, various average treatment effects can be calculated as the following: 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE): )]0()1([ YYE                                                                                         (A5) 
Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT): ]1/)0()1([  dYYE                                                    (A6) 
Average Treatment Effect of the Untreated (ATU): ]0/)0()1([  dYYE                                                (A7) 
The ATE is the expected treatment effect of a randomly drawn subject from the population. The ATT and ATU are 




 The effect of interest is ATT, the difference between outcomes for the same observation when the 
treatment exists and when the treatment does not exist. For my studies and many other studies, the outcome for the 
treated firms when there is no treatment is not observable. For example, the non-violating outcome is not observed 
for the violating firm. This is referred as the counterfactual.
34
  
The observed outcome in the data is either Y (1) or Y (0) depending on whether the subject is treated (d = 1) or 
untreated (d = 0). Because the counterfactual ((Y(0)/d=1 or Y(1)/d=0))is not observed, the researcher is forced to 
estimate:  
)0/)0(()1/)1((  dYEdYE                                                             (A8) 
or 
    
),0/)0((),1/)1(( XdYEXdYE                                                  
(A9) 
where X is a vector of covariates. 
To see how the selection bias leads to a biased estimation, equation (A8) can be rewritten as: 
         ]}1|)0([]1|)1([)0|)0(()1|)1((  dYEdYEdYEdYE     
                                            ]}0|)0([]1|)0([  dYEdYE                                         (A10) 
The first difference is the ATT (equation (A5)). The second difference term,
 ]}0|)0([]1|)0([  dYEdYE ,
 is the selection bias, which equals to zero only under specific conditions. In 
other words, if I use equation (A10) to evaluate the treatment effects on the treated, the selection bias would result in 
biased estimation. In contrast, random assignment would make the treatment groups and control groups similar such 
that there is no observable difference between the two groups. Consequently, the selection bias in equation (A10) is 
zero because: 0]1|)0([]1|)0((]0|)0([]1|)0([  dYEdYEdYEdYE   
When covariates are included, equation (A9) becomes:  
   ]},1|)0([],1|)1([),0|)0((),1|)1(( XdYEXdYEXdYEXdYE   
                                                          
33 Note that a treatment group can have two outcomes: Y(0)/d=1 and Y(1)/d=0. Y(0)/d=1 is the outcome for the 
treatment firms when there is no treatments, which is unobservable and referred as counterfactual. By the same 
token, for the control groups, the outcomes are: Y(1)|d=0 and Y(0)|d=0. The first one is unobservable and 
counterfactual.  
34 I may observe outcome for the same firm not in violation, but its economic status (performance) certainly differs 
in the violating and non-violating states.  
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                                                                          ]},0|)0([],1|)0([ XdYEXdYE                            (A11) 
This equation indicates that the difference in mean outcomes among the treated and untreated, conditional on 
X, is equal to the ATT plus the selection bias term.  
Heckman (1979) Two Stage Selection Model  
To account for the selection bias in equation (A9) and (A11), two approaches have been proposed 
(Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In the first approach, the biases are controlled by bringing exogenous 
variation using the inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from the choice equation. Specifically, in the first step, the choice 
of violation d is modeled as: 
                                         ii
d  *
                                                                                                                (A12) 










; in the second step, IMR1 is 
inserted to the OLS regressions. Essentially, the insertion of the IMR1 in the second stage regression causes the error 
term in the equation to be uncorrelated to the X variables, ensuring that the coefficients are estimated without self-
selection bias.  
The Propensity Score Matching Approach 
In the second approach, randomization is achieved by conditioning the treatment on a set of observables 
such that the treatment is independent of the potential outcomes, which would eliminate the selection bias 
component, i.e., E[Y(0)|d = 1,X)] = E[Y(0)|d = 0,X]. Specifically, the treatment and control firms are matched on a 
set of observables that could predict the probability of receiving treatment. The matching ensures that the treatment 
firms and control firms are similar in every dimension except for one group receiving treatment and another group 
not receiving treatment. Consequently, the difference in the outcomes between the two groups can be readily 
attributed to the treatment.
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Appendix D: Disclosure Example of the Loan Information and the Corresponding 
Violation (SEC 10Q Excerpt) 
 
Company Name: Aeroflex Inc 
SEC Central Index Key (CIK): 0000002601 
Violation Date: June 30, 2002 
 
“As of February 25, 1999, we replaced a previous agreement with a revised revolving credit, term loan and 
mortgage agreement with two banks which is secured by substantially all of our assets not otherwise encumbered. 
The agreement provided for a revolving credit line of $23.0 million, a term loan of $20.0 million and a mortgage on 
our Plainview property for $4.5 million. The revolving credit loan facility expires in December 2002.” 
 
“The terms of the revolving credit, term loan and mortgage agreement require compliance with certain covenants 
including minimum consolidated tangible net worth and pre-tax earnings, maintenance of certain financial 
ratios, imitations on capital expenditures and indebtedness and prohibition of the payment of cash dividends. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the Measurement Period for Change in Conservatism 
This figure shows the timeline of the measurement for Change in Conservatism. All firm-quarters are 





Figure 2: Selection of Non-violating Firm-Quarters  
This figure shows the timeline of selecting non-violating firm-quarters. The “quarter end date” 
(Compustat: datadate) for each non-violating quarter is identified as a “violating” quarter if the 
observation satisfies the following three criteria: 1) the quarter end is after January 1, 1998 or the loan 
initiation date (referred as “starting date”), whichever is later; 2) the quarter end date is before December 
31, 2007 or the loan maturity date, whichever is earlier; 3) the distance between the quarter end date and 





Figure 3: Violators’ Debt Issuance around the Quarter of Covenant Violations 
This figure shows the violators’ debt issuing activities around the quarter of covenant violation (td_count 
=0). The line connected by triangles represents the debt issuing activities of violating firms with change 
in conservatism (Chg_CCM) greater than the median of the sample (chg =1). The line connected by 
circles represents the debt issuing activities of the violating firms with the change in conservatism 
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Figure 4: Violators’ Investing Activities around the Quarter of Covenant Violations 
This figure shows the violating firms’ investing activities around the quarter of covenant violation 
(td_count =0). The line connected by triangles represents the capital expenditures of the violating firms 
with change in conservatism (Chg_CCM ) greater than the median of the sample(chg = 1). The line 
connected by circles represents the capital expenditures of the violating firms with the change in 







































Figure 5: Violators Gross Margin around the Quarter of Covenant Violations  
This figure shows the violating firms’ gross margin around the quarter of covenant violation (td_count 
=0). The line connected by triangles represents the gross margin of the violating firms with change in 
conservatism (Chg_CCM ) greater than the median of the sample (chg = 1). The line connected by circles 
represents the gross margin of the violating firms with the change in conservatism (Chg_CCM ) below the 
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Table 1 Sample Selection  
A: The Dealscan Loan Sample 
      
Criteria Loans Deals Firms 
(A1) Dealscan loan (1996-2006)
1
 30,530      
(A2) Loans with GVKEY identified through the Chava 
and Roberts (2008) Link  
  20,049  13,735  4,829  
A(3) Loans with tenor, pricing, financial covenants, 
maturity date 
  10,353  6,414  3,262  
(A4) Loans that have the largest amount in  each quarter 6,351  6,351  3,262  
B: The Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) violation sample 





   
(B1) NSS violations in 1996 - 2007 16,554 3,869  
   
(B2) NSS violations in 1998 - 2007
2
 13,925  3,387  
   
(B3) New violations in 1998 - 20073 4,045  3,387  
   
C: The intersection between the loan sample (A) and violation sample (B) and Non-violation Sample
4
 












(C1) Merge the above loan sample 
(A4) with the violation sample (B3) 
and non-violation sample. For the 
violators, I require the violating 
date between the loan initiation 
date and loan maturity date; for the 
non-violators, I require the fiscal 
quarter end date (compustat: 
datadate) between the loan 
initiation date or January 1, 1998 
whichever is later and the loan 
maturity date or 2007/12/31, 
whichever is early. 
1,180  1,098  1,180  2,711  1,396  29,580  
(C2) Require the distance between 
loan initiation and violation to be 
equal to or greater than 4 quarters 
and data available to calculate 
change in conservatism using three 
different measures 
478  455  478  1,046  634  8,432  
(C3) Require the number of 
quarters before loan initiation to be 
the same as the number of quarters 
between loan initiation and 
covenant violation  
411  391  411  1,003  611  7,065  
(C4)Require the financial variables 
to be available 




I require the loan initiation date beginning in 1996 because violation data is only available from 1996 and onward. I 
am not able to determine if a loan initiated before 1996 is violated since there is no violation information available. 
2
 The violation sample starts in 1998 because I require the violation to be a new violation (see definition about new 
violation below).  
3
 New violation is defined as a violation-quarter in which there is no disclosure of any violation in the preceding 
eight quarters. 
4
 The non-violation sample is obtained by eliminating all NSS sample violating firms (3,869 firms) from the 
Compustat Universe.
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Table 2 Validation Tests of the Conservatism Measures   
  This table reports the results of validation tests examining the effectiveness of the three conservatism 
measures for the sample firms to distinguish the degrees of asymmetric timeliness measured by Basu’s 
(1997) regressions. I divide the sample firms into three equal-sized groups for each conservatism 
measure (e.g., NonAcc, C-Score, and SK).I estimate the following regressions for each group: Basu’s 
model: Et/Pt-1 = γ0 + γ1DRt + γ2Rt + γ3DRt × Rt + εt.. Et is earnings per share; Pt-1 is fiscal quarter-end 
stock price per share; Rt is quarterly returns. DRt is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if Rt is negative 
and 0 otherwise. Panel A, B, and C report the coefficients from the Basu’s (1997) regressions by high, 
medium and low conservatism measured by NonAcc, C-Score, and SK. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Coefficients from Basu (1997) regressions by high, medium and low NonAcc groups during 




Intercept DR R DR × R 
Low 0.015*** -0.001 0.030*** 0.016 
Medium 0.014*** -0.002 0.002 0.023*** 
High 0.010 0.000 -0.003 0.148*** 
      
High - Low   -0.033** 0.132*** 
(t - statistics)   (-2.79) (5.20) 
     
Panel B: Coefficients from Basu (1997) regressions by high, medium and low C-Score  groups during 




Intercept DR R DR × R 
Low 0.018*** -0.005 0.009 0.035** 
Medium 0.011* 0.001 0.014 0.086* 
High 0.010*** 0.003 0.006 0.099*** 
      
High - Low   -0.003*** 0.064*** 
(t - statistics)   (-2.79) (5.35) 
     
     Panel C: Coefficients from Basu (1997) regressions by high, medium and low SK during the period of 
1996-2007 
 
SK Groups Intercept DR R DR × R 
Low 0.015*** -0.003 0.024*** -0.005 
Medium 0.016*** 0.003 -0.010* 0.088*** 
High 0.010 -0.004 -0.005 0.128*** 
      
High - Low   -0.029** 0.133*** 
(t - statistics)   (-2.57) (5.13) 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of the Loan Sample and the Violating and Non-Violating Sample  
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the loan sample and the violating/non-violating sample with loan information 
available. Table A presents the descriptive statistics for the loan sample with company name, pricing, maturity, loan amount not 
missing (A (4) in able 1). Panel B compares the violating and non-violating sample before the requirements of the availability of 
financial data are imposed [C (1) in Table 1]. Variable definitions  are given in Appendix A. 
 
 
             
Panel A Descriptive Statistics of the Loan Sample with loan information available between 1996-2006 
  
Variable N Mean Std Median          
Loan Size 
(million$) 6351 296.595  649.320  100          
Tenor(month) 6351 41.621  22.265  36          
NumCov 6351 2.231  0.887  2          
Spread 6351 193.852  115.373  177.860  
         
Per_P 6351 0.655  0.476  1          
NoLenders 6351 7.228  8.534  4          
              
     
     
     
Panel B Descriptive Statistics of the violating/non-violating sample with loan information available 
  Non-violating firm-loans   Violating firm-loans   
Test of the Mean 
Difference 
Variable N Mean Std Median   N Mean Std Median   




Test           
(p - 
value) 
Loan Size 2711 418.389 816.438 191 
 
1180 190.630 401.925 70 
 
0.000 0.000  
Tenor 2711 43.594 23.059 41 
 
1180 46.455 20.070 42 
 
0.000 0.002  
NumCov 2711 2.161 0.874 2 
 
1180 2.353 0.884 2 
 
0.000 0.000  
Spread 2711 157.173 107.889 135 
 
1180 222.715 106.472 225 
 
0.000 0.000  
Per_p 2711 0.731 0.444 1 
 
1180 0.646 0.478 1 
 
0.000 0.000  
NoLenders 2711 9.166 9.349 6   1180 5.402 6.834 3   0.000 0.000  
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Table 4 Yearly Distributions of Violations 
  
This table presents the yearly distribution of violating firm-quarters between 1998 and 2007. The 
sample includes firm-quarters for which I have information to calculate testing variables including 
loan information, financial information, and measure of change in conservatism.  





Quarters Percentage of Violations 
1998 635 66 10.39% 
1999 735 46 6.26% 
2000 726 40 5.51% 
2001 675 51 7.56% 
2002 654 31 4.74% 
2003 648 23 3.55% 
2004 665 22 3.31% 
2005 504 22 4.37% 
2006 280 10 3.57% 
2007 117 1 0.85% 




Table 5 Industry Distributions of Violations 
  
This table presents the industry distribution of violating firms. The sample includes firms for which I have 
information to calculate the testing variables. The Industry classification is based on the two-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) code.  
    
NAICS2 NAICS Industry Number of firms Percentage 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 20 6.60% 
23 Construction 4 1.32% 
31,32,33 Manufacturing 145 48.18% 
42 Wholesale Trade 22 7.26% 
44,45 Retail Trade 23 7.59% 
48,49 Transportation and Warehousing 9 2.97% 
51 Information 10 3.30% 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 2 0.66% 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Service 13 4.29% 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management 14 4.62% 
61 Educational Services 1 0.33% 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 17 5.61% 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 4 1.32% 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 14 4.62% 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 4 1.32% 
  Total 303 100.00% 
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Table 6 Sample Descriptive Statistics at the Time of Loan Initiation 
      
This table compares firm and loan characteristics at the time of loan initiation between the violating and non-violating firm-loans with loans 
initiated in 1996-2006. This sample includes firm-loan-quarters with information available to calculate the testing variables. Variable 
definitions are given in the Appendix A. Panel A presents the comparison of the conservatism and loan characteristics at loan initiation 
between violators and non-violators. t - test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests are used to compare the difference in each variable. The unit of 
comparison is firm-loan. Panel B presents the correlation of the variables at loan initiation with the number in bold face indicating that the 
correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
              
Panel A Comparison of the Firm and Loan Characteristics between the Violating and Non-Violating Sample at Loan Initiation 
  Non-Violating  Firm-loans (A)   Violating Firm-loans(B)   Test of the Difference(A)-(B) 







Test      
(p-value) 
Loan size(millions $) 861 354.069 717.167 175 
 
312 151.771 273.709 68 
 
202.298 0.000 0.000 
Tenor (month) 861 51.071 17.385 60 
 
312 49.128 16.609 48 
 
1.943 0.081 0.071 
Spread (basis point) 861 132.886 87.048 125 
 
312 207.691 96.675 212.500 
 
-74.805 0.000 0.000 
NumCov 861 2.217 0.863 2 
 
312 2.394 0.857 2 
 
-0.177 0.002 0.001 
Per_P 861 0.828 0.378 1 
 
312 0.715 0.452 1 
 
0.113 0.000 0.000 
NoLenders 861 9.909 9.910 7 
 
312 5.462 6.070 3 
 
4.448 0.000 0.000 
Secured 861 0.466 0.499 0 
 
312 0.721 0.449 1 
 
-0.255 0.000 0.000 
P_lending 861 0.688 0.464 1 
 
312 0.554 0.498 1 
 
0.133 0.000 0.000 
Insti1 861 54.890 89.227 0 
 
312 29.782 56.419 0 
 
25.108 0.000 0.013 
Insti2 861 0.921 1.383 0 
 
312 0.843 1.384 0 
 
0.078 0.393 0.370 
Insti3 861 2.769 4.409 0 
 
312 1.500 3.157 0 
 
1.269 0.000 0.000 
Cscore_Pre 861 0.149 0.155 0.133 
 
312 0.181 0.108 0.160 
 
-0.032 0.000 0.000 
NonAcc_Pre 861 0.008 0.018 0.006 
 
312 0.008 0.019 0.005 
 
0.001 0.606 0.428 
SK_Pre 861 0.233 1.447 0.193 
 
312 0.576 1.583 0.700 
 
-0.343 0.001 0.001 
Res_Pre 861 0.048 0.080 0.013 
 
312 0.049 0.087 0.009 
 
-0.001 0.826 0.650 
CCM_Pre 861 1.212 0.261 1.198 
 
312 1.268 0.284 1.265 
 
-0.056 0.002 0.001 
Log of MV (size) 861 6.361 1.533 6.370 
 
312 5.184 1.492 5.057 
 
1.176 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 861 2.009 2.325 1.331 
 
312 2.649 3.610 1.410 
 
-0.641 0.004 0.004 
MB 861 3.014 4.551 2.132 
 
312 2.235 2.992 1.738 
 
0.779 0.001 0.000 
EBITDA (%) 861 0.044 0.024 0.041   312 0.039 0.032 0.037   0.006 0.005 0.000 
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SK_Pre CCMPre Size Leverage MB EBITDA ROA Spread Tenor 
Loan 
Size 
Per_P Secured NumCov NoLenders 
Res_pre 0.089 0.023 0.017 0.045 0.029 -0.089 0.091 -0.126 -0.089 0.055 -0.078 -0.048 -0.126 -0.001 -0.072 -0.079 
Cscore_Pre 
 
0.086 -0.044 0.239 -0.226 -0.044 0.557 0.094 0.055 0.206 -0.058 -0.151 -0.109 0.156 0.044 -0.164 
NonAcc_Pre 
  
0.157 0.631 -0.007 -0.096 0.061 0.031 -0.178 0.050 -0.058 -0.036 0.010 0.046 0.086 -0.010 
SK_Pre 
   
0.831 0.025 0.028 -0.039 -0.031 -0.168 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.039 0.028 0.047 0.035 
CCM_Pre 
    
-0.036 -0.036 0.128 0.013 -0.203 0.082 -0.037 -0.052 0.010 0.080 0.088 -0.016 
Size 
     
-0.237 0.141 0.184 0.173 -0.508 0.189 0.480 0.252 -0.419 -0.190 0.601 
Leverage 
      
-0.083 -0.175 -0.168 0.312 -0.021 -0.018 -0.074 0.174 -0.001 -0.016 
MB 
       
0.164 0.128 -0.019 0.055 0.039 -0.010 0.003 -0.028 0.079 
EBITDA 
        
0.736 -0.260 0.112 0.043 0.106 -0.116 0.073 0.063 
ROA 
         
-0.279 0.119 0.033 0.068 -0.149 0.057 0.023 
Spread 
          
-0.109 -0.243 -0.299 0.586 0.207 -0.283 
Tenor 
           
0.116 0.143 -0.040 0.073 0.211 
Loan Size 
            
0.137 -0.182 -0.184 0.590 
Per_P 
             
-0.185 0.019 0.216 
Secured 
              
0.185 -0.185 
NumCov                               -0.112 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample at the Time of Covenant Violations  
 
This table compares the firm-loan-quarter characteristics between the violating and non-violating firm-quarters at the time of covenant 




  Non Violating  Firm Quarters (A)   Violating Firm Quarters (B)   Test of the Difference (A) - (B) 






Test         
(p-value) 
Chg_NonAcc 5327 0.002 0.019 0.002 
 
312 0.005 0.025 0.002 
 
-0.003 0.047 0.234 
Chg_SK 5327 0.080 1.958 0.073 
 
312 0.126 2.046 0.208 
 
-0.045 0.705 0.556 
Chg_Cscore 5327 -0.005 0.148 -0.008 
 
312 0.000 0.110 0.004 
 
-0.005 0.446 0.022 
Chg_CCM 5327 1.566 0.240 1.571 
 
312 1.590 0.282 1.596 
 
-0.024 0.145 0.105 
Chg_Rating 5327 -0.092 1.377 0.000 
 
312 0.200 1.234 0.000 
 
-0.292 0.000 0.000 
Sizet-1 5327 3066.027 6378.577 938.152 
 
312 794.926 3305.747 153.989 
 
2271.101 0.000 0.000 
Leveraget-1 5327 0.109 0.715 0.017 
 
312 0.351 0.943 0.136 
 
-0.242 0.000 0.000 
MBt-1 5327 2.621 2.625 2.060 
 
312 1.594 2.025 1.226 
 
1.027 0.000 0.000 
Chg_EBITDA 5327 -0.004 0.020 -0.003 
 
312 -0.012 0.023 -0.010 
 
0.008 0.000 0.000 
Cret 5327 0.162 0.476 0.108 
 
312 -0.136 0.479 -0.213 
 
0.297 0.000 0.000 
Chg_Debt 5327 -0.004 0.020 -0.003 
 
312 -0.012 0.023 -0.010 
 
0.008 0.001 0.000 
Chg_Cap_X 5327 -0.003 0.049 -0.001 
 
312 -0.021 0.068 -0.009 
 
0.018 0.000 0.000 
Chg_GM 5327 0.000 0.065 -0.001 
 
312 -0.015 0.087 -0.013 
 
0.015 0.003 0.000 
Post_Ret1 5327 0.182 0.474 0.129 
 
312 0.033 0.580 -0.021 
 
0.149 0.000 0.000 
Post_Ret2 5327 0.386 0.718 0.268   312 0.175 0.912 -0.044   0.212 0.000 0.000 
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Table 8 Comparison of Firm Characteristics and Outcomes of Covenant Violations between High Vs. Low Conservatism 
Firms  
This table provides the comparison of firm characteristics and changes in debt, changes in capital expenditure, changes in gross 
margins, and post0violation returns between the high and low conservative violating firms. The firms with change in conservatism 
greater than the median of the sample is classified as high conservatism firms and firms with change in conservatism smaller than the 
median of the sample is classified as low conservatism firms. Panels A, B, C, and D present comparison using NonACC, SK, C-
Score, and CCM as a measure of conservatism, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. t - test and Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Tests are used to compare the difference in each variable. 
Panel A: Using NonAcc as a Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
  Chg_Conservatism = Low (A)   Chg_Conservatism = High (B)   Test of the Difference (A) - (B) 
Variable N Mean Std Median   N Mean Std Median   Mean Diff. 
 t-Test       
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon Test    
(p-value) 
Res_Pre 156 0.051 0.096 0.008 
 
156 0.048 0.079 0.009 
 
0.003 0.758 0.728  
Acc_Pre 156 0.021 0.026 0.013 
 
156 0.003 0.024 0.000 
 
0.018 0.000 0.000  
Chg_Rating 156 0.169 1.217 0.000 
 
156 0.231 1.253 0.000 
 
-0.063 0.655 0.543  
Size 156 5.245 1.401 5.127 
 
156 5.124 1.580 4.933 
 
0.121 0.474 0.372  
Leverage 156 2.437 3.053 1.418 
 
156 2.861 4.091 1.372 
 
-0.424 0.300 0.929  
MB 156 2.370 3.237 1.809 
 
156 2.101 2.729 1.710 
 
0.269 0.428 0.368  
P_lending 156 0.545 0.500 1.000 
 
156 0.564 0.497 1.000 
 
-0.019 0.734 0.734  
Litigation 156 0.231 0.423 0.000 
 
156 0.224 0.419 0.000 
 
0.006 0.893 0.894  
Insti1 156 29.160 51.306 0.000 
 
156 30.404 61.267 0.000 
 
-1.244 0.846 0.879  
Insti2 156 0.904 1.458 0.000 
 
156 0.782 1.307 0.000 
 
0.122 0.438 0.832  
Insti3 156 1.474 2.935 0.000 
 
156 1.526 3.374 0.000 
 
-0.051 0.886 0.449  
Chg_Debt 156 -0.073 0.377 -0.011 
 
156 -0.054 0.256 -0.014 
 
-0.020 0.591 0.525  
Chg_Cap_X 156 -0.020 0.069 -0.008 
 
156 -0.022 0.068 -0.010 
 
0.002 0.796 0.627  
Chg_GM 156 -0.019 0.085 -0.013 
 
156 -0.010 0.088 -0.012 
 
-0.008 0.410 0.236  
Post_Ret1 156 0.025 0.578 -0.044 
 
156 0.041 0.584 -0.002 
 
-0.017 0.802 0.696  
Post_Ret2 156 0.126 0.864 -0.105   156 0.223 0.958 0.078   -0.097 0.346 0.440  
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Panel B: Using SK as a Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
  Chg_Conservatism = Low (A)   Chg_Conservatism = High (B)   Test of the Difference (A) - (B) 
Variable N Mean Std Median   N Mean Std Median   
Mean 
Diff. 




Res_Pre 156 0.051 0.090 0.009 
 
156 0.048 0.085 0.008 
 
0.003 0.769 0.921  
SK_Pre 156 1.260 1.501 1.300 
 
156 -0.187 1.359 -0.120 
 
1.447 0.000 0.000  
Chg_Rating 156 0.200 1.220 0.000 
 
156 0.201 1.250 0.100 
 
-0.001 0.994 0.539  
Size 156 5.267 1.536 5.093 
 
156 5.101 1.446 5.000 
 
0.166 0.327 0.407  
Leverage 156 2.799 3.589 1.459 
 
156 2.500 3.636 1.335 
 
0.299 0.466 0.123  
MB 156 2.539 3.385 1.918 
 
156 1.932 2.513 1.570 
 
0.607 0.073 0.009  
P_lending 156 0.577 0.496 1.000 
 
156 0.532 0.501 1.000 
 
0.045 0.427 0.427  
Litigation 156 0.231 0.423 0.000 
 
156 0.224 0.419 0.000 
 
0.006 0.893 0.894  
Insti1 156 30.583 61.525 0.000 
 
156 28.981 50.991 0.000 
 
1.603 0.802 0.900  
Insti2 156 0.833 1.334 0.000 
 
156 0.853 1.436 0.000 
 
-0.019 0.903 0.800  
Insti3 156 1.404 3.106 0.000 
 
156 1.596 3.214 0.000 
 
-0.192 0.591 0.699  
Chg_Debt 156 -0.075 0.389 -0.011 
 
156 -0.051 0.237 -0.013 
 
-0.024 0.515 0.663  
Chg_Cap_X 156 -0.017 0.069 -0.009 
 
156 -0.024 0.067 -0.011 
 
0.007 0.355 0.599  
Chg_GM 156 -0.013 0.082 -0.013 
 
156 -0.016 0.091 -0.013 
 
0.003 0.769 0.982  
Post_Ret1 156 0.008 0.571 -0.032 
 
156 0.058 0.589 -0.009 
 
-0.050 0.449 0.479  
Post_Ret2 156 0.112 0.819 -0.049   156 0.237 0.995 -0.024   -0.126 0.224 0.451  
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Panel C:Using C-Score as a Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
  Chg_Conservatism = Low (A)   Chg_Conservatism = High (B)   Test of the Difference (A) - (B) 
Variable N Mean Std Median   N Mean Std Median   
Mean 
Diff. 




Res_Pre 156 0.045 0.091 0.004 
 
156 0.053 0.084 0.016 
 
-0.007 0.464 0.055  
CScore_Pre 156 0.217 0.119 0.194 
 
156 0.146 0.080 0.146 
 
0.071 0.000 0.000  
Chg_Rating 156 0.156 1.187 0.000 
 
156 0.244 1.281 0.000 
 
-0.088 0.531 0.738  
Size 156 5.483 1.508 5.665 
 
156 4.886 1.418 4.749 
 
0.597 0.000 0.000  
Leverage 156 2.404 3.446 1.315 
 
156 2.895 3.762 1.646 
 
-0.491 0.230 0.012  
MB 156 2.597 3.668 2.036 
 
156 1.873 2.060 1.496 
 
0.724 0.033 0.000  
P_lending 156 0.571 0.497 1.000 
 
156 0.538 0.500 1.000 
 
0.032 0.570 0.571  
Litigation 156 0.231 0.423 0.000 
 
156 0.224 0.419 0.000 
 
0.006 0.893 0.894  
Insti1 156 35.551 58.298 0.000 
 
156 24.013 54.047 0.000 
 
11.538 0.071 0.123  
Insti2 156 0.897 1.420 0.000 
 
156 0.788 1.349 0.000 
 
0.109 0.488 0.392  
Insti3 156 1.744 3.241 0.000 
 
156 1.256 3.063 0.000 
 
0.487 0.173 0.069  
Chg_Debt 156 -0.037 0.229 -0.012 
 
156 -0.090 0.392 -0.012 
 
0.053 0.147 0.544  
Chg_Cap_X 156 -0.024 0.068 -0.011 
 
156 -0.018 0.069 -0.008 
 
-0.006 0.466 0.589  
Chg_GM 156 -0.014 0.075 -0.011 
 
156 -0.015 0.097 -0.014 
 
0.001 0.934 0.951  
Post_Ret1 156 0.021 0.560 -0.021 
 
156 0.045 0.601 -0.018 
 
-0.023 0.721 0.998  
Post_Ret2 156 0.099 0.868 -0.096   156 0.251 0.951 0.057   -0.152 0.141 0.144  
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Panel D: Using CCM as a Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
  Chg_Conservatism = Low (A)   Chg_Conservatism = High (B)   Test of the Difference (A) - (B) 
Variable N Mean Std Median   N Mean Std Median   
Mean 
Diff. 




Res_Pre 156 0.050 0.091 0.009 
 
156 0.048 0.084 0.008 
 
0.001 0.897 0.892  
CCM_Pre 156 1.412 0.259 1.392 
 
156 1.124 0.231 1.133 
 
0.288 0.000 0.000  
Chg_Rating 156 0.173 1.132 0.000 
 
156 0.227 1.330 0.000 
 
-0.054 0.699 0.522  
Size 156 5.292 1.544 5.091 
 
156 5.076 1.434 4.949 
 
0.216 0.202 0.262  
Leverage 156 2.751 3.564 1.440 
 
156 2.547 3.664 1.351 
 
0.204 0.619 0.311  
MB 156 2.493 3.453 1.781 
 
156 1.978 2.430 1.722 
 
0.515 0.129 0.146  
P_lending 156 0.564 0.497 1.000 
 
156 0.545 0.500 1.000 
 
0.019 0.734 0.734  
Litigation 156 0.231 0.423 0.000 
 
156 0.224 0.419 0.000 
 
0.006 0.893 0.894  
Insti1 156 34.981 65.109 0.000 
 
156 24.583 45.751 0.000 
 
10.397 0.104 0.230  
Insti2 156 0.955 1.420 0.000 
 
156 0.731 1.341 0.000 
 
0.224 0.152 0.120  
Insti3 156 1.679 3.320 0.000 
 
156 1.321 2.986 0.000 
 
0.359 0.316 0.291  
Chg_Debt 156 -0.080 0.385 -0.014 
 
156 -0.046 0.243 -0.010 
 
-0.034 0.352 0.992  
Chg_Cap_X 156 -0.021 0.079 -0.009 
 
156 -0.020 0.056 -0.010 
 
-0.001 0.932 0.556  
Chg_GM 156 -0.018 0.079 -0.013 
 
156 -0.011 0.094 -0.013 
 
-0.007 0.450 0.742  
Post_Ret1 156 0.045 0.587 -0.011 
 
156 0.021 0.574 -0.036 
 
0.025 0.707 0.728  
Post_Ret2 156 0.162 0.846 -0.006   156 0.187 0.976 -0.065   -0.026 0.804 0.741  
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Table 9 Correlation between Change in Conservatism and the Outcomes of Covenant Violation in the Violating and 
Non-violating Sample  
 
This Table presents the correlation among the variables for the violating and non-violating sample, separately. The upper 
half of the table presents the correlation for the violating firm quarters (N = 312) and the lower half of the table presents 
the correlation for the non-violating firm quarters (N=5,327). The correlation coefficient in bold face indicates the 
significance at a 5% level. 
 
Variable Chg_cscore Chg_NonAcc Chg_SK Chg_CCM chg_Debt Chg_Cap_X Chg_GM Post_Ret1 Post_Ret2 
Chg_cscore 
 
0.034 0.009 0.141 -0.034 0.151 -0.008 0.099 0.132 
Chg_NonAcc 0.039 
 
0.259 0.738 0.101 0.046 -0.006 -0.029 0.033 
Chg_SK -0.023 0.138 
 
0.833 0.120 0.029 -0.004 0.045 0.076 
Chg_CCM 0.185 0.624 0.839 
 
0.135 0.063 -0.007 0.026 0.086 
Chg_Debt -0.035 -0.010 0.004 -0.008 
 
0.045 -0.046 0.090 0.088 
Chg_Cap_X 0.014 -0.009 -0.017 -0.015 0.103 
 
0.070 0.148 0.100 
Chg_GM -0.045 0.009 0.048 0.034 -0.040 -0.002 
 
0.151 0.015 
Post_Ret1 -0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 -0.036 0.044 0.089 
 
0.666 
Post_Ret2 0.007 0.019 0.013 0.021 -0.037 -0.012 0.061 0.694   
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Table 10 The Implications of Conservatism for Debt Issuing Activities Using the OLS Model (H1) 
      
This table presents the results for the test of H1 using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model: Chg_Debtit =a0+a1Vio+a2Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio*Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ 
a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9 P_lending + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters 
prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal 
to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con - -3.554 -5.977 -5.793 0.014 0.046 0.039 -10.486** -11.041* -12.445* -0.245 -0.079 -0.131 
    (6.744) (6.697) (6.865) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (6.062) (7.118) (7.678) (0.610) (0.573) (0.582) 
Vio - -6.788*** -5.802*** -5.647*** -6.419*** -5.421*** -5.278*** -5.973*** -5.216*** -5.003*** -31.086** -30.253** -30.277** 
    (2.072) (1.978) (1.925) (1.903) (1.798) (1.752) (1.800) (1.728) (1.674) (16.887) (16.688) (16.670) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 134.208 137.648* 137.567* 1.880* 1.888* 1.907* -9.117 -9.612 -9.698 15.665* 15.767* 15.877* 
    (105.242) (105.135) (104.633) (1.340) (1.329) (1.334) (16.386) (16.173) (16.121) (9.974) (9.890) (9.902) 
Size ?   0.206* 0.145   0.213* 0.161   0.142* 0.013   0.212* 0.159 
      (0.114) (0.156)   (0.115) (0.158)   (0.112) (0.155)   (0.115) (0.159) 
Leverage -   -0.066 -0.066   -0.063 -0.065   0.010 0.011   -0.063 -0.063 
      (0.352) (0.348)   (0.348) (0.346)   (0.326) (0.320)   (0.348) (0.346) 
EBITDA ?   5.970 4.107   5.176 3.351   2.204 0.053   5.355 3.502 
      (7.493) (8.145)   (7.523) (8.213)   (7.830) (8.571)   (7.513) (8.201) 
MB +   -0.059 -0.058   -0.054 -0.054   -0.050 -0.046   -0.059 -0.058 
      (0.057) (0.058)   (0.057) (0.058)   (0.056) (0.057)   (0.058) (0.059) 
Cret +   1.498*** 1.536***   1.489*** 1.526***   1.410*** 1.444***   1.496*** 1.534*** 
      (0.431) (0.433)   (0.428) (0.430)   (0.441) (0.442)   (0.428) (0.430) 
P_lending +     -0.405     -0.417     -0.314     -0.432 
        (0.451)     (0.452)     (0.442)     (0.453) 
Constant ? -0.147 -1.931 -2.448 -0.154 -2.016 -3.177 -0.017 -1.947 -3.362 0.230 -1.846 -2.766 
    (0.103) (1.350) (3.763) (0.102) (1.346) (3.892) (0.096) (1.266) (3.898) (0.937) (1.625) (4.017) 
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.024  0.033  0.033  0.026  0.036  0.036  0.023  0.031  0.031  0.028  0.038  0.038  
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Table 11 The Implications of Conservatism for Investing Activities Using the OLS Model (H2) 
This table presents the results for the testing of H2 using the Ordinary Least Squares regression model: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+a1Vio+a2Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-
1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_Cap_X is the change in 
capital expenditures from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the 
composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional 
predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con ? -2.336 -6.022 -5.901 -0.043 -0.018 -0.022 0.466 0.475 0.334 -0.312 -0.320 -0.356 
    (6.682) (6.585) (6.596) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.801) (0.922) (0.948) (0.354) (0.358) (0.363) 
Vio - -1.830*** -1.105*** -1.039*** -1.783*** -1.061*** -0.996*** -1.772*** -1.028*** -0.970*** -4.701** -4.419** -4.323** 
    (0.426) (0.437) (0.445) (0.395) (0.405) (0.415) (0.391) (0.401) (0.411) (2.499) (2.467) (2.465) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 15.115 19.932 19.781 0.140  0.155 0.151 8.935*** 9.485*** 9.354*** 1.849 2.130* 2.111* 
    (21.902) (21.209) (21.006) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (4.341) (4.202) (4.185) (1.506) (1.489) (1.488) 
Size -   -0.072 -0.228**   -0.074 -0.230**   -0.057 -0.207**   -0.075 -0.233** 
      (0.077) (0.121)   (0.077) (0.122)   (0.075) (0.119)   (0.078) (0.122) 
EBITDA +   9.619 10.957   9.300  10.651   8.972 10.333   9.429 10.784 
      (9.447) (9.385)   (9.412) (9.350)   (9.428) (9.373)   (9.427) (9.372) 
MB +   -0.037 -0.025   -0.035 -0.024   -0.049 -0.035   -0.034 -0.022 
      (0.040) (0.040)   (0.040) (0.040)   (0.044) (0.045)   (0.040) (0.040) 
Leverage -   0.032* 0.016   0.031 0.015   0.026 0.011   0.033* 0.017 
      (0.019) (0.017)   (0.019) (0.017)   (0.016) (0.015)   (0.020) (0.017) 
Cret +   1.618*** 1.624***   1.608*** 1.614***   1.622*** 1.625***   1.610*** 1.616*** 
      (0.213) (0.215)   (0.213) (0.215)   (0.212) (0.215)   (0.212) (0.215) 
Rating_D +   0.472*** 0.399**   0.474*** 0.400**   0.463*** 0.394**   0.475*** 0.401** 
      (0.231) (0.221)   (0.231) (0.221)   (0.232) (0.222)   (0.231) (0.221) 
Constant ? -0.300*** 0.140 2.470 -0.300*** 0.140 2.470 -0.300*** 0.090 2.340 0.180 0.650 3.020 
    (0.076) (0.793) (2.398) (0.073) (0.791) (2.403) (0.073) (0.794) (2.384) (0.568) (1.029) (2.407) 
Loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.006  0.043  0.044  0.006  0.042  0.043  0.008  0.045  0.045  0.006  0.043  0.044  
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Table 12 The Implications of Conservatism for Operating Performance Using the OLS Model (H3) 
This table presents the results for the test of H3 using the Ordinary Least Squares Regression model: Chg_GMit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ 
a4Sizeit-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_GM is change in gross margin from four quarters prior to 
covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violation. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-
tailed test otherwise), respectively. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con ? 3.007 0.809 1.967 0.161* 0.155* 0.166* -1.968 -2.837 -2.807 0.917 0.739 0.86 
    (9.221) (9.450) (9.157) (0.085) (0.087) (0.085) (1.650) (1.891) (1.883) (0.660) (0.631) (0.632) 
Vio + -1.453*** -0.749 -0.866 -1.452*** -0.739 -0.863 -1.458*** -0.813 -0.915 0.295 0.766 0.829 
    (0.511) (0.584) (0.575) (0.498) (0.577) (0.566) (0.500) (0.568) (0.563) (2.960) (2.988) (2.970) 
Vio*Chg_con + -5.064 -5.446 -6.779 -0.176 -0.167 -0.177 1.365 3.509 3.578 -1.122 -0.973 -1.092 
    (20.720) (20.882) (20.815) (0.259) (0.259) (0.256) (5.433) (5.267) (5.346) (1.850) (1.847) (1.846) 
Size -   0.041 0.113   0.047 0.129   -0.021 0.022   0.047 0.128 
      (0.119) (0.220)   (0.119) (0.222)   (0.107) (0.198)   (0.119) (0.221) 
MB +   0.101** 0.089*   0.101** 0.088*   0.159** 0.148**   0.097* 0.084* 
      (0.061) (0.058)   (0.061) (0.058)   (0.083) (0.079)   (0.060) (0.057) 
Cret +   1.152*** 1.161***   1.172*** 1.183***   1.120*** 1.134***   1.158*** 1.169*** 
      (0.305) (0.307)   (0.306) (0.308)   (0.314) (0.314)   (0.307) (0.308) 
Constant ? 0.008 -2.283* -0.891 0.000 -2.320* -0.871 0.004 -1.898 -0.204 -1.423 -3.478** -2.234 
    (0.137) (1.200) (4.151) (0.139) (1.209) (4.097) (0.138) (1.157) (3.911) (1.046) (1.620) (4.388) 
Loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 5639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.002 0.026 0.028 0.004 0.028 0.030 0.004 0.029 0.031 0.003 0.027 0.029 
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Table 13 The Implications of Conservatism for the Stock Market Performance (Four-Quarter Returns) Using the OLS Model (H4) 
   This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using the Ordinary Least Squares regression model: Post_Ret1it =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Post_ret1 is the raw returns over four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of 
the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables 
are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-
tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
    NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
  
Predicted 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_con ? 0.236 0.032 -0.016 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.028 0.079 0.068 0.020 0.011 0.005 
    (0.586) (0.530) (0.522) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) 
Vio + -0.146*** -0.162*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.167*** -0.158*** -0.149*** -0.164*** -0.155*** -0.203 -0.276 -0.269 
    (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.214) (0.208) (0.208) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -0.913 -0.762 -0.717 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.550** 0.597*** 0.587*** 0.034 0.070 0.071 
    (1.617) (1.581) (1.579) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.300) (0.294) (0.292) (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) 
Size -   -0.030*** -0.041***   -0.029*** -0.041***   -0.028*** -0.038***   -0.029*** -0.041*** 
      (0.007) (0.011)   (0.007) (0.011)   (0.007) (0.011)   (0.007) (0.011) 
Leverage -   -0.005 -0.006   -0.005 -0.006   -0.005 -0.006   -0.005 -0.006 
      (0.009) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.008) 
MB -   -0.009*** -0.008***   -0.010*** -0.008***   -0.011*** -0.010***   -0.010*** -0.008*** 
      (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant   0.182*** 0.159** 0.274 0.182*** 0.159** 0.270 0.182*** 0.150** 0.252 0.150** 0.141 0.266 
    (0.011) (0.075) (0.204) (0.011) (0.075) (0.203) (0.011) (0.075) (0.205) (0.070) (0.102) (0.214) 
                            
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.005 0.075 0.075 0.005 0.075 0.076 0.005 0.077 0.077 0.005 0.075 0.075 
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Table 14 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Eight Quarter Returns) Using the OLS Model (H4) 
   This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using the Ordinary Least Squares regression model: Post_Ret2it =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Post_ret2 is the raw stock returns over eight quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is 
one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other 
variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
    NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
  
Predicted 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_con + 0.699 0.238 0.162 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.033 0.128 0.095 0.062 0.017 0.006 
    (1.077) (0.980) (0.964) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.152) (0.156) (0.155) (0.084) (0.078) (0.076) 
Vio + -0.216*** -0.270*** -0.245*** -0.216*** -0.273*** -0.248*** -0.212*** -0.265*** -0.242*** -0.557* -0.666** -0.636* 
    (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) (0.333) (0.322) (0.324) 
Vio*Chg_con + 0.496 0.265 0.249 0.029 0.039* 0.039* 1.065*** 1.003*** 0.974*** 0.216 0.250 0.247 
    (2.379) (2.283) (2.272) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.468) (0.449) (0.447) (0.216) (0.210) (0.211) 
Size -   -0.060*** -0.096***   -0.060*** -0.096***   -0.057*** -0.092***   -0.060*** -0.096*** 
      (0.012) (0.020)   (0.012) (0.020)   (0.013) (0.021)   (0.012) (0.020) 
Leverage -   -0.004 -0.008   -0.004 -0.008   -0.005 -0.009   -0.004 -0.008 
      (0.016) (0.014)   (0.016) (0.014)   (0.015) (0.013)   (0.016) (0.014) 
MB -   -0.013** -0.010*   -0.013** -0.010*   -0.016*** -0.012*   -0.013** -0.010* 
      (0.007) (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant ? 0.385*** 0.144 0.476 0.386*** 0.143 0.461 0.386*** 0.130 0.440 0.289** 0.116 0.457 
    (0.021) (0.122) (0.375) (0.022) (0.122) (0.374) (0.022) (0.121) (0.374) (0.129) (0.175) (0.385) 
                            
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.004  0.109  0.113  0.005  0.110  0.114  0.005  0.111  0.115  0.005  0.110  0.114  
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Table 15 The Probit Regression Results to Predict the Probability of Violation 
This table presents the Probit regression results for the model predicting the probability of violation: Pr (Vio=1) 
= F(Chg_conit-1, Con_preit-1, Res_preit-1 , Loan Sizeit-n, Tenorit-n, NumCovit-n, Spreadit-n, Per_Pit-n, NoLendersit-n, 
Sizeit-n , MBit-n, Chg_leverage it-1, Chg_ROAit-1, chg_EBITDAit-1, Cretit-1). The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable Vio, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters and 0 otherwise. Chg_Con is change in conservatism. 
Conservatism is measured by three conservatism measures (NonAcc, SK, and C-Score) and the composite 
measure of the three measures. Subscript t-n indicates that the variable is measured at the year of loan initiation. 
Subscript t-1 indicates that the variable is measured as the average over four quarters prior to the violation 
quarter. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented in the 
parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-
tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_con + 0.157 0.519*** 0.178 0.558*** 
    (0.176) (0.180) (0.189) (0.198) 
Con_pre ? -3.039 0.271*** 1.157 0.978*** 
    (5.189) (0.066) (0.831) (0.315) 
Res_pre ? -0.953 -1.285 -0.989 -1.143 
    (1.228) (1.250) (1.223) (1.219) 
Loan Size + -0.019 0.005 -0.002 -0.067 
    (0.129) (0.132) (0.130) (0.129) 
Tenor ? -0.014** -0.015** -0.013** -0.013** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
NoCov + 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.025 
    (0.105) (0.106) (0.104) (0.106) 
Spread + 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Per Pricing - 0.184 0.205 0.162 0.175 
    (0.240) (0.247) (0.242) (0.242) 
NoLenders - -0.029* -0.033** -0.029* -0.028* 
    (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
P_lending - -0.091 -0.123 -0.071 -0.139 
    (0.206) (0.213) (0.209) (0.208) 
Size - -0.215*** -0.248*** -0.198** -0.136* 
    (0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) 
Chg_Leverage + 0.114 0.086 0.118 0.034 
    (0.106) (0.103) (0.105) (0.106) 
MB - -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.070*** 
    (0.020) (0.022) (0.032) (0.021) 
Chg_Roa - 7.121 8.566 6.866 8.675 
    (5.529) (5.359) (5.428) (5.357) 
Chg_Ebitda - -29.110*** -31.006*** -28.253*** -30.303*** 
    (6.392) (6.403) (6.367) (6.334) 
Cret - -1.415*** -1.386*** -1.407*** -1.391*** 
    (0.241) (0.235) (0.239) (0.234) 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Pseudo. R2   0.249 0.259 0.249 0.255 
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Table 16 The Implications of Conservatism for Debt Issuance Activities Using the Heckman 
Selection (Heckman, 1979) Model 
This table presents the results using the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Chg_Debt =a0+b0IMR1+ a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ 
a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + 
ηit . IMR1 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the first stage regression presented in Table 15; 
Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters prior to covenant violations to four quarters after 
covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is 
an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other 
variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional 
predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? 7.816*** 6.995*** 7.005*** 8.907*** 
    (2.307) (2.041) (2.173) (2.384) 
Chg_Con - 0.418 0.008 -1.872* -0.240 
    (7.304) (0.072) (1.229) (0.588) 
Vio - -28.921*** -25.822*** -25.833*** -56.400*** 
    (8.344) (7.288) (7.699) (21.386) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 151.253* 1.831* -7.468 15.762* 
    (105.121) (1.309) (16.091) (9.706) 
Size ? 0.013 0.052 -0.053 -0.001 
    (0.159) (0.163) (0.161) (0.160) 
Leverage - -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 0.004 
    (0.316) (0.315) (0.317) (0.301) 
EBITDA ? -10.634 -11.048 -8.735 -14.333 
    (9.540) (9.646) (9.275) (9.972) 
MB + -0.060 -0.054 -0.004 -0.055 
    (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) 
Cret + -0.077 0.118 0.042 -0.277 
    (0.580) (0.523) (0.564) (0.593) 
P_lending + -0.287 -0.276 -0.250 -0.328 
    (0.449) (0.448) (0.445) (0.452) 
Constant ? 0.797 -0.544 0.841 1.249 
    (3.613) (3.618) (3.626) (3.739) 
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.044 0.046 0.037 0.052 
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Table17 The Implications of Conservatism for Investing Activities Using the Heckman Selection 
(Heckman, 1979) Model 
This table presents the results using inverse Mills’ ratio to correct the selection bias in the following 
model: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+b0IMR1 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 
+ a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry 
Indicators + ηit. IMR1 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the first stage regression presented in 
Table 15; Chg_Cap_X is change in capital expenditures from four quarters prior to covenant violation to 
four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the 
composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 
otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? 1.710 1.367 1.798* 1.285 
    (1.075) (0.899) (1.060) (0.895) 
Chg_con ? -4.517 -0.029 0.185 -0.379 
    (6.676) -0.040 (0.962) (0.365) 
Vio - -6.104** -4.987** -6.275*** -8.063*** 
    (3.226) (2.673) (3.163) (3.552) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 22.469 0.139 9.450*** 2.090* 
    (20.954) (0.196) (4.185) (1.501) 
Size - -0.338*** -0.329*** -0.327*** -0.328*** 
    (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.140) 
EBITDA + 8.192 8.286 7.549 8.615 
    (8.878) (8.992) (8.868) (9.127) 
MB + -0.021 -0.019 -0.026 -0.018 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.039) 
Leverage - 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.012 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Cret + 1.260*** 1.328*** 1.242*** 1.345*** 
    (0.303) (0.273) (0.302) (0.272) 
Rating_D + 0.363* 0.373** 0.364* 0.380** 
    (0.221) (0.220) (0.222) (0.220) 
Constant ? 3.747 3.529 3.691 4.104* 
    (2.291) (2.286) (2.257) (2.332) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.046  0.045  0.048  0.046  
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Table 18 The Implications of Conservatism for Operating Performance Using the Heckman 
Selection (Heckman, 1979) Model 
This table presents the results using the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Chg_GMit =a0+b0IMR1 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . IMR1 is the inverse 
Mills’ ratio obtained from the first stage regression presented in Table 15. Chg_GM is change in gross 
margin from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con 
is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 
1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test 
otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? -3.760** -2.454 -3.332* -3.603** 
    (1.794) (1.765) (1.906) (1.664) 
Chg_Con ? -0.636 0.181** -2.590 0.934 
    (9.161) (0.090) (1.820) (0.636) 
Vio + 10.240** 5.969 8.888* 11.319** 
    (5.454) (5.371) (5.745) (6.102) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -13.598 -0.145 3.365 -1.054 
    (21.295) (0.252) (5.490) (1.855) 
Size - 0.296 0.358 0.197 0.305 
    (0.268) (0.269) (0.258) (0.263) 
MB + 0.096* 0.147*** 0.147** 0.089* 
    (0.059) (0.057) (0.079) (0.058) 
Cret + 1.985*** 1.889*** 1.866*** 1.951*** 
    (0.488) (0.467) (0.505) (0.464) 
Constant ? -2.996 -1.300 -2.119 -4.359 
    (4.517) (4.979) (4.357) (4.745) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.034  0.046  0.035  0.034  
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Table 19 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Four-Quarter Returns) 
Using the Heckman Selection Model 
This table presents the results using the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) to correct the selection bias in the 
following model Post_Ret1it =a0+b0IMR1 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit.  IMR1 is the 
inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the first stage regression presented in Table 15. Post_ret1 is the raw 
stock returns over four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism 
measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-
quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? -0.040 -0.025 -0.033 -0.024 
    (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) 
Chg_con + -0.032 0.000 0.066 0.005 
    (0.521) (0.005) (0.071) (0.042) 
Vio + -0.035 -0.085 -0.060 -0.200 
    (0.174) (0.166) (0.168) (0.258) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -0.824 0.017 0.576** 0.072 
    (1.590) (0.017) (0.293) (0.131) 
Size - -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.047*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage - -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
MB - -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant ? 0.310 0.313 0.290 0.309 
    (0.203) (0.201) (0.203) (0.212) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.076  0.077  0.078  0.076  
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Table 20 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Eight-Quarter Returns) 
Using the Heckman Selection (Heckman, 1979) Model 
This table presents the results using the inverse Mills’ ratio to correct the selection bias in the following 
model Post_Ret2it =a0+b0IMR1 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + a5MBit-1 + 
a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit.  IMR1 is the inverse Mills’ 
ratio obtained from the first stage regression presented in Table 15. Post_ret2 is the raw stock returns over 
eight quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the 
composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. 
Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? -0.128 -0.123 -0.123 -0.101 
    (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.096) 
Chg_con + 0.105 -0.001 0.090 0.007 
    (0.960) (0.009) (0.153) (0.076) 
Vio + 0.130 0.106 0.115 -0.342 
    (0.280) (0.268) (0.273) (0.414) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -0.083 0.041* 0.947*** 0.247 
    (2.306) (0.029) (0.451) (0.211) 
Size - -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.105*** 
    (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Leverage - -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
MB - -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Constant ? 0.513 0.504 0.478 0.506 
    (0.371) (0.369) (0.371) (0.381) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.116  0.117  0.118  0.116  
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Table 21 The Implications of Conservatism for Debt Issuing Activities Using the Propensity Score 
Matching Approach 
This table presents the results for the testing of H1 using the model: Chg_Debt =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 
+ a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year 
Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters prior to 
covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism 
measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-
quarters and 0 for the matched non-violating control sample (matched by propensity score). Definitions of 
other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the 
estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for 
directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con - -2.562 0.776* -1.420 -2.630*** 
    (29.648) (0.547) (1.593) (1.180) 
Vio - -4.763*** -5.230*** -1.514*** -8.074*** 
    (1.836) (1.882) (0.515) (2.598) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 126.551* 1.265 7.239* 4.890*** 
    (93.613) (1.186) (5.324) (1.796) 
Size ? -1.913** 0.335 -0.859** -0.042 
    (0.901) (1.277) (0.344) (0.280) 
EBITDA ? 4.087 -40.373 -8.919 11.254 
    (22.207) (30.872) (13.001) (14.611) 
MB + -0.012 -0.113 0.110 -0.116 
    (0.410) (0.287) (0.218) (0.175) 
Leverage - -4.352*** -2.774*** -0.583*** -0.006 
    (1.735) (0.979) (0.199) (0.155) 
Cret + 3.261* -0.011 0.623 0.795* 
    (2.090) (2.529) (0.640) (0.616) 
P_lending + 1.993 4.337*** 1.161* 1.008* 
    (2.133) (1.843) (0.737) (0.701) 
Constant ? 25.373*** 22.520*** -2.054 3.997 
    (9.650) (8.680) (6.351) (4.061) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   582 566 578 572 
# of Firms   443 431 438 440 
Adj. R2   0.112  0.100  0.092  0.060 
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Table 22 The Implications of Conservatism for Investing Activities Using the Propensity Score 
Matching Approach 
This table presents the results for the testing of H2 using the model: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+a1Vio+a2 
Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ 
a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_Cap_X is change in 
capital expenditures from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant 
violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an 
indicator variable, equal to one for the violating firm-quarters and 0 for the matched non-violating control 
sample (matched by propensity score). Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), 
respectively 




NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_con ? (3.528) (0.085) -1.362 -0.247 
    (14.360) (0.166) (2.170) (0.858) 
Vio - -1.056** -1.266*** -1.427*** -3.578* 
    (0.583) (0.487) (0.501) (2.246) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 15.923 0.282 11.231*** 2.005* 
    (25.092) (0.264) (4.824) (1.503) 
Size - -0.254 -0.583* -0.561* -0.572** 
    (0.438) (0.436) (0.378) (0.293) 
EBITDA + 30.885* 28.828 2.421 23.48 
    (24.017) (29.290) (14.004) (26.141) 
MB + -0.264 -0.447 -0.007 -0.195 
    (0.308) (0.323) (0.103) (0.221) 
Leverage - 0.106 -0.160 0.006 0.104 
    (0.179) (0.179) (0.151) (0.162) 
Cret + 1.888*** -0.054 0.214 0.232 
    (0.876) (0.792) (0.630) (0.674) 
Rating_D + 0.883 1.540** 0.407 1.109* 
    (0.725) (0.823) (0.677) (0.691) 
Constant ? 1.752 4.467 8.330*** 2.264 
    (3.878) (3.309) (3.198) (3.359) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   578 564 575 568 
# of Firms   439 429 435 437 
Adj. R2   0.039  0.016  0.056  0.043 
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Table 23 The Implications of Conservatism for Operating Performance Using the Propensity Score 
Matching Approach 
This table presents the results for the testing of H3 using the model: Chg_GMit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 
+ a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4Sizeit-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry 
Indicators + ηit . Chg_GM is change in gross margin from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four 
quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite 
measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to one for the violating firm-quarters and 0 for the matched 
non-violating control sample (matched by propensity score). Definitions of other variables are given in 
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-
tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con ? 1.002 0.007 0.009 0.090* 
    (1.035) (0.011) (0.053) (0.054) 
Vio + -0.047** -0.071*** -0.045** 0.044 
    (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.087) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -1.212 -0.009 0.028 -0.064 
    (1.170) (0.012) (0.123) (0.064) 
Size - -0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.001 
    (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) 
MB + 0.009** 0.002 0.003 0.003 
    (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cret ? 0.024 0.028 -0.017 -0.001 
    (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) (0.024) 
Constant ? 0.218* 0.301* 0.184 0.043 
    (0.123) (0.179) (0.169) (0.104) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   580 564 578 570 
# of Firms   442 430 438 440 
Adj. R2   0.030  0.065  0.030  0.049  
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Table 24 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Four-Quarter Returns) 
Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach 
This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using the model: Post_Ret1it =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 
+ a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4Sizeit-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry 
Indicators + ηit. Post_ret1 is the raw stock returns over four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con 
is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 
one for the violating firm-quarters and 0 for the matched non-violating control sample (matched by 
propensity score). Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con ? -0.033 -5.203*** 0.409** -0.203 
    (0.022) (1.581) (0.166) (0.133) 
Vio + -0.163*** -0.124** -0.166*** -0.508** 
    (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.244) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 0.065*** 3.544** 0.141 0.260* 
    (0.027) (2.071) (0.362) (0.171) 
Size - -0.019 -0.049* -0.008 -0.007 
    (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026) 
MB - -0.008 0.005 -0.011 -0.018* 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Leverage - -0.013 -0.001 0.023 -0.003 
    (0.030) (0.037) (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant ? -0.528* -0.029 -0.258 0.288 
    (0.282) (0.213) (0.228) (0.320) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   566 582 578 572 
# of Firms   431 443 438 440 
Adj. R2   0.077  0.116  0.119  0.060  
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Table 25 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Eight Quarter Returns) 
Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach 
This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using model: Post_Ret2it =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + 
a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry 
Indicators + ηit. Post_ret2 is the raw stock returns over four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is 
one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 
one for the violating firm-quarters and 0 for the matched non-violating control sample (matched by 
propensity score). Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and presented below the estimates.   ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con ? -6.079*** -0.043 0.742 -0.265 
    (1.862) (0.034) (0.456) (0.183) 
Vio + -0.119 -0.309*** -0.274*** -0.759** 
    (0.080) (0.082) (0.083) (0.343) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 6.548*** 0.076** 0.461 0.437** 
    (2.811) (0.044) (0.672) (0.246) 
Size - -0.035 -0.008 0.036 0.024 
    (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.041) 
MB - -0.005 -0.022 -0.027* -0.020 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Leverage - 0.014 -0.006 0.001 0.016 
    (0.063) (0.053) (0.038) (0.048) 
Constant ? -0.335 -0.890* -0.952** -0.004 
    (0.408) (0.455) (0.401) (0.469) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   582 566 578 572 
# of Firms   443 431 438 440 
Adj. R2   0.064  0.069  0.103  0.070  
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Table 26 The Probit Regression Results to Predict the Probability of Change in Conservative 
Reporting 
This table presents the Probit regression results for the model used to predict the probability of change in 
conditional conservative reporting with inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR1) calculated from the first stage modeling 
the probability of violation. The Probit model predicting the probability of change in conditional 
conservatism is: Pr (Chg=1) = F (IMR1, ConPreit-n, ResPreit-n, Leverageit-n, Sizeit-n, MBit-n, P_lendingit-n, 
Litigationit-n, ChgRatingit-1, Insti1it-n, Insti2it-n, Insti3it-n, Year Indicator, Industry Indicator). The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable Chg, equal to 1 if change in conditional conservatism is above the median 
of the sample, and 0 otherwise. IMR1 is the inverse Mills’ ratio from the probability model presented in 
Table 15. ConPre is the pre-contracting conditional conservatism. Conditional conservatism is measured by 
three conservatism measures (NonAcc, SK, C-Score) and a composite measure. Res_pre is a measure of 
unconditional conservatism at the time of loan initiation. Subscript t-n indicates that the variable is 
measured at the quarter of loan initiation. Subscript t-1 indicates that the variable is measured at the quarter 
of covenant violation. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and presented in the parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR1 ? -0.001 -0.026 0.016 -0.002 
    (0.057) (0.061) (0.054) (0.059) 
Con_Pre - -109.991*** -1.103*** -17.386*** -5.963*** 
    (11.298) (0.063) (3.504) (0.418) 
Res_pre - -2.124*** 0.267 1.191 -1.264* 
    (1.019) (0.844) (1.061) (0.950) 
MB - -0.018 0.000 0.341*** 0.032* 
    (0.019) (0.018) (0.146) (0.023) 
Leverage ? -0.018 -0.009 0.013 0.023 
    (0.026) (0.031) (0.039) (0.033) 
Size ? -0.025 0.079 -0.790*** -0.052 
    (0.063) (0.064) (0.154) (0.065) 
P_lending ? -0.153 0.208 -0.322* 0.059 
    (0.180) (0.164) (0.173) (0.164) 
Chg_rating ? -0.038 0.134*** 0.107** 0.085* 
    (0.053) (0.055) (0.064) (0.059) 
Insti1 + -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Insti2 + 0.010 -0.015 0.017 0.034 
    (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.061) 
Insti3 + 0.007 0.010 -0.008 0.001 
    (0.040) (0.038) (0.046) (0.038) 
Litigation + 0.277 -0.218 -0.188 -0.158 
    (0.223) (0.177) (0.229) (0.206) 
Constant ? 4.317*** 0.043 24.287 8.329*** 
    (1.576) (0.722) 0.000  (0.955) 
            
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Pseudo. R2   0.204 0.265 0.195 0.236 
144 
Table 27 The Implications of Conservatism for Debt Issuing Activities Using the Double Selection 
Model 
This table presents the results using the double selection approach with  the inclusion of the second inverse 
Mills’ ratio (IMR2) estimated from the model presented in Table 26  to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Chg_Debt =a0+b0IMR2+ a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-
1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+  Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. 
Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after 
covenant violations. IMR2 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the Probit model in Table 26; Chg_Con 
is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 
for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test 
otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR2 ? -0.029 -0.260* 0.141 -0.154 
    (0.162) (0.140) (0.134) (0.152) 
Chg_Con - -4.841 0.139* -1.928* 0.393 
    (8.059) (0.096) (1.460) (0.817) 
Vio - -5.688*** -5.253*** -5.115*** -30.161** 
    (1.932) (1.753) (1.686) (16.625) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 137.631* 1.900* -8.486 15.788* 
    (104.125) (1.331) (16.268) (9.868) 
Size ? 0.301 0.311 0.243 0.317* 
    (0.187) (0.191) (0.188) (0.192) 
Leverage - -0.037 -0.034 -0.036 -0.032 
    (0.337) (0.335) (0.335) (0.334) 
EBITDA ? 2.757 2.298 2.574 2.241 
    (8.199) (8.290) (8.241) (8.261) 
MB + -0.063 -0.059 -0.030 -0.062 
    (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) 
Cret + 1.553*** 1.551*** 1.508*** 1.553*** 
    (0.433) (0.430) (0.438) (0.430) 
P_lending + -0.148 -0.157 -0.147 -0.169 
    (0.435) (0.432) (0.435) (0.433) 
Constant ? -3.688 -4.349 -3.383 -4.826 
    (3.926) (4.076) (3.913) (4.454) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.034 0.037 0.029 0.039 
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Table 28 The Implications of Conservatism for Investing Activities Using the Double Selection Model 
This table presents the results using the double selection approach with the inclusion of the second inverse 
Mills’ ratio (IMR2) estimated from the model presented in Table 26 to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+b0IMR2 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ 
a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + 
Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_Cap_X is change in capital expenditures from four quarters prior to covenant 
violation to four quarters after covenant violations. IMR2 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the Probit 
model in Table 26; Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is 
an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other 
variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional 
predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR2 ? -0.079 -0.051 -0.075 -0.005 
    (0.100) (0.089) (0.063) (0.085) 
Chg_con ? -3.263 -0.003 0.538 -0.344 
    (8.016) -0.048 (0.975) (0.509) 
Vio - -1.023*** -0.966*** -0.946*** -4.286** 
    (0.444) (0.418) (0.412) (2.460) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 19.035 0.152 9.438*** 2.099* 
    (20.906) (0.195) (4.197) (1.484) 
Size - -0.268** -0.274*** -0.256** -0.277*** 
    (0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.137) 
EBITDA + 11.060 10.798 10.545 10.885 
    (9.372) (9.340) (9.367) (9.314) 
MB + -0.021 -0.020 -0.028 -0.019 
    (0.041) (0.040) (0.045) (0.040) 
Leverage - 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.008 
    (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Cret + 1.616*** 1.609*** 1.619*** 1.609*** 
    (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
Rating_D + 0.345* 0.337* 0.327* 0.339* 
    (0.219) (0.218) (0.220) (0.217) 
Constant ? 2.681 2.738 2.670 3.264 
    (2.420) (2.422) (2.391) (2.423) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.045  0.044  0.046  0.045  
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Table 29 The Implications of Conservatism for Operating Performance Using the Double Selection 
Model 
This table presents the results using the double selection approach with the inclusion of the second inverse 
Mills’ ratio (IMR2) estimated from the model presented in Table 26 to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Chg_GMit =a0+b0IMR2 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_GM is change in 
gross margin from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. IMR2 
is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from the Probit model in Table 26; Chg_Con is one of the three 
conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating 
firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR2 ? 0.160 0.114 -0.049 0.076 
    (0.117) (0.133) (0.144) (0.105) 
Chg_Con ? -3.343 0.123 -2.648 0.611 
    (10.208) (0.086) (2.085) (0.671) 
Vio + -0.864 -0.888 -0.911 0.765 
    (0.575) (0.565) (0.561) (2.967) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -5.753 -0.177 3.693 -1.056 
    (20.883) (0.256) (5.298) (1.845) 
Size - 0.105 0.130 0.018 0.127 
    (0.221) (0.222) (0.204) (0.221) 
MB + 0.086* 0.088* 0.151** 0.083* 
    (0.058) (0.058) (0.078) (0.057) 
Cret + 1.165*** 1.179*** 1.134*** 1.168*** 
    (0.307) (0.308) (0.314) (0.308) 
Constant ? -0.739 -0.887 -0.160 -1.842 
    (4.193) (4.096) (3.975) (4.386) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.028  0.030  0.031  0.029  
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Table 30 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Four-Quarter Returns) 
Using the Double Selection Model 
This table presents the results using the double selection approach with the inclusion of the second inverse 
Mills’ ratio (IMR2) estimated from the model presented in Table 26 to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Post_Ret1it =a0+b0IMR2 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Post_ret1 is the 
raw stock returns over four quarters after covenant violations. IMR2 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained from 
the Probit model in Table 26. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite 
measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions 
of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the 
estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for 
directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR2 ? 0.004 0.009 -0.011 -0.001 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Chg_con + -0.142 -0.003 0.100* 0.008 
    (0.587) (0.006) (0.074) (0.048) 
Vio + -0.151*** -0.158*** -0.153*** -0.268 
    (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.208) 
Vio*Chg_Con + -0.712 0.017 0.605*** 0.071 
    (1.583) (0.017) (0.291) (0.131) 
Size - -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage - -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
MB - -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant ? 0.332* 0.323 0.316 0.315 
    (0.201) (0.200) (0.202) (0.214) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.076  0.077  0.078  0.076  
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Table 31 The Implications of Conservatism for Stock Market Performance (Eight-Quarter Returns) 
Using the Double Selection Model 
This table presents the results using the double selection model with the inclusion of the second inverse 
Mills’ ratio (IMR2) estimated from the model presented in Table 26 to correct the selection bias in the 
following model: Post_Ret2it =a0+b0IMR2 + a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + 
a5MBit-1 + a6Leveraget-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Post_ret2 is the 
raw stock returns over eight quarters after covenant violations. IMR2 is the inverse Mills’ ratio obtained 
from the Probit model in Table 26. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite 
measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. 
Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented 
below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed 
test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
IMR2 ? -0.003 0.013 0.002 -0.001 
    (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Chg_con + 0.272 -0.006 0.079 0.008 
    (1.033) (0.010) (0.164) (0.087) 
Vio + -0.242*** -0.248*** -0.239*** -0.632* 
    (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.325) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 0.180 0.039* 0.952*** 0.247 
    (2.273) (0.030) (0.446) (0.211) 
Size - -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.104*** -0.108*** 
    (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Leverage - -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
MB - -0.009* -0.009* -0.011* -0.009* 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Constant ? 0.568 0.555 0.532 0.549 
    (0.371) (0.368) (0.369) (0.388) 
    
    
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.115 0.116 0.117 0.116 
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Table 32 Summary of the Analysis  
This table summarizes the test results presented in Chapter 5. ΔDebt, ΔCap_X, and ΔGM are changes in debt 
issuance, changes in capital expenditures, and changes in gross margin from four-quarters prior to covenant 
violations to four-quarters after the covenant violations, respectively. Post_ret1 and Post_Ret2 are cumulative raw 
stock returns over four quarter and eight quarters after covenant violation, respectively. ΔNonAcc, ΔSK, ΔC-Score, 
and ΔCCM are four measures of change in conservatism. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating 
firm-quarter, and 0 otherwise. The models used in the testing are presented in Chapter 3. While √ indicates that the 
test results support the respective hypothesis, X indicates there is no evidence supporting the respective hypothesis. 
 
  
H1: ΔDebt H2: ΔCap_X 








ΔNonAcc *Vio √  √  √  √  X  X  X  X  
Δ SK *Vio √ √ X  √ X  X  X X  
ΔC-Score *Vio X  X  √  X  √  √  √ √  
ΔCCM *Vio √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
  
H3: ΔGM H4: Post_Ret1(Ret2) 








ΔNonAcc *Vio X  X  X  X  X(X)  X (X) √(√)  X(X)  
Δ SK*Vio X  X  X  X  X(√)  X(√)  √(√) X(√)  
ΔC-Score*Vio  X  X  X  X  √(√)  √(√)  X (X) √(√)  
ΔCCM *Vio X  X  X  X  X(X)  X(X)  √ (√) X(X)  
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Table 33 The Test Results for H1 Using the Violating Sample 
  
This table presents the results for the testing of H1 using the violating sample: Chg_Debtit =a0+a1 
Chg_Conit-1 +a2Ebitdait-1+ a3MBit-1 + a4Sizeit-1 + a5Leverageit-1+a6Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators 
+ Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters prior to covenant 
violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and 
the composite measure. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
      
  Predicted Sign  NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con + 161.313** 1.708* 13.172 13.568** 
    (92.151) (1.204) (14.610) (8.000) 
Size ? 2.017 2.005 2.156 2.265 
    (2.070) (2.081) (2.097) (2.150) 
Leverage - -4.511* -4.482* -4.603* -4.858* 
    (3.380) (3.456) (3.513) (3.538) 
EBITDA ? -115.575* -123.329* -123.398* -119.087* 
    (68.074) (69.176) (68.966) (68.581) 
MB + 0.192 0.326 0.122 0.359 
    (0.800) (0.771) (0.725) (0.767) 
Cret + 6.914** 6.155* 6.475* 6.789** 
    (4.008) (4.153) (4.162) (3.956) 
Constant ? 41.108 26.160 37.867 16.760 
    (37.857) (40.123) (37.346) (40.083) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   312 312 312 312 
# of Firms   303 303 303 303 
Adj. R2   0.140  0.136  0.125  0.140  
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Table 34 The Test Results for H2 Using the Violating Sample 
  
This table presents the results for the testing of H2 using the violating sample: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+a1 
Chg_Conit-1 +a2Ebitdait-1+ a3MBit-1 + a4Sizeit-1 + a5Leverageit-1+a6Cretit-1+ a7 Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables 
+ Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_Cap_X is change in capital expenditures from four 
quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three 
conservatism measures and the composite measure. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test 
otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con + 13.904 0.198 10.434*** 1.652 
    (18.675) (0.207) (4.718) (1.378) 
Size - -1.000*** -1.010*** -0.772** -0.975*** 
    (0.429) (0.440) (0.409) (0.432) 
EBITDA + 50.766* 50.008* 47.020 50.494* 
    (34.786) (34.609) (36.893) (34.819) 
MB + 0.008 0.020 -0.138 0.024 
    (0.200) (0.198) (0.199) (0.199) 
Leverage - 0.209 0.211 0.172 0.166 
    (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) 
Cret + 1.717* 1.638* 1.691* 1.714* 
    (1.107) (1.103) (1.053) (1.106) 
Rating_D + 1.806** 1.910** 1.888** 1.899** 
    (1.048) (1.017) (1.030) (1.032) 
Constant ? 22.026*** 20.676** 23.361*** 19.448** 
    (8.021) (8.025) (8.047) (8.172) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   312 312 312 312 
# of Firms   303 303 303 303 
Adj. R2   0.080  0.081  0.099  0.083  
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Table 35 The Test Results for H3 Using the Violating Sample 
  
This table presents the results for the testing of H3 using the violating sample: Chg_GMit =a0+a1 
Chg_Conit-1 + a2MBit-1 + a3Sizeit-1 + a4Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + 
ηit. Chg_GM is change in gross margin from four quarters prior to covenant violation to four quarters after 
covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. 
Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented 
below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed 
test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con + 0.045 0.003 0.066 0.036 
    (0.344) (0.006) (0.081) (0.039) 
Size - -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
MB + 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cret ? 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.035 
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant ? 0.791*** 0.773*** 0.800*** 0.739*** 
    (0.239) (0.238) (0.236) (0.228) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   312 312 312 312 
# of Firms   303 303 303 303 
Adj. R2   0.034  0.035  0.035  0.037  
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Table 36 The Test Results for H4 (Four-Quarter Returns) Using the Violating Sample 
This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using the violating sample: Post_ret1it =a0+a1 
Chg_Conit-1 + a2MBit-1 + a3Sizeit-1 + a4Leverageit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators 
+ ηit. Post_ret1 is the cumulative raw returns over four quarter after violation. Chg_Con is one of the three 
conservatism measures and the composite measure. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test 
otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con + -0.636 0.020 0.873*** 0.132 
    (1.532) (0.016) (0.307) (0.119) 
Size - -0.013 -0.010 0.009 -0.008 
    (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Leverage - -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
MB - 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.014 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant ? 0.214 0.126 0.369 0.041 
    (0.663) (0.637) (0.638) (0.636) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   312 312 312 312 
# of Firms   303 303 303 303 
Adj. R2   0.051  0.055  0.071  0.055  
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Table 37 The Test Results for H4 (Eight Quarter Returns) Using the Violating Sample 
This table presents the results for the testing of H4 using the violating sample: Post_ret2it =a0+a1 
Chg_Conit-1 + a2MBit-1 + a3Sizeit-1 + a4Leverageit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators 
+ ηit. Post_ret2 is the cumulative raw returns over eight quarter after violation. Chg_Con is one of the three 
conservatism measures and the composite measure. Definitions of other variables can be found in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test 
otherwise), respectively. 
  Predicted Sign NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
Chg_Con + -0.357 0.032 1.251*** 0.241* 
    (2.125) (0.028) (0.509) (0.183) 
Size - 0.002 0.006 0.032 0.011 
    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Leverage - -0.025* -0.024* -0.029** -0.031** 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
MB - -0.003 -0.004 -0.023 -0.002 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
Constant ? -0.561 -0.724 -0.355 -0.900 
    (1.056) (1.065) (1.021) (1.072) 
            
Loan Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs   312 312 312 312 
# of Firms   303 303 303 303 
Adj. R2   0.079  0.085  0.097  0.086  
155 
Table 38 The Test Results for the Implications of Pre-Contracting Conservatism for the Outcomes of Violations 
This table reports the testing results using the following regression model for the violating sample: Outcome it = a0 + a1 Con_Preit-n + a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3 Con_preit-
n*Chg_Conit-1 +Control Variables. The dependent variables are change in debt issuance, change in capital expenditures, change in gross margin, and post-violation 
four-quarter and eight-quarter returns, respectively. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures (NonAcc, SK, C-Score) or the composite measures. Con_pre 
is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the pre-contracting conditional conservatism is greater than the median of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are the 
same as those control variables presented in Table 10 through Table 14. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates. ***, **, * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel A presents the results for the models using Chg_Debt, Chg_Cap_X, and Chg_GM as the 
dependent variables, respectively. Panel B presents the results using Post_Ret1 and Post_Ret2 as the dependent variables, respectively. 
Panel A 
            
  Chg_Debt Chg_Cap_X Chg_GM 
  NonAcc SK CSCORE CCM NonAcc SK CSCORE CCM NonAcc SK CSCORE CCM 
Chg_Con 274.261** 1.235 -47.477 14.483 -22.994 0.210 8.399* 1.765 -0.435 0.001 0.032 0.033 
  (136.370) (3.039) (98.584) (16.251) (15.152) (0.392) (5.060) (1.802) (0.273) (0.005) (0.046) (0.025) 
Con_Pre 9.585** 2.470 -2.002 -18.864 -0.970 0.389 -1.409 -1.743 -0.011 0.005 -0.023* 0.083 
  (4.667) (5.780) (3.589) (32.231) (0.840) (0.894) (0.944) (4.799) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.059) 
Con_Pre*Chg_Con -43.680 1.649 94.382 17.555 58.728 0.082 6.474 1.030 0.708 -0.001 0.066 -0.055 
  (227.185) (3.800) (108.942) (18.962) (40.843) (0.451) (8.980) (3.179) (0.438) (0.007) (0.106) (0.039) 
                          
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 
# of Firms 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 
Adj R2 0.150  0.132  0.125  0.156  0.084  0.075  0.099  0.083  0.079  0.070  0.086  0.077  
156 
Panel B   
  Post_Ret1 Post_Ret2 
  NonAcc SK CSCORE CCM NonAcc SK CSCORE CCM 
Chg_Con -2.229 0.035 0.850*** 0.099 -3.873 0.090 1.380** 0.252 
  (2.058) (0.030) (0.326) (0.212) (3.280) (0.056) (0.537) (0.382) 
Con_Pre -0.059 0.025 -0.034 0.200 -0.172 0.067 0.045 0.246 
  (0.075) (0.077) (0.094) (0.451) (0.118) (0.118) (0.140) (0.744) 
Con_Pre*Chg_Con 1.967 -0.022 1.535** -0.252 3.566 -0.095 3.357*** -0.244 
  (3.425) (0.041) (0.865) (0.286) (5.324) (0.073) (1.313) (0.475) 
                  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 
# of Firms 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 
Adj R2 0.050  0.053  0.077  0.073  0.086  0.092  0.118  0.089  
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Table 39 The Test Results for H1 with Changes in Debt Calculated over Two Quarters before and after Violations 
This table presents the results using the same model in Table 10:  Chg_Debtit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1 + a4Ebitdait-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + 
a7Leverageit-1 + a8Cretit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from two quarters prior to covenant violation 
to two quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the 
violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
    NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
  
Predicted 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 
1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con - 6.240 2.278 1.734 0.066 0.077 0.074 -0.920 -1.296* -1.369* 0.302 0.186 0.137 
    (7.164) (7.068) (7.119) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) -0.727 (0.904) (0.909) (0.512) (0.500) (0.503) 
Vio - -1.559** -1.040 -1.007 -1.543** -1.005 -0.979 -1.488** -0.979 -0.942 -6.055 -5.766 -5.785 
    (0.893) (0.893) (0.896) (0.852) (0.851) (0.854) (0.855) (0.855) (0.858) (5.008) (4.969) (4.968) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 10.702 14.650 14.785 0.381 0.397 0.403 5.240 4.771 4.705 2.966 3.13 3.162 
    (34.835) (34.928) (34.995) (0.454) (0.449) (0.448) (8.303) (8.489) (8.481) (3.264) (3.230) (3.228) 
Size ?   0.135* 0.064   0.140* 0.075   0.111 0.026   0.142* 0.075 
      (0.076) (0.117)   (0.076) (0.116)   (0.079) (0.118)   (0.077) (0.117) 
Leverage -   0.251** 0.239*   0.251** 0.239*   0.258** 0.245**   0.251** 0.239* 
      (0.126) (0.127)   (0.125) (0.125)   (0.121) (0.122)   (0.126) (0.126) 
EBITDA ?   10.718** 11.093**   10.662** 11.025**   10.859** 11.231**   10.636** 10.996** 
      (5.066) (5.218)   (5.109) (5.248)   (5.097) (5.232)   (5.080) (5.223) 
MB +   -0.104* -0.103*   -0.104* -0.103*   -0.079 -0.076   -0.109* -0.108* 
      (0.056) (0.056)   (0.056) (0.056)   (0.062) (0.062)   (0.057) (0.057) 
Cret +   1.286*** 1.282***   1.298*** 1.292***   1.274*** 1.269***   1.295*** 1.289*** 
      (0.368) (0.368)   (0.364) (0.365)   (0.368) (0.368)   (0.365) (0.365) 
Constant ? -0.059 -1.938** -2.764 -0.054 -1.970** -2.943 -0.053 -1.788** -2.501 -0.505 -2.245* -3.129 
    (0.093) (0.880) (2.355) (0.092) (0.876) (2.340) (0.094) (0.859) (2.342) (0.758) (1.167) (2.535) 
                            
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.001 0.011 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.011 
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Table 40 The Test Results for H2 with Changes in Capital Expenditures Calculated over Two Quarters before and after Violations 
This table presents the results using the same model in Table 11: Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + 
a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_Cap_X is change in capital expenditures from two 
quarters prior to covenant violation to two quarters after covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-




Non- Acc SK C-Score CCM 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_con ? -2.835 -6.046 -6.325 -0.036 -0.020 -0.026 0.333 0.539 0.397 -0.193 -0.197 -0.275 
    (8.464) (8.634) (8.749) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.960) (1.056) (1.090) (0.356) (0.370) (0.379) 
Vio - -1.641*** -1.056** -0.964* -1.657*** -1.082** -0.989** -1.668*** -1.071** -0.986** -2.223 -2.045 -1.937 
    (0.500) (0.503) (0.513) (0.496) (0.492) (0.502) (0.492) (0.489) (0.500) (2.297) (2.268) (2.259) 
Vio*Chg_con + -4.023 -0.584 -0.268 -0.064 -0.043 -0.048 7.55* 8.193** 8.020* 0.365 0.627 0.618 
    (24.229) (23.595) (23.376) (0.226) (0.226) (0.227) (5.013) (4.939) (4.913) (1.442) (1.418) (1.411) 
Size -   -0.098 -0.267**   -0.099 -0.270**   -0.081 -0.245*   -0.103 -0.277** 
      (0.083) (0.135)   (0.084) (0.136)   (0.079) (0.130)   (0.085) (0.138) 
EBITDA +   7.061 8.104   6.765 7.808   6.432 7.480   6.854 7.930 
      (8.882) (8.884)   (8.865) (8.860)   (8.835) (8.831)   (8.870) (8.877) 
MB +   -0.058 -0.042   -0.057 -0.041   -0.071 -0.053   -0.054 -0.036 
      (0.045) (0.047)   (0.045) (0.047)   (0.049) (0.051)   (0.044) (0.046) 
Leverage -   0.031 0.012   0.030 0.011   0.026 0.009   0.031 0.013 
      (0.022) (0.019)   (0.021) (0.019)   (0.019) (0.018)   (0.022) (0.019) 
Cret +   1.370*** 1.373***   1.361*** 1.364***   1.376*** 1.377***   1.362*** 1.364*** 
      (0.216) (0.217)   (0.216) (0.217)   (0.217) (0.218)   (0.216) (0.217) 
Rating_D +   0.508** 0.409*   0.502** 0.403*   0.495** 0.401*   0.509** 0.412* 
      (0.221) (0.213)   (0.221) (0.214)   (0.222) (0.214)   (0.221) (0.214) 
Constant ? -0.231*** 0.440 2.402 -0.233*** 0.451 2.483 -0.235*** 0.389 2.287 0.055 0.764 2.909 
    (0.079) (0.938) (2.766) (0.074) (0.940) (2.807) (0.074) (0.946) (2.776) (0.553) (1.119) (2.907) 
                            
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 5,617 
# of Firms   836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 
Adj. R2   0.003  0.017  0.018  0.003  0.017  0.017  0.004  0.018  0.018  0.003  0.017  0.017  
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Table 41 The Testing Results for H3 with Changes in Gross Margin Calculated over Two Quarters before and after Violations 
This table presents the results using the same model in Table 12: Chg_GMit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+ a4SIZEit-1 + a5MBit-1 + a6Cretit-1+ Loan 
Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit.  Chg_GM is change in gross margin from two quarters prior to covenant violation to two quarters after 
covenant violations. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-
quarters, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of other variables are given in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_con ? 21.891 20.981 22.825 0.328* 0.321 0.336* -1.325 -3.013 -3.281* 2.034 1.701 1.811 
    (20.035) (19.896) (20.047) (0.189) (0.204) (0.202) (1.879) (1.847) (1.960) (1.621) (1.491) (1.460) 
Vio + -1.101 -0.244 -0.233 -0.972 -0.073 -0.066 -0.840 -0.044 -0.010 -9.113 -8.982 -8.493 
    (1.761) (1.824) (1.884) (1.683) (1.758) (1.820) (1.672) (1.738) (1.801) (8.957) (8.967) (8.966) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 41.474 36.205 35.096 0.868 0.893 0.835 -5.467 -1.432 -1.783 5.347 5.856 5.534 
    (41.958) (42.616) (42.533) (0.842) (0.855) (0.855) (11.727) (11.515) (11.652) (5.521) (5.502) (5.486) 
Size -   -0.139 -0.373   -0.117 -0.331   -0.201* -0.484   -0.092 -0.293 
      (0.142) (0.410)   (0.138) (0.397)   (0.140) (0.429)   (0.130) (0.387) 
MB +   0.144 0.175*   0.144 0.173*   0.207** 0.247**   0.111 0.137 
      (0.115) (0.136)   (0.115) (0.135)   (0.117) (0.147)   (0.107) (0.126) 
Cret +   1.996 2.009   2.058 2.073   1.978 1.993   2.051 2.064 
      (1.928) (1.946)   (1.947) (1.964)   (1.924) (1.938)   (1.938) (1.955) 
Constant ? -0.003 0.140 13.941** 0.009 0.038 13.347** 0.029 0.558 14.560** -3.034 -2.651 10.467* 
    (0.202) (1.422) (6.514) (0.206) (1.446) (6.491) (0.195) (1.419) (6.722) (2.526) (2.720) (5.946) 
                            
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
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Table 42 The Test Results for H1 with Changes in Debt Deflated by Assets 
       This table presents the results using the same model in Table 10: Chg_Debtit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + 
a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit . Chg_Debt is change in debt issuance from four quarters prior to covenant 
violation to four quarters after covenant violations deflated by assets. Chg_con is one of the three conservatism measures and the composite measure. Vio is an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables can be found in Appendix A. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 
    NonAcc SK C-Score CCM 
  
Predicted 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con - -6.865** -8.617*** -8.684*** -0.049* -0.026 -0.028 -0.889* -0.963* -1.071** -0.707*** -0.650*** -0.691*** 
    (3.912) (3.942) (3.987) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.633) (0.603) (0.626) (0.290) (0.290) (0.299) 
Vio - -1.302*** -0.830*** -0.794*** -1.291*** -0.829*** -0.791*** -1.269*** -0.819*** -0.780*** -4.205*** -3.780*** -3.715*** 
    (0.306) (0.315) (0.315) (0.302) (0.310) (0.312) (0.300) (0.309) (0.310) (1.894) (1.843) (1.829) 
Vio*Chg_Con + 10.671 13.381 13.692 0.167 0.158 0.150 5.283* 5.079* 5.007* 1.922* 1.941* 1.927* 
    (17.606) (17.394) (17.237) (0.148) (0.143) (0.142) (3.825) (3.754) (3.750) (1.216) (1.180) (1.172) 
Size ?   0.031 -0.055   0.028 -0.058   0.011 -0.084   0.017 -0.077 
      (0.040) (0.064)   (0.040) (0.065)   (0.040) (0.069)   (0.040) (0.066) 
Leverage -   -0.043 -0.048   -0.045 -0.049*   -0.042 -0.046*   -0.040 -0.044 
      (0.038) (0.038)   (0.038) (0.038)   (0.035) (0.035)   (0.036) (0.036) 
EBITDA ?   6.879* 7.810**   6.444* 7.380*   6.433* 7.392*   6.738* 7.683** 
      (3.730) (3.875)   (3.725) (3.879)   (3.729) (3.875)   (3.711) (3.858) 
MB +   -0.007 -0.002   -0.005 0.000   0.013 0.021   0.005 0.011 
      (0.035) (0.035)   (0.035) (0.035)   (0.035) (0.035)   (0.035) (0.036) 
Cret +   0.678*** 0.682***   0.665*** 0.670***   0.659*** 0.664***   0.661*** 0.666*** 
      (0.186) (0.186)   (0.186) (0.185)   (0.186) (0.186)   (0.185) (0.185) 
Constant ? -0.165*** -0.563 1.608 -0.173*** -0.553 1.644 -0.181*** -0.436 1.912 0.889** 0.486 2.767* 
    (0.054) (0.608) (1.460) (0.054) (0.608) (1.468) (0.054) (0.609) (1.513) (0.440) (0.749) (1.602) 
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.005  0.022  0.023  0.005  0.021  0.022  0.006  0.022  0.023  0.006  0.023  0.023  
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Table 43 The Test Results for H1 with Changes in Capital Expenditures Deflated by Assets 
This table presents the results using the same model in Table 11:Chg_Cap_Xit =a0+a1Vio+a2 Chg_Conit-1 + a3Vio* Chg_Conit-1+a4Ebitdait-1+ a5MBit-1 + a6Sizeit-1 + 
a7Leverageit-1+a8Cretit-1+ a9Rating_Dit-1 + Loan Variables + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + ηit. Chg_cap_x is change in capital expenditures from four 
quarters prior to covenant violation to four   quarters after covenant violations deflated by assets. Chg_Con is one of the three conservatism measures and the 
composite measure. Vio is an indicator variable, equal to 1 for the violating firm-quarters, and 0 other wise. Definitions of other variables can be found in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the estimates.  ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed 
test for directional predictions and two-tailed test otherwise), respectively. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chg_Con ? -0.847 -1.468 -1.349 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.097 0.050 0.029 -0.010 -0.024 -0.019 
    (1.509) (1.421) (1.418) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.172) (0.179) (0.181) (0.089) (0.086) (0.087) 
Vio - 0.412 0.559** 0.544** 0.315 0.461* 0.446* 0.316 0.465* 0.449* 1.496 1.508 1.545 
    (0.263) (0.259) (0.258) (0.253) (0.248) (0.247) (0.251) (0.246) (0.245) (1.509) (1.507) (1.501) 
Vio*Chg_con + -20.320* -19.393* -19.661* 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.747 1.006 0.963 -0.768 -0.681 -0.715 
    (10.838) (10.794) (10.709) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (2.721) (2.697) (2.692) (0.939) (0.937) (0.933) 
Size -   -0.014 -0.040*   -0.014 -0.039*   -0.012 -0.037*   -0.014 -0.041* 
      (0.020) (0.027)   (0.020) (0.027)   (0.021) (0.028)   (0.020) (0.027) 
EBITDA +   0.363 1.022   0.310 0.976   0.278 0.949   0.336 1.006 
      (1.553) (1.608)   (1.565) (1.622)   (1.557) (1.612)   (1.561) (1.619) 
MB +   0.006 0.007   0.005 0.007   0.004 0.006   0.006 0.007 
      (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.008) (0.009) 
Leverage -   0.006 0.003   0.006 0.003   0.005 0.003   0.006 0.003 
      (0.013) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Cret +   0.346*** 0.343***   0.347*** 0.344***   0.348*** 0.345***   0.345*** 0.342*** 
      (0.068) (0.068)   (0.068) (0.068)   (0.068) (0.068)   (0.068) (0.068) 
Rating_D +   0.039 0.018   0.038 0.019   0.036 0.017   0.035 0.016 
      (0.065) (0.066)   (0.065) (0.066)   (0.065) (0.066)   (0.065) (0.066) 
Constant ? -0.143*** 0.240 1.085* -0.145*** 0.245 1.119* -0.144*** 0.240 1.105* -0.129 0.284 1.175* 
    (0.021) (0.242) (0.591) (0.021) (0.245) (0.594) (0.021) (0.250) (0.603) (0.131) (0.286) (0.621) 
loan Variables   No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# of Obs   5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 5,639 
# of Firms   838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 
Adj. R2   0.008  0.035  0.037  0.002  0.029  0.031  0.002  0.029  0.031  0.003  0.030  0.032  
 
